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From Paris to London, from London to Berlin, from Berlin 
to Washington is a pilgrimage among the capitals which 
differs from the traditional methods of diplomacy. This 
must be accounted for by the fact that new duties are 
imposed upon those responsible for government as a result 
of the crisis which unsettles the world and undermines the 
morale of nations. 
Pierre Laval, New York, 1931 1 
1 
"Address of the President of the Council of Ministers of France," Press Releases, 4 July - 26 December 
1931, weekly issues nos. 92-l 17A (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), 355-357. 
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Preface 
In choosing to study a controversial historical figure such as Pierre Laval -- Vice-
Premier (Vice-President du Conseil des Ministres) of the Vichy government during 
World War II -- one exposes oneself to a great deal of academic probing, eyebrow raising 
and even hostility. This would be of no consequence if it did not challenge one's 
historical objectivity. In my defense, my writing this thesis has nothing to do with 
political affiliations nor sympathies. I have no invested interest in glorifying nor for that 
matter in degrading Pierre Laval. 
In all honesty this thesis originated in jest over a moustache I once bore. My 
professor of diplomatic history, John David Treadway, jokingly remarked that my 
moustache reminded him of Pierre Laval's. I was somewhat nonplussed, as at the time 
the name "Laval" only evoked the dark years of the German occupation and French 
collaboration with the occupant. 
Nonetheless this witticism was not without consequences. Through a pedagogical 
twist I do not recall, I wrote a class paper on the role of Laval during the Abyssinian 
crisis in 1935 and 1936. That study showed me a different Laval, a man who was clearly 
aware of the German threat and thought to contain Adolf Hitler's ambitions. To do so, 
Laval needed Mussolini's support. Italy was essential to the Stresa Front, formed in 
x 
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cooperation with France and Great Britain, in 1935, against Hitler's expansionism.2 
When the Halo-Ethiopian War broke out on 3 October 1935 and world opinion turned 
against Mussolini, Laval still hoped to save Stresa.3 He sought a peaceful solution to the 
conflict. In association with the British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare, Laval drafted a 
plan, which, under mysterious circumstances, fell prematurely into to hands of the French 
press. The Hoare-Laval plan was touted as a sell out to the invader.4 The peace attempt 
crumbled.5 
2 The Stresa Conference was held in April 1935. For the text of the Stresa Agreement consult: Documents 
on International Affairs 1935, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1936), 80-82. 
Further reading: Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Politiquefranraise (1919-1940) (Paris: Les Editions 
Nouvelles, 1947). Leon Noel, Les Illusions de Stresa: L'Italie abandonnee a Hitler (Paris: France Empire, 
1975). Charles de Chambrun, Tradition et Souvenirs (Paris: Flammarion, 1952). Nicholas Rostow, Anglo 
French Relations, 1934-1936 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984). Esmonde Robertson, Mussolini as 
Empire Builder: Europe and Africa, 1932-1936 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). 
3 The Stresa Front was already shaken by the Anglo-German naval agreement of 18 June 1935 which 
regulated naval strength between Germany and England in the ratio of35 to 100. The signature of this 
agreement on the anniversary date of the Anglo-Prussian victory over France at Waterloo was a diplomatic 
coup for Hitler, as it weakened the Anglo-French alliance. 
4 Two journalists, Genevieve Tabouis and Pertinax (Andre Geraud) obtained the text. The leak(s) 
certainly came from the Italophobe faction at the Quai d'Orsay; whether it was Alexis Leger (doubtful) or a 
secretary remains a mystery. No claim was ever substantiated. 
5 For the only complete correspondence between Laval and Mussolini regarding this affair consult Benito 
Mussolini, Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, vol. XXVII, Dall'Inaugurazione Della Provincia Di Littoria 
Alla Proc/amazione Dell'Impero (19 Dicembre 1934-9 Maggio 1936), eds. Edoardo and Duilio Susmel 
(Florence: La Fenice, 1951), 287. 
For further reading on the Abyssinian crisis and the Hoare-Laval affair; see Henderson B. 
Braddick, "The Hoare-Laval Plan: A Study in International Politics," European Diplomacy Between Two 
Wars, 1919-1939, ed. Hans W. Gatzke (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972). Arnod Wolfers, Britain and France 
between Two Wars, Conflicting Strategies of Peace from Versailles to World War !!(New York: Norton, 
1966). Thomas M. Verich, The European Powers and the Italo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936, A Diplomatic 
Study (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1980). James Dugan and Laurence Lafore, Days of 
Emperor and Clown, The Jtalo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936. Dennis Mack Smith, Mussolini (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1982). 
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Damage done to the moral standing of Laval was dreadful, and some historians 
have traced the origins of Laval's collaboration with the Axis to these events.6 Such 
analysis overlooked the foundation of Laval's policy: the maintenance of a Franco-Italian 
alliance to contain Germany and to deal with it from a position of strength. 7 As to the 
immorality of an alliance between Democratic France and Fascist Italy, it was not a 
concern voiced by many until the African adventure. 
However unfortunate its outcome, the affair did show that Laval realized the threat 
represented by Hitler and sought to oppose him -- an unusual action for someone who 
would be presented as a henchman of Nazi aspirations. And this was not an isolated 
action. Laval, though anti-Bolshevik, was also part of a concerted effort to achieve 
entente with the Soviet Union, still with the intent of controlling Hitler. He even traveled 
to Moscow in 1935 and met with Stalin.8 
6 This negative vision of the role of Laval is found in V. Potiemkine's work. V. Potiemkine, I. Mintz, A. 
Pankratova, N. Koltchanovski and E. Tarle, Histoire de la Diplomatie, tome 3, 1919-1939 (Paris: Librairie 
de Medecis, 1947). While it is understandable that historians, especially Soviet ones, so shortly after the 
war failed to be objective, it is rather puzzling in the case of more recent authors. Nicholas Rostow wrote 
that Laval's dealings over Abyssinia "were steps to Vichy and collaboration after 1940;[ ... ]and to the 
crystallization of his reputation as an amoral manipulator and traitor" Nicholas Rostow, Anglo-French 
Relations, 1934-36 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984), 78. 
7 William I. Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy, the Enigma of Fascist Italy in French Diplomacy, 1920-1940 
(Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1988),167-169. 
8 William Evans Scott, despite his dislike of Laval, offered an interesting analysis of the Franco-Soviet 
Pact. Scott wrote in his preface that he offered a look at Laval "before he decided to serve his country at 
the side of the devil." Williams Evans Scott, Alliance Against Hitler, The Origins of the Franco-Soviet 
Pact (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962), ix. 
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This concern, about German Nationalism and Hitler, was already found in 1931, 
and this one of the reasons I chose to this particular period for this study. Another reason 
was because 1931 was the first time Pierre Laval served as President du Conseil de 
l'Assemblee Nationale (the Third Republic title for a prime minister). Laval would head 
three consecutive governments from 27 January 1931to21February1932. The first 
lasted until the presidential elections of May 1931; the second had to be recast in 12-14 
January 1932 because of the death of War Minister Andre Maginot. Laval's third 
government lasted but a few weeks, Laval would not return as Premier for another three 
years. By Third Republic standards, a stewardship of over a year was a long and stable 
government.9 Farthest removed in time from his role during World War II, Laval's first 
term as premier was a dynamic year for person to person diplomacy: Laval that year 
traveled to London, Berlin, and Washington and met with a number of figures of state, 
with whom we shall acquaint ourselves. Ninety thirty-one saw one of the ultimate grand 
diplomatic efforts before Hitler came to power. 
To my knowledge this is the first study entirely dedicated to Pierre Laval's first term 
as premier. The difficulties for this inquiry reside in the lack of available documentation. 
9 Governments in the Third Republic were very unstable. The executive power lay in the hands of the 
President du Conseil (premier). In order to be able to govern the premier needed a majority in the 
Assemblee Nationale. Unfortunately not one party ever gathered enough seats to secure a majority. All 
governments were supported by coalitions which would disintegrate over the slightest disagreement and 
thus cause the collapse of the government. The President de la Republique was a sort of constitutional 
"monarch," a post "given" to a deserving deputy or senator by their peers. The presidency had the authority 
to nominate the premier and a certain power of influence. For the list of French presidents and Premiers 
between 18 February 1906 and 10 July 1940 see Appendix B on page 165. For more on the Third Republic 
and the political parties in France, see Appendix Con page 168. 
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First, a considerable part of the archives of the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres 
concerning the 1930s was burned in the courtyard of the Quai d'Orsay in May 1940 so 
they would not fall in German hands. Most of the remaining holdings were evacuated, 
but were lost or destroyed in the chaos generated by the German invasion. The archives 
have since then been partially, but inadequately, reconstituted from documents held in 
France's legations. 10 The available documentation for the year 1931 consisted of a few 
dispatches from French Ambassador Paul Claudel in Washington, as well as dispatches 
from French ambassadors in Central Europe, and some undated memoranda. 11 Also, 
indelicate hands have repeatedly stolen documents despite the security measures anyone 
who has done research at the Quai d'Orsay can attest to. 12 
The lack of documentation can also be imputed to Laval himself. Laval was a 
verbal figure who wrote relatively little, which suited his taste for secrecy. 13 His 
diplomatic style reflected that as well. He preferred to talk directly on the telephone 
rather than pass through the conventional diplomatic channels. 
10 Martin de Framond and Helene Servant, lnventaire de la Collection des Papiers 1940 (Paris: 
lmprimerie Nationale, 1990) Introduction, no page number. 
11 Archives Diplomatiques du Ministeres des affaires Etrangeres, Paris. Microfilm, Serie Y: 
Internationale, 1918-1940. Copie P, vol. 61, Vues 100. Serie: PA AP 166 Tardieu. Copie P, vol. 488, 
Vues 354. 
12 Martin de Framond and Helene Servant, Introduction, no page number. 
13 Fred Kupferman, Laval 1883-1945 (Paris: Balland, 1987), 75. 
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A great offender against the search for truth was no doubt France's post-war justice 
system. The trial set up to judge Pierre Laval for his actions during the occupation was a 
tragic farce. Judge, prosecutor, and jury were all, openly, hostile to the accused. Laval 
and his lawyers were prevented from organizing a defense. They were denied access to 
the terms of the prosecution, personal archives, and any other documentation. Laval was 
also prevented from testifying on his own behalf. 
Pierre Laval refused to take part in the tomfoolery and ceased to appear in the 
courtroom. Equally disgusted, the defense lawyers followed suit. Unperturbed, the 
pretense of justice followed its course. Laval was promptly sentenced to death and shot 
just in time for the elections and referendum of 21 October 1945. 14 
The only memoirs Laval left were the notes written on scrounged pieces of paper in 
the obscurity of his seedy cell. Laval's daughter Josee gathered these notes and censored 
rebuttals and published them. 15 Unfortunately for the purpose of this thesis, these 
14 For a complete treatment of the "trial" Rene de Chambrun ... et cefut un crimejudiciaire ... Le "Proces" 
Laval (Paris: France-Empire, 1984) also by Laval's Attorney Jacques Baraduc, Dans la Cellule de Pierre 
Laval (Paris: Self, 1948) and Jacques Baraduc, I 5 Oct ob re I 945, Pierre Laval Devant la Mort (Paris: 
Pion, 1970). 
In an ultimate protest Laval swallowed cyanide the morning of his execution. Refusing to be 
robbed of their grim prize, the "authorities" had him brought back to life to be shot a few hours later at 
12:20 p.m., 16 October 1945. "Le Courier De L'Ouest A 50 Ans, Regards sur l'Histoire et notre histoire," 
Le Courrier De L'Ouest (Angers), 25 November 1994. 
15 Pierre Laval, Laval Parle, Notes et Memoires Rediges par Pierre Laval dans sa Cellule, avec une 
Preface de sa jil/e, et de nombreux document inedits (Geneve: Les Editions du Cheval Aile, 194 7) and in 
English, Pierre Laval, The Unpublished Diary of Pierre Laval, introduction by Josee Laval, Countess R. de 
Chambrun (London: Falcon Press, 1948). Josee Laval and her husband Rene de Chambrun have dedicated 
much of their lives to rehabilitating the memory of Pierre Laval. 
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"memoirs" dealt essentially with the accusations of the prosecution and little with the 
year 1931. 
This display of pseudo justice by the enemies of Laval was reckless and absurd for 
they lost the moral high ground. Even if Laval was guilty, his hurried elimination could 
only raise doubts and questions. What were the accusers of Laval trying to hide? Were 
they trying to conceal the portion of success the Vichy government had? Yes, French 
policemen arrested and turned over Jewish men, women, and children to the SS. Yes, 
there were transit and internment camps in France. Yes, the Mil ice tracked and 
eliminated the partisans. These horrors are undeniable. But a greater number of Jews in 
France escaped the Holocaust than anywhere else in occupied Europe. 16 On the whole 
France fared much better economically than any other occupied nation -- occupied being 
a key word here. 
Perhaps even more troubling was Laval's seeming awareness that serving in a 
government in France under German occupation would mean, if not death, at least 
imprisonment when France would regain her sovereignty. It meant not only danger to 
16 76,000 Jews were deported from France, less than 3,000 would return. However 254,000 or 75 percent 
of the Jews in France survived, while only 50 percent survived in Belgium and 15 percent in the 
Netherlands. On the other hand, in percentages only Bulgaria with seventeen percent or 11,500 deported, 
Denmark with 7 percent or 420 deported and Finland with only IO deported(!) fared the best in this grim 
tally. For the most complete treatment of the Jews deported from France: Serge Klarsfeld, Le memorial de 
la deportation des ju ifs de France (Paris: Klarsfeld, 1978) or Serge Klarsfeld, Memorial to the Jews 
deported from France, 1942-1944: Documentation of the Deportation of the Victims of the Final Solution 
in France (New York: B. Klarsfeld Foundation, 1983). 
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himself but also to those that surrounded him. 17 In the early days of the occupation Laval 
had sent one of his assistants, Pierre Destribatz, away to Syria, then under French 
mandate. When this assistant reported for a new assignment after the fall of Syria to the 
allies, Laval was surprised. "Quesque tu fouts la?" Laval reportedly interjected. After a 
brief discussion Laval convinced his assistant that it would be better for him to stay away 
from him, in effect saving his assistant from the accusation of collaboration and possibly 
his life. 18 Even Laval's wife, Jeanne, pronounced herself against his participating in the 
Vichy government, according to Laval's testimony after the war. 19 
Because his "trial" was botched, the responsibility of Laval, good or ill, was never 
objectively established. How much did Laval know? How could he bear the daily 
humiliations, the ruthless repression of student protests, the hostage taking, the phony 
trials, the deportations, the executions, at the hands of the occupant? If collaboration in 
the face of the disaster of May-June 1940, when Germany seemed about to win the war, 
is somehow understandable, why did he persist after Stalingrad, the allied landing in 
Africa, Sicily, or Normandy? If he had been allowed to testify, Laval might have replied 
publicly as he stated privately to his attorney Yves Frederic Jaffre: 
17 The sentiment that participating in the Vichy government was lethal was widespread. Jacques Le Roy 
Ladurie who served in the Laval government as minister of Agriculture and supplies for five months before 
entering the resistance recorded many a remark in that sense. Jacques Le Roy Ladurie, Memoires, 1902-
1945 (Paris: Flammarion/Plon, 1997), 305, 406. 
18 Monsieur Pierre Daubin, nephew of Pierre Destribatz. Conversation with Monsieur Daubin, June 1991. 
19 
"Portrait de Madame Laval par Pierre Laval" in Chambrun, Laval devant l'histoire, 384. 
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When it came to France, I have all the egocentrisms and all the ambitions. I 
wished a peace that would have left intact our territory and our empire. I 
wanted to reduce to a minimum the sacrifices imposed on our country by the 
occupation. Was it a crime?20 
In eliminating the key witness, the provisional government of Charles de Gaulle made the 
quest for truth very difficult. 
The reason I insist on reviewing this period in the life of Laval in the preface, is that 
it shaped the opinion of generations of historians. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, for 
example, in a book published in 1932, simply "regretted" that "French adherence to the 
Hoover Plan should have dragged on."21 By 1974, however, the same author, treating the 
same subject, singled out Laval for criticism. He accused him of "ruining" and 
"wrecking" the Hoover Moratorium.22 Wheeler-Bennett was, and is, not alone in judging 
the entire career of Laval through the prism of World War II. Maurice Torres wrote a 
vicious, largely unsubstantiated, indictment of Laval while in the United States in 1941.23 
Authors as David Thompson, a Cambridge don no less, then liberally quoted Torres' 
20 
"Quand ii s'agit de la France, j'ai tous Jes egoism es et toutes Jes ambitions. Je souhaitais une paix qui 
nous laisse intacts notre territoire et notre empire. Je voulais reduire au minimum Jes sacrifices imposes a 
notre pays par !'occupation. Etait-ce un crime?" Pierre Laval in Yves Frederic Jaffre JI ya cinquante ans ... 
Pierre Laval: Le proces qui n'a pas eu lieu (Paris: Albin Michel, Not published at the time this was 
written). 
21 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security Since Locarno, 1925-1931; Being the Political 
and Technical Background of the General Disarmament Conference, 1932 (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 
339. 
22 John Wheeler-Bennett, Knaves, Fools and Heroes, in Europe Between the Wars (New York: 
Macmillan, 1974), 47. 
23 Maurice Torres, La France Trahie, Pierre Laval (New York: Brentano's, 1943). 
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words taking them at face value! 24 Louise Weiss, close to Aristide Briand, never thought 
much of Laval and seemed to find evidence of base collusion with Germany as early as 
1931!25 
While it might not be possible to show Laval as he might have appeared to his 
contemporaries in 1931, this study aims to show Laval, the diplomat, as accurately, and 
impartially, as possible. Not surprisingly, in studying Pierre Laval I have found 
contradictory testimonies. When sources were reliable, I have often included all versions 
either in the text itself or in a footnote. 
Plenty has been written on Pierre Laval, but most authors have focussed their efforts 
on the somber years of the occupation. Laval's first presidency was studied, no doubt but 
no one stopped to see what Laval intended to achieve. Because of Laval's reserve, there 
probably never existed a document entitled "My solutions for the ills of Europe." 
Nevertheless, this research unearthed Laval's diplomatic purposes in the year 1931. 
Granted, it was not as "sexy" as the 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact to outlaw war. It was 
nonetheless, an answer to Europe's ills which the reader is now invited to discover. 
A portrait of a scoundrel might have been more electrifying. Unfortunately, I can 
only offer the reader a year in the life of Pierre Laval, politician, statesman and diplomat. 
24 David Thompson, Two Frenchmen, Pierre Laval and Charles de Gaulle (London, The Cresset Press, 
1951). 
25 Louise Weiss, Combats pour L'Europe (Paris: Peyot, 1968). 
XIX 
All efforts have been made to make this study error-free. Any oversights in this 
regard are solely my responsibility and in no way attributable to the editors. By the same 
token, unless noted otherwise, all translations are my own. 
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CHAPTER 
I 
FROM PUPIL TO PRESIDENT 
The year 1931 was the midpoint between World War I (1914-1918) and World War 
II (1939-1945) and in retrospect seemed far removed from both conflicts. But all who 
lived the inter-war years faced constant reminders of the War that had passed and the war 
that might be -- the peace negotiations ( 1918-1920); the occupation of the Ruhr ( 1923 ), 
the war debt negotiations with the Dawes Plan (1924) and the Young Plan (1929); the 
occupation of the Rhineland (1918-1930); the invasion of Manchuria (1931), the advent 
of Adolf Hitler (1933); the parades of the veterans; the tirades of the politicians and the 
demagogues; the missing husbands, fathers, brothers or sons; the crippled and the gassed; 
the hate and the thirst of vengeance -- nothing but an interlude between two bloodbaths. 
Even the literary world seemed unable to bring cheer to the year 1931. Antoine de 
Saint Exupery published his grim Vol de nuit, Charles Maurras peddled hate in Au signe 
de Flore, and Jean Giono expressed the tragedy of the War in Le Grand Troupeau. 1 
1 Antoine de Saint Exupery, Vol de Nu it (Paris: Gallimard, 1931 ). Charles Maurras, Au Signe de Flore, 
souvenir de vie politique,/'affaire Dreyfus, lafondation de /'Action Franr;aise. (Paris: Les <Euvres 
Representatives, 1931 ). Jean Giono, Le Grand Troupeau (Paris: Gallimard, 1931 ). 
The movie theaters played Rene Clair's bitter comedy A nous la liberte. This movie would inspire 
Chaplin's Modern Times. 
1 
Yet not all was bleak, Josephine Baker was spreading cheer over the radio waves 
with J'ai deux amours and other songs. The fabulous Exposition Coloniale showed to 
more than six million visitors the wealth and diversity of the French and other empires. 
Those who lived through these years, knew not of the War to come. War might have 
been feared but it was not unescapable. To those who lived at the time it was still an age 
of hope, and their heros were peacemakers such as Briand, Stresemann, Kellogg, and, 
yes, Laval. 
A. Childhood 
Pierre Laval was born in Auvergne in the little town ofChateldon on 28 June 18832• 
His father, Baptiste Laval, was proprietor of the most prosperous of the seven local inns, 
l'H6tel du Centre. Baptiste Laval was also the butcher and the postmaster and ran the 
only coach service.3 Through his function as innkeeper and postmaster, he could claim 
equal footing with the local notables. Culturally, however, he still belonged to the world 
of farmers and sharecroppers. Pierre Laval would develop great pride from his rural 
ongms. 
2 Gaston Jacquemin, La Vie Publique de Pierre Laval, 1883-1945 (Paris: Pion, 1973), 19. 
3 
"La maison de mes parents... C'est la qu'a vu le jour la premiere entreprise de transport de Chiiteldon ... 
Nous avions six cheveaux, deux voitures, l'une de dimension modeste, l'autre d'un gabarit plus important" 
(The house of my parents ... There, was born Chiiteldon's first transportion firm ... We had six horses, two 
carriages, a small one, the other larger) Pierre Laval in Rene de Chambrun, Laval devant l'Histoire (Paris: 
France-Empire, 1983), 16. 
2 
Pierre had two elder brothers and a sister. One of his brothers became a railroad 
employee after a passage through the seminary. The other was an army officer. His 
sister married a warrant officer and established herself in Bayonne where Laval the law 
student would stay with her for a time.4 
From his mother, Claudine, Pierre inherited his black hair, dark and almost slanted 
eyes and fleshy lips. The whole gave him a "foreign appearance" and made him an easy 
target for verbal and physical abuse from his classmates. Rather than bend, the little 
Pierre resisted and learned not only to fight but also to charm his opponents. He would 
befriend Joseph, son of the doctor Joseph Claussat, the Radical Socialist mayor of 
Chateldon.5 
A good student, he easily completed his primary studies and at barely eleven he 
obtained his Certificat d'Etudes Primaire, a success deemed largely sufficient by Baptiste 
Laval. Pierre was now to help at the inn and drive the coach to Puy-Guillaume, the train 
station of Ris or even to Vichy.6 But Pierre had greater ambitions, and education was the 
sole means to breech the social gap between farmer and notable. For four years Pierre 
would battle his father for more education. His mother and the local priest, who helped 
him with his Latin, supported him. 
4 Jean-Paul Cointet, Pierre Laval (Paris, Editions Fayard, 1993), 15, 19. Alfred Mallet, Pierre Laval, Part 
I, Des annees obscures a la disgrace du 13Decembre1940 (Paris: Amiot Dumont, 1955), 12. 
5 Kupferrnan, Laval, 1987, 11. Joseph was nine years older than Pierre. Geoffrey Warner, Pierre Laval 
and the Eclipse of France (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1968), l. 
6 Chambrun, Laval devant l'Histoire, 16. 
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The father eventually relented, and Pierre left Chateldon for the quasi-monastic life 
at the lycee (high school) in Moulins. There he did well enough to be allowed to study 
for the baccalaureat at the prestigious Lycee St. Louis in Paris. He secured the precious 
diploma on his first try on 20 July 1901.7 He had become an official member of France's 
intellectual elite. 
B. Studies and Political Engagement 
Young Pierre's thirst for knowledge was not yet quenched, he pursued graduate 
studies in Natural Sciences first in Bordeaux then in Bayonne. He sustained himself as a 
study hall monitor (pion) in lycees, a choice which led him from town to town as posts 
opened and closed. Being young, poor, "intellectual," a witness of the condition of 
workers reduced to misery by age or injury in the industrial towns of St. Etienne and 
Lyons, Pierre Laval naturally gravitated to the political left. 
In 1903 he joined a radical branch of the Socialist Party, le comite revolutionaire 
central. Laval's Socialist convictions, however, were not motivated by ideology but by 
his sense of equity and justice. That same year he was conscripted into the army. Laval 
7 Laval's grades at the baccalaureat were Composition fran~aise 14/20; langues vivantes, 10/20; explication 
frarn;aise (Chateaubriand, Mme de Stael), 10/20; histoire (Frederic II) 4/10; geographie (cotes de la 
Mediterranee), 3.5/10; anglais (Tales from Shakespeare, de Lamb), 11/20; espagnol (novelas de Cervantes), 
2/20; sciences physiques (images formees par Jes mirroir spheriques), 11/20; mathematiques (resolutions de 
triangles), 13/20. Alfred Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 14. To an American eye the grades 
may appear low but one has to know that save for the exact sciences a grade of20/20 was and is unheard 
off, outstanding students range in the 15+. It is interesting to note that Laval's English (11/20) was 
apparently not as awful as once commonly believed. 
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did not share the admiration of many of his compatriots for the military. After all, 
soldiers were often used to crush strikers, and the Dreyfus Affair, still in full swing, 
showed the ugly side of the army's top echelon. 8 In addition, at the turn of the century 
Pacifism and International Socialism were nearly undistinguishable. Pacifism was 
perhaps the only ideology Laval would ever embrace. He would serve only one of the 
mandatory two years.9 The army discharged him because of varicose veins, possibly a 
pretext for the military hierarchy to rid itself of a potentially contentious element. The 
whole experience left no discernible mark. 10 
In 1905, Laval obtained his natural science degree in botany, zoology and 
zootechnique. This degree could have brought him the security of a post of professor. 
8 The Dreyfus affair opened in 1894 with the discovery by the French Military Intelligence (Service de 
Renseignement) ofa note (bordereau) in a trash can of the German embassy incriminating a French officer. 
Alfred Dreyfus, "naturally" suspicious because he was Jewish and Alsatian, was quickly singled out and 
hastely convicted on made up charges. A year later the new head of the M.I., Colonel Georges Picart 
discovered foul play. Picart notified his superior General de Boisdeffre, and found himself immediately 
sent away to Tunisia. Under the pressure of the brother of Dreyfus, and Journalists such as Bernard Lazare, 
George Clemenceau, and author Emile Zola, the truth was revealed and soon divided France between pro 
and anti-Dreyfusards. The officer corp itself was divided and duels multiplied. Dreyfus was tried anew in 
1899, found guilty with attenuating circumstances, and then pardoned. New eruptions of violence unsued. 
The second trial was eventually nullified in 1906 and Dreyfus was reinstated. 
Under the influence of men such as Charles Maurras, anti-Dreyfusard sentiments brought anti-
semitism to the forefront of French political life. A direct consequence of the Dreyfus affair was the 
creation of Action Franr;aise and the dissolution of the Service de Renseignement,which would be sorely 
missed in 1914. Not all was negative, however, as the Ligue des droits de l'homme (League for Human 
Rights) was created in 1898. Jean-Denis Bredin, The Affair, The Case of Alfred Dreyfus (New York: 
George Braziller, 1986), 51-52, 122, 158-159. Charles Maurras, Au Signe de Flore, souvenir de vie 
po/itique,l'affaire Dreyfus, la fondation de /'Action Fram;aise (Paris: Les CEuvres Representatives, 1931 ). 
Samuel Osgood, French Roya/ism since I 870, Second enlarged edition of French Roya/ism under the 
Third and Fourth Republics (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970). Eugen Weber, Action Franr;aise, 
Roya/ism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). 
9 The duration of the compulsory military service in France was increased to three years in 1913. 
rn Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 16. 
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Perhaps because he had spent too much time within school walls, he opted to study law in 
Lyon. 
The law student bore a moustache; it would remain part of his persona for the rest 
of his life. He also took to wearing a red tie as a mark of his political affiliation. In 1908 
he passed the bar. 11 
C. Jeanne 
Still poor but now respectable, Laval returned more often to his hometown of 
Chateldon. He often visited his friend Joseph Claussat, also a Socialist, who had 
followed his father's footsteps into the mayor's seat. The visits to Joseph were spiced by 
the presence of his sister, Jeanne-Eugenie Elisabeth Claussat, a voluptuous beauty. Her 
charms were only enhanced by political savvy and superior management skills, which are 
said to be inborn among Auvergnats. Moreover she was even a great cook. 12 Pierre and 
Jeanne fell in love and were married on 20 October 1909. From all accounts they would 
remain happily faithful to each other for the rest of their lives. 13 
Laval's law degree brought him respectability. With this marriage Laval had also· 
entered the world of distinguished gentlemen. At least in Chateldon where a man was 
11 Ibid., 18. 
12 
"Parfaite maltresse de maison, elle aimait jardiner et faire des confitures dans la grande cuisine" (Perfect 
lady of the house, she liked to garden and make jams in the big kitchen). Chambrun, Laval devant 
l'Histoire, 18. 
13 This during the Third Republic when mistresses were almost an accepted fringe benefit for politicians. 
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more important than his political color, being a Socialist, did not diminish one's 
respectability, but, to mark his change in social status, Laval took to wearing what would 
be one of his trademarks, a white tie. 
Fortune did not follow, at least not right away. He opened an office on the first 
floor of a humble building he shared with a "dentist," a cobbler, a tripe butcher, and a 
prostitute. His fees were paltry, two francs per visit. His neighbor pulled teeth for 
three. 14 While Laval persevered, Jeanne made do with the limited resources. His 
Socialist ties and bargain prices gained him humble but grateful clients. Small 
entrepreneurs, furniture movers, coach and taxi drivers, and manual laborers were the 
core of his patrons. 
D. Bakunin's Portrait 
In 1911 the CGT, the Socialist labor union, asked Laval to defend one of its 
members, an anarchist who had been caught with explosives. The case for the defense 
seemed hopeless and no CGT lawyer wanted the case. Laval decided to take it pro bono. 
The prosecution made much of a portrait of Bakunin, famed Russian anarchist, found in 
possession of the accused. 15 Laval masterfully down played the accusations and 
14 Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 19. 
15 Michael Bakunin (1814-1876), Russian, anarchist theorist and plotter, very active in the 1830s and 
1840s, was arrested by the Austrians in Saxony for his participation in the 1848 revolution there. He was 
turned over to the Russians and deported to Siberia. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 4th ed., 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 364-366. 
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annihilated the prosecution's case by proving that the alleged portrait of Bakunin was in 
fact that of the accused's father. 16 Overnight Laval gained fame and fortune. The grateful 
unionists raised 50,000 francs as an expression of their gratitude. His brother-in-law 
Joseph Claussat, a deputy himself, encouraged him to take advantage of his new found 
fame and run for office. Laval entered the race for the seat of deputy of Neuilly-
Boulogne-Billancourt. Even though he was defeated, he fared well for a newcomer. His 
courtroom triumph gained him a wealthier clientele, but he refused to forsake his 
prev10us one. 
E. Bonds 
One of Laval's attractive traits was his loyalty to his friends. It crossed social and 
political barriers, and was returned in kind. Ties once established were longstanding: the 
furniture movers, he had aided in the lean years, provided his security service when he 
campaigned under the Socialist label. The movers remained true to Laval even after his 
defection from the Socialist Party. 
In 1911, Laval's life was enriched by the birth of his only child, Josee Laval (1911-
1992). The father and the daughter would develop an intimate bond, and she would play 
a pivotal role in his life, private and even political. 
16 Cointet, Pierre Laval, 25. 
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F. Depute Socialiste de La Seine 
In the spring of 1914, as fear of war swept the nation, in April the Socialists and the 
Radicals geared up their electoral campaign in defense of peace. Their leaders were Jean 
Jaures and Joseph Caillaux. 17 The Bloc des Gauches denounced the law passed in July 
1913 extending the compulsory military service from two to three years. The CGT 
sought Pierre Laval as Socialist candidate for the district of the Seine, a Parisian suburb 
both rural and industrial. He was victorious. The Radicals, with the support of the 
Socialists, held the majority in the chamber. Together they hoped to avert war. The 
assassinations of Archduke Francis Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 and Jaures on 31 July 
1914 shattered the hopes of the pacifists. 
Pierre Laval and some 2,000 others were listed by the military in the infamous 
carnet B, a compilation of the potentially subversive elements who might hinder or 
17 Caillaux, Joseph Pierre Marie Auguste (1863-1944), was both a brilliant politician and a lunatic. He 
fathered the income tax. He had foreseen the devastating effects of World War. His greatest failure was 
arrogance, so convinced he was of his own greatness that he would only accept the company of people who 
would agree with him. Opposition caused him intense mental distress. In 1914, when the Figaro attacked 
him and published his private letters, he became so aggravated that his wife, Henriette, in order to put an 
end to the paper's campaign, shot and killed Gaston Calmette the editor of the Figaro! The court was 
sympathetic to the wife, defender of the husband's honor, and found her not guilty! Furthermore, Caillaux's 
taste for sensationalism caused him to make statements that were at best irrelevant but often incendiary. 
While the French government was attempting to bring Italy into the war against Germany, Caillaux let it be 
heard that England was about to withdraw on the assurance of German evacuation of Belgium. It was also 
discovered that Caillaux's contacts had accepted money from Germany. For all this Clemenceau had him 
tried. Although the case against Caillaux was weak, he was nonetheless condemned to time served -- two 
years -- and stripped of his civic rights for a period often years. Rene Escaich, Les Monstres Sacn~s de la 
Ille Republique (Paris: Jean Dullis, 1974), 203-215. Jacquemin, La vie publique, 37. Jacques Chabannes, 
Les Scandales de la «Troisieme»(Paris: Perrin, 1972), 125-155, 227-244. 
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oppose the mobilization. 18 In name of national unity, Minister of the Interior Jean-Louis 
Malvy, despite pressure from the chiefs of staff, refused to have anyone apprehended. 19 
During the war Laval remained a pacifist, a dangerous position when any 
consideration of dialogue with the enemy was considered a crime. Unlike Socialists such 
as Pierre Renaudel of L'Humanite or Leon Jouhaux of the CGT, Laval remained true to 
his pacifist's convictions.20 He quietly chose to direct his efforts toward the material 
wellfare of the French. In December 1915, Jean Longuet, grandson of Karl Marx, 
proposed to the Socialist parliamentarians that they open communications with the 
Socialists of other states. Longuet hoped to pressure the belligerent govermnents into a 
negotiated peace. Laval signed on, but the motion was defeated.21 
With all of France's resources geared for war, basic goods were often scarce or 
overpriced. Laval first concerned himself essentially with the well being of his 
constituency. Eventually he would extend his efforts to the Parisian and national scene. 
He was seen visiting slaughter houses with Minister Malvy. On 30 January 1917, in the 
national assembly he called upon Supply Minister Edouard Herriot to deal with the 
18 Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 28. Jacquemin, La vie publique, 36-37. Laval, in an interview given in 1933, 
thought he had been put on the carnet B because he was the lawyer for the CGT, and all CGT leaders were 
on the carnet B. Paul Allard, Les Enigmes de la Guerre (Paris: Editions des Portiques, 1933), 44. 
19 Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 28. Jacquemin added that Clemenceau recommended the arrests. Jacquemin, 
La vie publique, 38. 
2° Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 28. Jacquemin, La vie publique, 38. The scission of the Socialist Party 
originated with the division between the majority supportive of the war (L'Humanite') and the minority 
wanting to seek out opportunities for peace (Le Populaire). Ibid., 40. 
21 Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 32. 
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inadequate coal supply in Paris. Author Alfred Mallet wrote: "Herriot whimpered 'If I 
could, I would unload the barges myself ... "' Laval retorted "Do not add ridicule to 
ineptitude. "22 The words delighted the assembly and attracted the attention of George 
Clemenceau. The relationship between Laval and Herriot, however, would always be 
strained. 
G. Stockholm, etoile polaire 
As the bloody stalemate of the war only grew worse, Laval scorned the conduct of 
the war and the poor supply of the troops in the field. When mutinies broke out after 
General Robert Nivelle's disastrous offensive of April 1917 at Chemin des Dames, he 
spoke in defense of the mutineers. When Marcel Cachin and Marius Moutet returned 
from St. Petersburg in June 1917 with the invitation to a convention of the international 
socialism in Stockholm, Laval saw a chance for peace. In a lyrical address to the 
assembly, reported here by author Mallet, he urged the chamber to allow a delegation to 
go: "Yes, Stockholm, in response to the call of the Russian Revolution... Yes, 
Stockholm, for peace . . . Yes, Stockholm the polar star. "23 The request was denied. The 
Alexandre Ribot government was overthrown. Paul Prudent Painleve formed a new 
22 
"Herriot gem it: 'Si je pouvais, j'irais decharger moi-meme Jes peniches.' La voix rauque du jeune depute 
de la Seine s'eleve, implacable: 'N'ajoutez pas le ridicule a l'incapacite!'" Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees 
obscures, 18-19. Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 35. Cole, Laval, 29. 
23 
"Oui, Stockholm, a l'appel de la revolution Russe... Oui, Stockholm pour la paix... Oui, Stockholm 
etoile polaire.'' Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 20. 
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government that did not last long. The wind of peace, which for a brief moment blew in 
the spring of 1917, was overwhelmed by the discovery of a flurry of traitors, some real, 
some imagined, as with Malvy -- Because he had refused to arrest the Frenchmen on the 
carnet B, Malvy now became a suspect.24 At this stage of the war, a traitor was anyone 
who did not believe in the victory or who wished for peace. Laval's "Stockholm, etoile 
polaire" speech had not been forgotten. Many of Laval's acquaintances, the publishers of 
the anarchist Bonnet rouge (Red hat), and other pacifists were arrested or interrogated. 
Though Laval frequented pacifist circles -- it was said that he was acquainted with Leon 
Trotsky -- the authorities did not pursue him.25 His seat of deputy, his overall caution, 
and his many friendships across the political spectrum protected him. In November 1917, 
Clemenceau even offered him a post in government, but the Socialist Party by then 
refused to enter any government. Laval toed to the party line, but he questioned the 
wisdom of such a policy in a meeting of the Socialist members of parliament.26 
24 Ibid., 20. This is the time which saw the arrest of famous lady spy, Mata Hari, in July 1917, before 
being put in front of the firing squad in October of the same year. 
25 Mallet reported that Laval certainly knew Leon Trotsky (Bronstein) as the latter was only expelled from 
France in September 1916. Mallet further noted that in his memoirs Trotsky wrote that he once held a 
conference in a cafe, "several Socialist deputies were present. But as soon as an Italian Socialist talked 
about fake passports all fled; a deputy settled the bill -- Laval stated that it was him who had paid for 
Trotsky's coffee!" Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 19. 
The Petrograd Insurrection began on 23 February 1917, Nicolas II abdicated on 3/16 March 1917, 
and Trotsky became president of the Petrograd Soviet in September 1917. The October Revolution began 
with the insurrection on 24 October 1917, victory was achieved on 9 November 1917. Riasanovsky, A 
History of Russia, 457, 460-461, 475. 
26 Cole, Laval, 43. Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 20. Jacquemin, La vie publique, 45. 
Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 39. 
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The war ended, a pyrrhic victory for the whole of France. The north of the country 
was ravaged. Every town, every village, every family was affected by death or 
mutilation. Laval's brother, Jean, the army officer, died in the first months of the war. 
H. Party Member? 
Nineteen nineteen was an election year. A conservative tidal wave, the Bloc 
National, swept the National Assembly. Despite a dynamic campaign, Pierre Laval was 
not reelected. The Socialists record of pacifism, their opposition to the immensely 
popular Clemenceau, and the anxiety arising from the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia; all 
contributed to the defeat of the Socialists.27 
Throughout France as in much of the rest of Europe, social unrest followed the 
conservative victories. The CGT, with a strength of2,400,000 members, launched a 
general strike in 1920. The CGT's offensive petered out, however, as thousands of 
workers were laid off. The government sought to dissolve the CGT. Laval, with Joseph 
Paul-Boncour as chief counsel, assumed the defense of the union leaders.28 While they 
failed in the courtroom, Laval saved the CGT by appealing directly to the ministers of the 
27 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 23. Jacquemin, La vie publique, 47-49. Kupferman, Laval, 
1987, 42. Cole, Laval, 31-32. 
28 Warner, Pierre Laval, 16. 
13 
interior and of commerce and industry, Theodore Steeg and Auguste Isaac. The CGT 
survived.29 
While his interest in improvingthe lot of the workers never faltered, his relation 
with the Socialist Party drew to an end. The last few years spent with the Socialist 
caucus in the chamber combined with the party discipline eroded Laval's attachment to 
the Socialist cause. With the Bolshevik victory in Russia the party itself was changing, 
the congress of Tours in December of 1920 saw the schism of the Socialists into two 
ideologically competing components: the Communist Party (PCF), which derived its 
inspiration directly from Moscow, and the more moderate SFIO, Section Franyaise de 
l'Intemationale Ouvriere. Laval simply let his membership fall by the wayside, not taking 
sides as the two factions battled over the legacy of Jean Jaures.30 Ideology would never 
hold Laval's attention. When, during the dark years of the occupation a variety of "right 
wing" doctrines came forth, which he would also ignore.31 
29 Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 46. Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 25. Jacquemin, La vie 
publique, 48-49. 
3° Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 44-45. Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 24-25. Jacquemin, La vie 
publique, 50. 
31 Michel Winock, ed., Histoire de /'extreme droite en France (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 199. 
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I. The Notable 
Laval's financial success, possibly affected his decision to leave the Socialists. 
Possibly he preferred not to tackle the incongruity of being well to do and a card-carrying 
member of the SFIO or the PCF. He might also have simply been unwilling to waste his 
energy in ideological jousts. When probed about his defection, Laval declared that the 
party had changed at Tours, not him.32 In truth, Laval was too much of an individualist to 
belong to any party. He would run for the first time as an independant in the 1923 
mayoral election in Aubervilliers. He sought to become a well-respected notable like the 
Claussats in Chateldon. He believed that "a sound material independence, if not 
essential, gives to government officials who have it a greater political independence."33 
His aspirations were attained with a new residence, 15 Villa Said, near the elegant 
Avenue Foch, first as tenant and then in 1925 as an owner. In 1923 he also bought Le 
Domaine de la Corbiere, a small farm in Normandy, making him a neighbor of Aristide 
Briand.34 Always a farmer at heart, he managed the property himself and bought and sold 
his own cattle and horses. Laval was finally able to put his degree in Natural Sciences to 
good use. 
32 Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 53. 
33 
"Une independance materielle assuree, si elle n'est pas indispensable, donne aux hommes de 
gouvemement qui la possedent une plus grande independance politique." Pierre Laval, Laval Parle, 21. 
34 Cole, Laval, 33. 
15 
A successful political career needs the support of the press. With this in mind, 
Laval acquired the newspaper the Moniteur du Puy-de-Dome and the printing works 
Mont Louis in 1927. In 1931 he bought Radio-Lyon and the Lyon Republicain. He 
would resell the Lyon Republicain to his friend, the young deputy Raymond Patenotre.35 
The acquisition of the Chateau de Chateldon was a symbol of his ascension. The castle 
also possessed three springs he would secure a few years later. Laval would bottle the 
water of the most productive spring, La Sargentale. Though La Sargentale's ouput was 
never great, it was Laval's joy to see it served on board the trains of the Compagnie 
Internationale des Wagons-Lits. He managed his enterprises closely and placed his 
friends in the key posts. Some, like La Sargentale, barely eked out a profit, but the 
printing house, the paper and the radio did very well. Much had been made of the Laval 
"fortune," especially at the 1945 trial. But even Laval's stubborn enemies had to concede 
that Lava_l attained it honestly. Laval was able to accumulate wealth in part because he 
lived frugally, entertained little, and invested conservatively in stable capital, never 
putting his trust in stocks or banking his income.36 
35 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 26. 
36 Ibid., 26-27. Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 46-48. 
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J. Maire d'Aubervilliers 
In 1923 the city of Aubervilliers, in the northern suburb of Paris, needed a new 
mayor. As a former deputy of the circonscription (constituency), Laval was an obvious 
candidate for the post. To be eligible for election in that particular district, Laval 
purchased a piece of farmland "Les Bergeries. "37 Because Laval's defection from the 
Socialists was done with little fanfare, few were aware of it. Laval was asked in turn by 
the local SFIO and the Communist Party to head their respective lists.38 Laval, instead, 
chose to run under the Laval list, composed of former Socialists he convinced to leave the 
party and work for him. This was an independent Socialist Party of sorts that only 
existed in Aubervilliers. In a four-way race Laval was victorious in the second round.39 
By nature Laval abhorred conflict and he promptly won over through personal 
contacts those he defeated. He developed a network among the humble and the well to 
do in Aubervilliers, not to mention the mayors of the neighboring towns. He was the 
only independent politician in the northern suburb of Paris known after the 1924 elections 
as the Ban/ieu Rouge (Red Suburb). This peculiarity allowed him to avoid getting 
immersed in the ideological war raging between Socialists and communists. Laval 
37 Ibid., 52. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 51-54. Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 24. Jacquemin, La Vie Publique, 51. 
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simply built friendships and earned the confidence of the voters by intelligently managing 
the town's assets.40 
K. Depute Independant de La Seine 
If the SFIO resented Laval's withdrawal from the party, it was discreet about it. The 
Socialists needed Laval for the 1924 legislative elections. The Socialist Party in 
combination with the Radicals formed a national coalition known as the Cartel des 
Gauches. Laval headed a list of independent Socialists in the Seine. The Cartel was 
victorious and Laval who regained a seat of deputy for the national assembly. Leftist 
euphoria swept France. The first action of Laval as deputy was to bring back Joseph 
Caillaux, former member of the national assembly and once the shining star of the 
Radical Party.41 Clemenceau had had Caillaux arrested toward the end of the War for 
collusion with the enemy. He had served two years in prison and had lost his civic rights. 
Laval took a stand for Caillaux's pardon. Laval, with others, was successful. In Caillaux, 
Laval gained an influential patron. 
4
° Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 55-56. 
41 For more on Caillaux, see page 9, footnote number 17. 
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L. Ministre and Senateur 
Laval's reward for his support of the Cartel was his appointment as Minister of 
Public Works in the government of Paul Painleve in April 1925. Six months later in pure 
Third Republic style, the government collapsed.42 Nevertheless, from then on Laval 
belonged to the exclusive club of former ministers from which new ministers were 
usually drawn.43 Between 1925 and 1926 Laval participated three more times in Briand 
governments, once as under-secretary to the premier and twice as minister of Justice 
(garde des sceaux). When he first became minister of justice, Laval abandoned his law 
practice to avoid any conflict of interest. This was a sacrifice well worth making, as the 
ministry of justice was the gateway to the prime ministry.44 
Laval's momentum was frozen after 1926 through a reshuffling of the cartel 
majority orchestrated by the Radical-Socialist mayor and deputy of Lyon, Edouard 
Herriot.45 Founded in 1901 the Radical Party became the hinge faction of the Third 
Republic.46 Its support or defection, as Laval would experience, often meant the survival 
42 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 29. For the list of French presidents and Premiers between 
18 February 1906 and 10 July 1940, see Appendix Bon page 165. 
43 Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 61. 
44 Ibid., 61. 
45 Herriot, nicknamed Edouard Le Gros, history professor by trade, began his political career as mayor of 
Lyon. A great orator, he could carry a crowd, but on the whole he was an ineffective politician. Of 
Herriot's achievements Briand once said "r;a ne pese pas lourd" (It does not amount to much). Rene 
Escaich, Les Monstres Sacres, 271-282. 
46 Parti Republicain Radical et Radical-Socialiste known as Parti Radical-Socialiste. For more on the 
Third Republic and the political parties in France, see Appendix C on page 168. 
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or collapse of governments. Through this latest mood swing in the national assembly, 
Laval was excluded from the direction of France for four years. Author Gaston 
Jacquemin suggested that Laval deliberately chose not to partake in a Herriot 
government, which he judged incapable of handling the financial crisis.47 The year 1926 
marked the definitive break between Laval and the left.48 If Laval was attacked in the 
leftist press for his departure, he nonetheless maintained his friends on the left. 
In 1927 Laval won the seat of the Senator of the Seine, in effect withdrawing from 
and placing himself above the political battles for ephemeral majorities in the National 
Assembly.49 He longed for a constitutional reform that would strengthen the executive 
branch and eliminate the political instability, the grievous flaw of the Third Republic.50 
On 2 March 1930 Laval returned to government as Minister of Labor in the second 
Andre Tardieu government. Tardieu and Laval knew each other from the days of 
47 Jacquemin, La Vie Publique, 62-63. 
48 Fred Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 61. 
49 Laval defeated no less than former President Alexandre Millerand. Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire 
Politique de la Troisieme Republique, tome quatrieme, Cartel des Gauches et Union Nationale (1924-
1929), 2nd ed., (Paris: Press Universitaire de France, 1973), 202. 
50 Jacquemin, La Vie Publique, 65. "Pour faire une politique interieure et exterieure coherente et arreter 
Hitler, ii fallait renforcer le pouvoir de l'Executif et reduire celui des chambres. Doumergue et Tardieu 
l'avaient bien compris, depuis longtemps, mais pas les partis de gauche[ ... ]" (To have a coherent interior 
and exterior policy and stop Hitler, it was necessary to reinforce the executive power and reduce that of the 
chambers. Doumergue and Tardieu understood that very well, for a long time, but not the leftist parties). 
Chambrun, Laval devant l'histoire, 31. 
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Clemenceau, which developed into mutual appreciation.51 Tardieu needed men he could 
trust: his previous government collapsed a little over a week earlier because of the 
defection of the minister of Labor, Louis Loucheur. But, when the radical Socialist 
Camille Chautemps failed to form a viable government, Tardieu was called back.52 
At the time the social climate was tense. More than 150,000 textile workers were 
on strike, and violence was feared. As minister of public works in 1925, Laval had ended 
the strike of the mine workers. Tardieu hoped he could do the same as minister oflabor. 
Tardieu's faith was justified: The conflict was settled without bloodshed.53 Even 
51 Andre Tardieu had been the collaborator of George Clemenceau. As in all of the governments of the 
Third Republic of this time period the governments relied on coalitions in the Chamber of Deputies. In this 
Laval government he secured the support of the Right. He served first as minister of Agriculture, took over 
the Interior from Laval in the Fall of 1931 and served as War minister in January 1932. Elegant and often 
perceived as arrogant, nicknamed "Prince of the Republic," he was the antithesis of the populist Laval. Yet 
they got along remarkably well. Tardieu had made the evacuation of the Rhineland, sought by Briand, 
possible (May 1930). Tardieu was also the great hope of the conservatives, he hoped to be able to 
modernize France an to revamp the party system. Rudolph Binion Defeated Leaders, The Political Fate of 
Cail/aux, Jouvenel and Tardieu (Morningside Heights, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 
310-314. Kupferrnan, Laval, 1987, 69. 
In July 1939 Tardieu became paralysed by hemiplegia. An editorialist for Gringoire, Le Temps· 
and other papers, Tardieu could no longer speak or write and thus no longer earn a living. In 1942 Laval 
was able to help Tardieu materially. Laval requested to visit his ailing colleague. But Tardieu's caretakers 
feared it would be too emotional for their patient. Mallet who had been Laval's secretary wondered; had 
Tardieu not fallen ill, how Tardieu would have exerted his sway on Laval during the occupation. Mallet, 
Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 33-34. For more on Tardieu read: Michel Junot, Andre Tardieu, le 
mirobolant (Paris: Denoi:!l, 1996). 
52 Jacquemin, La Vie Publique, 69-70. 
53 Kupferrnan, Laval, 1987, 70-71. Jacquemin, La Vie Publique, 70. Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees 
obscures, 39. 
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Socialist politician Leon Blum, never one of Laval's allies, conceded that Laval's 
"intervention was skillful, opportune and decisive. "54 
Laval's greatest achievement in the Tardieu government was yet to come. Social 
insurance (Assurances Socia/es) had been on the agenda of the legislative assembly for 
over ten years. It had even passed the Chamber of Deputies but not the Senate in 1928. 55 
Tardieu gave Laval the deadline of May first to get the project through. The date was 
chosen to stifle the usual agitation of labor day. 56 Laval's first effort went into clarifying 
the muddled collection of texts. He then consulted the employer and labor organizations. 
In two months Laval was able to present to the assembly a text which overcame the 
difficulties which had caused its original failure. It met the financial constraints, reduced 
the control of the government, and preserved the free choice of doctors and their billing 
freedom. The chamber and the senate passed the new law with an overwhelming 
majority. Another Tardieu achievement was the establishment of free High School 
education. The successes of the Tardieu government, however, did not resist the 
ramifications of the Oustric affair. After the failure of the Oustric Bank, it appeared that 
members of the Tardieu government had improper ties to the financial institution. The 
scandal involved Minister of Justice Raoul Peret, and Under-Secretaries Henri Falcoz and 
54 Leon Blum, L'CEuvre de Leon Blum, Reparations et Desarmement, Les Problemes de la Paix, La 
Montee des Fascismes, 1918-1934 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1972), 263. 
55 Warner, Pierre Laval, 19. 
56 Chambrun, Laval devant l'Histoire, 25. 
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Eugene Lautier. Though Tardieu was not involved in the wrongdoing of his ministers, 
on 4 December 1930, Tardieu lost his majority in the Senate.57 
President of the Republic Gaston Doumergue called upon Louis Barthou to form a 
government, but Barthou failed. 58 Doumergue turned to Laval, who fared no better. 59 
The disappointment was short-lived, however, as the following month the government 
formed by Theodore Steeg floundered. Doumergue renewed his offer to Laval. On 27 
January 1931 he successfully formed his first government. 60 
57 Chabannes, Les Scandales de la «Troisieme,» 281-290. 
58 Barthou, Louis (1862-1934). Barthou, a conservative, served in Briand and Clemenceau cabinets 
before World War I. As premier in 1913 he passed the the law raising the compulsory military service to 
three years. In 1921 he was war minister in a Briand government, he also served as justice minister under 
premier Raymond Poincare. As Doumergue's foreign minister in 1934 he actively attempted to reinforce 
the alliances with Belgium, Poland, and the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia). But, 
safe for Czechoslovakia he encountered little enthusiasm. This caused Barthou to seek an Italian alliance 
and to become a proponent of a Franco-Soviet pact. Because an Italian alliance was certain to upset the 
Yugoslavs it was important to make King Alexander of Yugoslavia understand the expediency of such an 
association. With this in mind Barthou met with King Alexander in Marseilles. Within moments of their 
encounter they were assassinated by an Ustashi terrorist on 9 October 1934. 
59 Jacquemin stated that Doumergue acted upon a suggestion made by Tardieu. Jacquemin, La Vie 
Publique, 72. For the list of French presidents and Premiers between 18 February 1906 and 10 July 1940, 
see Appendix Bon page 165. 
60 Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 79. 
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M. The Laval Government 
In the words of Leon Blum, the Socialist opposition was amazed and disappointed 
that the ghost ofTardieu's government reappeared within a few weeks of being defeated 
with Laval, "like a night bird surprised by the light" at its head.61 Laval's nomination as 
premier led to the speculation that Tardieu, the new Agriculture minister, held the real 
power in the Laval Government.62 Indisputably Laval thought highly ofTardieu, as well 
as of Briand, and applied policies in line with theirs.63 Laval, however, had his own style 
and certainly had not made it that far to become Tardieu's mouthpiece. 
While it was true that the ministers who formed the Laval government were in 
great part the same who had formed Tardieu governments in the past, it was, however, 
more a function of the composite majority Laval could find at the National Assembly 
than anything else.64 Laval -- like Raymond Poincare, Briand and Tardieu before him --
had offered ministerial posts to Herriot's Radicals, but to no avail.65 
61 
"Comme un oiseau de nuit surpris par la lumiere," Blum, L'CEuvre, 271. 
62 Minister of Agriculture was not a minor post as France was still a highly rural nation in 1931 even 
though the polished Tardieu seemed a bit out of place at that post. 
63 Binion, Defeated Leaders, 310-314. 
64 For the composition of the government and their party affiliation(s), when known, Appendix A on page 
163. 
65 Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire Politique de la Troisieme Republique, tome cinquieme, La Republique en 
Danger: Des Ligues au Front Populaire (1930-1936), 2nd ed., (Paris: Press Universitaire de France, 1973), 
37-39, 61. 
Raymond Poincare (1860-1934) was one of the more remarkable statesmen of the Third Republic. 
Poincare was premier five times, served as minister in many governments, and was president of the republic 
during World War I. He is best remembered as an economist. He sat on the budget commission in the 
chamber, served as Finance minister and in 1926, as premier, orchestrated the successful stabilization of the 
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Although it had chosen not to be represented in the government, the support of the 
inescapable party of Herriot, was still necessary. Laval's ace-in-the-hole was his network 
of friends and supporters in the chamber, the "Lavalists." Laval like Tardieu did not 
always see eye to eye with the deputy of Lyon. While the sometimes abrasive Tardieu 
was often in conflict with Herriot, Laval would attempt the delicate task of conciliating 
the two.66 
Besides the so called unmovables (inamovibles) -- Briand, Maginot, Pierre-
Etienne Flandin, Paul Reynaud -- Laval brought in his own team of advisors, such old 
friends as Maurice Foulon, the collaborator from Aubervilliers, and Pierre Cathala, whom 
he knew from his days in Bayonne and who had worked in Laval's Labor ministry. 
Cathala began as under-secretary of the interior and would become minister of the interior 
in January 1932.67 Blaise Diagne of Senegal, the first African deputy, had joined the 
National Assembly at the same time as Laval in 1914. Diagne achieved another first 
when Laval invited him to join his cabinet as under-secretary to the colonies, making him 
the first Black African in a French government. Laval also called on financial experts 
such as Jacques Rueff, Charles Rist and Adeodat Boissard to tackle the arduous financial 
puzzles of the time. Germanist, Andre Fran9ois-Poncet, was brought to the forefront first 
franc. 
66 Being the head of the hinge party Herriot, was courted by all and therefore liked by few. Blum 
denounced the Radicals roguishly teamed up with Tardieu. Blum, L 'CEuvre, 271. 
67 Cointet, Pierre Laval, 90. 
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as under-secretary to the premier and then as ambassador to Germany.68 Laval's 
government even included an economist, Claude-Joseph Gignoux, at a time when 
economists in government services were rare. 69 The presence of economists could be 
taken as an indication that Laval was concerned about the condition of France's economy. 
N. France's Economy in 1931 
Indeed France, in 1931, could still pretend to be unaffected by the crisis that had 
brought the world to its knees.70 Premier Laval declared upon embarking for America on 
16 October 1931, "France remained healthy thanks to work and savings. "71 Agriculture, 
small industry, and protectionism were the bases of France's economy. The conservative 
policy, some would say the "archaic" system of contained wages and limited social 
services, had allowed France to accumulate the largest gold reserves in the world after the 
68 After the Great War, in which he served as a infantry lieutenant, Andre Fran~ois-Poncetjoined the 
diplomatic corps, serving in Bern, Washington, Genoa, and the Ruhr (during the occupation). In 1924 he 
was elected Deputy of the Seine and in 1928 became under-secretary of the Beaux-Arts in the cabinets of 
Poincare and Briand. In 1931, Laval dispatched him to Berlin as ambassador where he remained until 
1938. After the Munich accords Fran~ois-Poncet requested a transfer to Rome. Dictionnaire Biographique 
Fran9ais Contemporain (Paris: Pharos, 1954), 276. 
69 Fred Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 83-85. 
70 While France's industrial production virtually remained unchanged between 1929 and 1930, United 
Kingdom's production dropped 7 percent, Italy 8 percent, Germany 14 percent, Austria 15 percent, Canada 
16 percent and the United States nearly 20 percent. Wholesale prices between August 1929 and September 
1930 dropped world-wide, however, France suffered only a 6.7 percent drop while in Germany wholesale 
prices dropped 10.8 percent, United States 12.2 percent, U.K. 14.9 and Canada 16 percent. Charles P. 
Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 114, 
278. 
71 
"La France est restee saine grace au travail et a l'epargne." Laval in Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees 
obscures, 47. 
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United States.72 France still reaped the benefits of the devaluation of the franc 
orchestrated by Poincare, which made French products such as automobiles very 
competitive on the world market. Unemployment was at least officially virtually 
nonexistent with only 12,000 jobless for the whole of France.73 Official low 
unemployment numbers meant no benefits for the unemployed were necessary which 
translated into substantial budgetary savings, further perpetuating the image of a healthy 
economy. While France's good fortune was perhaps exaggerated, its economic situation 
was far better than that of other nations. 
Laval and his cabinet considered the good economy and the substantial gold 
reserves, as means to diplomatic ends. In this rich nation's game it was essential that 
assistance should be received with gratitude and not scorn. With this master card in hand 
Laval left France for the first time to visit London, Berlin and Washington. He attended 
various conferences and focussed on several of the interlinked problems of the world 
economic crisis, war reparations and debts, disarmament, and the gold standard. 
72 
"Archaic" system: Jean Baptiste Duroselle, Politique etrangere de la France; La Decadence, 1932-
1939 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1979), 11. 
The gold reserves were at their highest ever: 4910 metric tons. Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 85. 
73 Ibid., 83. Kupferman's number has to be taken in perspective. The beginning of the year had seen a 
debate in the National Assembly on these numbers, the Bureau International du Travail (BIT) in Geneva 
estimated that France had 350,000 unemployed. Bonnefous, Histoire Politique, tome cinquieme, 68. 
Britain's unemployment was rising from 1,204,000 jobless in March 1929 to 1,700,000 in March 1930. In 
the United States unemployment prior to the stock market crash was 1.6 million out of a population of 122 
million. Unemployement reached its peak in 1933 with 13.7 million Americans without work. In Germany 
unemployment in 1931 neared two million out of a population of 64 million. Kindleberger, The World in 
Depression, 1929-1939, 103, 126, 134, 231, 
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CHAPTER 
II 
A TAINTED PEACE 
In this chapter we focus not so much on Laval but on the political and diplomatic 
situation that Laval had to contend with in 1931. At the heart of all international 
problems of the early thirties laid the Versailles treaty. It exerted its deleterious influence 
on most post-war administrations world-wide, Laval's government included. Many of 
France's problems internationally and therefore domestically derived from the treaty. 
A. The Versailles Treaty 
The Versailles Treaty was but one of five treaties generated from the Paris Peace 
Conference. The Treaties of St. Germain-en-Laye (September 1919), Neuilly (November 
1919), Trianon (June 1920) and Sevres (August 1920) ended the war respectively with 
Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. Sevres would have to be 
renegotiated because of the advent of Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk) and the birth of the 
Turkish state. 
The Treaty of Versailles, however, signed on 28 June 1919, loomed far above the 
other treaties, for it officially "settled" the conflict between France, her allies, and 
Germany, and set the tone for the other treaties. The months, after the hostilities ceased, 
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were sheer chaos: inadequate accommodations for the delegates in Paris, the 
embarrassing exposure of secret treaties, the collapse of empires, births of nations, 
horrors of famine, and deadly influenza. As if this were not enough, the big egos of the 
principals collided; they worked without agenda nor direction. These principals were: 
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and his Foreign Secretary Arthur James 
Balfour, French Premier Georges Clemenceau and Delegate Andre Tardieu, Italian 
Premier Vittorio Orlando and his Foreign Minister Sydney Sonnino, American President 
Woodrow T. Wilson and his confidant Edward M. House. Paul H. Hymans of Belgium 
and Eleutherios Venizelos of Greece commanded a presence in the negotiations by the 
sheer strength of their personalities.74 In addition to these delegates were the envoys of 
all the other nations involved in the conflict except the defeated powers, and Russia. 
Every aspects of the Treaty not dealt specifically by the principals were farmed out to 
committees who unfortunately did not confer among each other. 
Eventually on 7 May 1919 after nearly six months of preparations the allies 
presented the German delegates with a treaty of 440 clauses. Because the allies did not 
want to spend any more time on the treaty than they already had, they did not give the 
German delegation the opportunity to negotiate.75 Germany's non-participation was the 
74 Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace, International Relations in Europe 1918-1933 (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1976), 2-10. 
75 Ibid., 11. 
29 
first major problem of the Versailles treaty, which would be denounced at nauseam as the 
diktat, by German nationalists. 
Germany had lost the war and as a consequence, the Versailles treaty stripped 
Germany of all its colonies witch were ceded under allied mandates.76 In Europe 
Germany lost territories as well. In the West, the Alsace and the Lorraine which had been 
seized during the Franco-Prussian War (1870) were returned to France. France also 
received a fifteen-year mandate on the coal rich Saar region. Belgium gained the frontier 
districts ofMoresnet, Eupen, and Malmedy. To protect the West from a new German 
threat the left bank, and a band fifty kilometers wide on the right bank of the Rhine was 
to be demilitarized. In the North, a plebiscite -- first promised by Otto von Bismarck in 
1866 -- returned part of the Schleswig to Denmark. Heligoland remained German but 
had to be demilitarized. The East saw the most change. The Poles used the war to 
resurrect their nation and the Polish Republic was in place by the time the armistice was 
declared on 11November1918.77 One of the principal aspirations of the new republic, 
76 Under Mandates: Cameroon (France and Great Britain), Togoland (Great Britain), Southwest Africa 
(Union of South Africa), East Africa (Great Britain and Belgium), Marshall Islands (Japan), New Guinea 
Australia), Somoa (New Zealand), and Nauru Island (British empire). The Shantung province was given 
outright to Japan. "Versailles, Treaty of," Encyclopredia Britannica, A New Survey of Universal 
Knowledge, vol. 23 (Chicago: Encyclopa:dia Britannica, 1942), 96. 
77 The Polish State which, in the 1500s, had stretched from the Baltic to the Black sea, had been so 
encroached upon by its Prussian, Austrian and Russian neighbors that by 1795 it had disappeared from the 
European map. Brought back by Napoleon I, in 1806 as the Great Duchy of Warsaw, it was maintained as 
the vassal kingdom of Poland -- known as Congress Poland -- by tsar Alexander in 1815. By 1863, 
however, all appearances of independence had disappeared in Russian occupied Poland. In Prussian Poland 
(Poznan or Posen), the Poles maintained their culture and language and prospered in the face of Bismarck's 
Kulturkampf, a combination of economic policies aimed at expropriating Poles in favor of Germans. In 
Austrian Poland (Galicia), the Poles were long persecuted and exploited until the creation of the Dual 
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however, was access to the sea, and only the allied powers could achieve this. 
Clemenceau was very much in favor of expanding Poland to the Baltic, but Lloyd George 
despised anything Polish and wished to keep the new state as small as possible. Wilson 
favored the Polish claim but he was also determined not to dismember Germany. The 
compromised result was the creation of the Polish corridor leading from Poland proper to 
the free city/harbor of Danzig. This absurd solution cut East Prussia from the rest of 
Germany and left Poland with a potential aggressor on two fronts. To allay Polish and 
French fears, the German army was drastically reduced and barred from possessing tanks, 
airplanes and other modern articles of war. The English were content with stripping the 
German navy of most of its capital ships and prohibiting the construction and use of 
submarines. 
In 1870 Prussia-Germany had exacted heavy indemnities and occupation costs 
from France and it seemed only natural to demand the same from defeated Germany. 
Monarchy (1866), which gave Galicia greater autonomy within the Empire. In November 1916, in the hope 
of raising a large Polish army to fight the Russians, General Erich Ludendorffheld out the promise of the 
restoration of Congress Poland, and encouraged some administrative autonomy in a Polish Council of State. 
With the fall of Tsar Nicholas II (March 1917), Russia recognized Poland's right to self-determination. In 
May 1917 the Polish members of the Austrian Reichsrat demanded an independent Poland with an outlet to 
the sea. At the same time the Polish Council of State requested greater powers from the Germans. The 
Germans agreed provided the Poles raised an army and swore loyalty to Germany. 
This caused Jozef Pilsudski and his partisans to resign from the diet. In the meantime the Polish cause had 
received much support from the Americans and the French. The French ties with Poland went as far back 
as the very briefreign of Henri of Valois (1573-1574) -- the future Henri III of France -- as the elected king 
of the Polish republic. Ever since, notwithstanding strategic considerations, Polish causes always received a 
sympathetic audience in France. This allowed the formation of the Polish National Committee in France 
during the war. Embolded by the weakening of the German army and strengthened with international 
support, on 3 November 1918 the Polish Republic was proclaimed and assumed executive power on 11 
November 1918. Andrzej Brozek, The History of Poland: a Guide for English-speaking Students 
(Krak6w: Naki. Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 1985). Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: A Short History of 
Poland (Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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President Wilson was agreeable to reparations to restore the damage done to the allied 
powers, but he vehemently opposed indemnities to reimburse the war costs endured by 
the allies. 78 Setting the amount of the reparations then was not feasible, in part because 
Wilson wanted to verify the damage claims of the allies. 79 The failure to set an amount 
for the reparations would poison international relations for the years to come, as Germany 
denounced the blank check. 
One article pertaining to the reparations had an impact out of proportion with its 
intended scope. Article 231 of the Treaty read: 
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the 
responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and 
damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their 
nationals have been subjected as a consequence of a war imposed upon 
them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies. 
This article, which would incidently also appear in the treaties with Austria and Hungary, 
would be denounced, with great ability, by Germany as the infamous war guilt clause. In 
his memoirs Jacques Benoist-Mechin related that German children learned, like a prayer, 
a speech by President Paul von Hindenburg given on 18 September 1927: 
... We reject, and the German people unanimously with us, the accusation 
that Germany was responsible for initiating the greatest of all wars. 
Neither envy, nor hate, nor thirst of conquest armed us. The war was only 
the supreme means, at the cost of immense sacrifices, to face a world of 
enemies. It is with a pure heart that we defended our fatherland; it is with 
78 Marks, The Jllusion of Peace, 12-13. 
79 Ibid., 14. 
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pure hands that the German army handled the sword . . . Germany is 
ready, at all times, to prove it to impartial judges ... 80 
All in all the treaty of Versailles was not as harsh as it could have been. Many 
Frenchmen had looked with favor upon the outbreak of the Bavarian revolution 
(7-9 November 1918) seeking independence from Germany; these same Frenchmen 
would have been delighted to see the German Empire, which had been proclaimed at 
Versailles on January 1871, be undone there as well. Clemenceau, however, accepted to 
curb the more exacting demands in exchange of the promise of an Anglo-American 
security agreement, which never became a reality. 
The loftiest accomplishment of the treaty of Versailles was the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. President Wilson's brain child, the League was designed to offer a 
forum to the world nations in which they could solve international problems. The 
members of the league agreed to engage in diplomatic talks for three months before 
resorting to war. The Covenant also called for the creation of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice which went into effect in 1921 and came to siege in The Hague. 
However, as discussed below, the League of Nations was in for a difficult birth. 
To be effective, the Treaty of Versailles relied on the cooperation of the chief 
victors: The United States, Great Britain and France. It also trusted in the cooperation of 
defeated Germany. Many Germans, however, apparently did not feel honor bound by 
80 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, A /'epreuve du temps, tome l, 1905-1940, Eric Roussel, ed., (Paris: Julliard, 
1989), 250. 
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what they called the Diktat. As to the Allies the cooperation that had prevailed during the 
war and during the peace talks was soon put to the test.81 
B. The United States and the Versailles Treaty 
In 1919-1920 American President Woodrow Wilson faced an isolationist 
movement at home. Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, Republican chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, led the opposition. The senator had the support of 
western colleagues such as William E. Borah of Idaho. Borah, with perhaps less talent 
but with equal effect, would perpetuate Lodge's isolationist sway on American world 
politics into the 1930s.82 
Hostility to the treaty in the United States focussed on the clause calling for the 
creation of the League of Nations. This section was particularly dear to the "apostle of 
peace," President Wilson, while it conjured images of entangling alliances among Lodge 
and his supporters. Unwilling to compromise, the president attempted to appeal directly 
81 The cooperation prevailed during the treaty negotiations, except for Italy which wanted a larger share of 
the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Pierre Laval had never been very impressed with the Treaty of Versailles. As a junior socialist 
deputy he had voted against its ratification. Yet even as premier he would not be able to challenge it 
without guarantees from either the Germans or the former allies. The compact was too valuable to most of 
his compatriots and to friends and political allies such as cabinet member Andre Tardieu who had been 
Clemenceau's right hand man during the Paris peace conference. Aristide Briand had dedicated all his 
efforts in the post-war years to bringing about a Franco-German rapprochement. Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des 
annees obscures, 23, 34. Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War, The politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of 
Reparations, 1918-1932 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 328. 
82 Claudius Osborne Johnson, Borah of Idaho (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), 311-317. 
Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1969), 248-253. 
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to the people. Unfortunately, a heart attack followed by a long and agonizing recovery 
prevented the President from effectively challenging Senator Lodge, and the United 
States Senate never ratified the treaty. 
C. Great Britain and France in relation to Germany 
In the post-war years Great Britain, more than any other major power, showed a 
rare willingness to put the war behind her. In 1922 the British foreign office sent out the 
"Balfour Note." Foreign Secretary Balfour stated in the note Great Britain's willingness 
to forego all debt payment and reparations, but since the United States was not ready to 
do the same, Great Britain simply requested that the allies and Germany pay enough to 
cover the American loan. The British lent one and a half billion pounds ( ::::$7.3 billion) 
excluding interest and owed 4.3 billion dollars ( ::::£878 million) to the United States. 
However generous, this plan did not appeal to the French for they wanted Germany's 
reparations to cover all the foreign debt, which was not acceptable for the British or for 
that matter Germany. 
The difficulties raised by the French in combination with the demands of an 
anemic economy led the British to talk about canceling the reparations all together. The 
British thought that by lifting the reparation burden, the German economy would revive 
and open up to British goods and services. An additional benefit was to reestablish the 
disrupted balance of power on the continent which the British believed to be too much in 
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France's favor. Canceling the reparations unilaterally, however, was economically not 
viable and as long as reparations were to be paid, the English would fight for their share. 83 
The fact that the British even mentioned canceling the reparations, simply horrified the 
French haunted as they were by the Teutonic threat. 
As to the continental balance of power, Britain wrongly assessed France's 
intentions; European adventures reminiscent of those of Napoleon I and Napoleon III 
were of the past. The Great War had cost France much of its youth and dynamism. Only 
Serbia and Rumania had suffered a greater percentage of dead and missing. 84 France 
aspired for peace and security; it could no longer think of conquest. Construction from 
1927 to 1936 of the purely defensive Maginot Line best illustrated France's hunger for 
security, and her dread of Germany.85 
Had France supported Great Britain's suggestion to cancel reparations and even 
abrogate Versailles, it could be argued that Germany would not have generated Hitler for 
lack of a political platform from which to grab power. Nevertheless, abandoning 
Versailles was unthinkable to most Frenchmen; too many had died for it, and only strong 
military guarantees from the British or the Americans, preferably both, might have 
83 
"Mr. Philip Snowden [ ... ] fought for the higher allocation of British allocation than was proposed by the 
Young plan." Madan Gopal Gupta, International Relations since 1919, Part One 1919-1945 (Allahabad: 
Chaitanya Publishing House, 1963), 48. 
84 Michel Huber. La population de la France pendant la guerre, 4th ed., (Paris: Hachette, 1965), 449. 
85 For a detailed study of the political and military history of the Maginot Line: Judith M. Hughes. To the 
Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation's in the 1920's (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971 ). 
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suaded the French. Without the support of their former allies, the French did not want to 
take the risk of trusting the Germans. France's survival, so thought many Frenchmen, 
could not allow a revitalized Germany.86 This intransigence was, however, impossible 
for all Frenchmen to maintain, and efforts were eventually made to reconcile the two 
peoples. 
The first of such efforts resulted in the Pact ofLocamo in 1925. By this pact 
Germany, represented by Chancellor Hans Luther and German Foreign Secretary Gustav 
Stresemann, recognized Germany's present western borders with France and Belgium and 
promised not to resort to war to change them. Germany also accepted demilitarized 
status of the Rhineland. Great Britain, in the person of British Foreign Secretary Austen 
Chamberlain, and Italy, in the person of Benito Mussolini, pledged to declare war upon 
the violator of the pact whether he be French or German. A direct consequence of the 
Pact was the evacuation of the Ruhr -- which had been occupied by the French and the 
Belgians because of Germany's failure to pay the reparations -- and the admission of 
Germany to the League of Nations. At Locamo, for the first time since the war, the 
former enemies had met and dealt with each others as equals. Through the pact Briand 
was able to mend the diplomatic damage done to France's image abroad by the 
86 Geoffrey Warner pointed out the absurdity of the Franco German rapport de force. Versailles 
perpetuated a situation in which a militarily stronger France kept in check a demographically and 
economically superior Germany. Warner, Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France, 26. 
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occupation of the Ruhr. For his efforts Chamberlain was awarded the 1925 Nobel Peace 
Prize. Stresemann and Briand received the prize jointly in 1926. 
D. The implications of a link between 
war reparations and war debts in Franco-American relations 
During the war France had lent fourteen billion francs (:::::$2.7 billion) to her allies, 
more than seven billion of it to a Russian government which no longer existed. France 
had also been a borrower, £450,000 ( :::::$2.2 billion) from Great Britain, and roughly $3.5 
billion dollars from the Americans, two thirds during the conflict and a third afterwards to 
sustain the economy.87 Though President Wilson had insisted that the German 
reparations were intended solely for the restoration of the lands and industries devastated 
by the war, it was France's intention -- as well as that of Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy 
-- to use the funds to reimburse the lenders.88 Versailles had established the principles of 
reparations, the Conference of Spa (5-16 July 1920) allocated each nation's share of the 
reparations: France was to receive 52 percent, the British Empire 22 percent, Italy 10 
percent, and Belgium 8 percent. The remainder was to be divided among the other allied 
87 Joseph Brandes, Herbert Hoover and Economic Diplomacy, Department of Commerce Policy, 1921-
1928, foreword by Lewis Straus (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), 172. The French debt 
was of three billion dollars plus an additional debt of 407 million for stock purchases. Kupferman, La 
po/itique economique de Pierre Laval en 1931, colloque de Nanterre, 18-19 Mars 1977: Politique 
economique exterieure de la France, 1934-1937. 
88 Walter Lipmann and William 0. Scroggs, The United States in World Affairs, An Account of American 
Foreign Relations, 1931. Pub. for Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1932), 
162-163. 
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powers. The amount of the reparations and the mode of payment was yet to be 
determined. 89 
The French, probably more so than the other nations, viewed intergovernmental 
loans as a tool of diplomacy. When it became apparent that the Americans were not 
eager to join in a security pact, the French thought to tie French and American interest. It 
thus became essential to link the debt owed America to the German reparations due 
France. The declared reason was that if Germany ceased payments, France wanted to be 
able to do the same vis-a-vis the United States, but the concealed intent of an American 
recognition of the link between reparation and debt was to bond France and America in a 
common purpose against Germany. It was an indirect way for the French to force the 
Americans to fulfill Wilson's promises at Versailles despite the United States Senate. 
Versailles, rightly or not, was seen by the French as the only warrant for peace and 
security. For the same reasons, ignoring the potential link between debt and reparations 
was essential for the isolationists in the American Senate. 
More practically, as author Alfred Mallet suggested, the Americans were not 
averse to the cancellation of the German public debt, which amounted to the reparations 
to the allies. Cancellation would alleviate the German people's tax burden and insure the 
repayment of the private loans extended by the Americans.90 Indeed from the armistice 
89 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Wreck of Reparations Being the Political Background of the Lausanne 
Agreement 1932 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1972), 106. 
90 Mallet, Pierre Laval des annees obscures, 45. 
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until 1929, and even beyond, American investors had made many, potentially bad loans 
to Germany. 
Herbert Hoover, secretary of commerce from 1920 to 1928, had initially 
encouraged these loans in 1924 through the Dawes plan -- named for General Charles G. 
Dawes, engineer, attorney, financier, statesman and in this instance chairman of the 
Allied Reparation Committee.91 The Dawes plan set the annual payment for Germany to 
the allies at one billion gold Reichsmarks (::::£50 million or ::::$240 million) to be 
progressively raised to 2.5 billion Reichsmarks ( ::::£1.25 billion or ::::$6 billion) on the fifth 
year and the years after that. No mention of a final date was set. The national German 
railroads in chaos since the end of the war were reorganized under the Dawes plan and 
formed into the Deutsche Reichseisenbahngesellschaft with a capital of fourteen billion 
gold marks. The new railroad company was to pay an annuity of 660 million gold marks 
to the Reparation Commission. The Commission was also to receive the interest from the 
mortgage of five billion marks imposed on the German industry at the end of the War.92 
The Dawes plan called for an 800 million Reichsmarks (::::£40 million or ::::$200 million) 
loan to back the newly created Reichsmark and help Germany meet its first annuity.93 
91 Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of Reparations (London: Macmillan and Co., 1939). 
92 Henry Blumenthal, Illusion and Reality in Franco American Diplomacy, 1914-1945 (Batton Rouge: 
Lousiana State University Press, 1986), 133. 
93 Keith Eubank, World War JI, Roots and Causes (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 
1992), 26-27. The Reichsmark replaced the Rentenmark (introduced in 1923) and the old mark at the rate 
of one trillion old marks for one Reichsmark. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, 27. 
40 
Hoover and President Calvin Coolidge praised Dawes's effort and encouraged the 
financing of the German recovery.94 American investors responded enthusiastically by 
taking up half the loan, British participation amounted to a quarter. Hoover had not 
expected such a response from American investors and now feared that his fellow citizens 
had overreached themselves. Hoover's concern rose when the use of the loans became 
apparent. Many German municipalities used American short-term credits to finance 
long-term public projects such as "soccer stadia, swimming pools complete with artificial 
wave-making apparatus, and blocks of workers' housing containing the unheard-of 
extravagance of private bathrooms in each family unit. "95 
Private American yearly foreign lending increased from $969 million in 1924 to 
$1.25 billion in 1928. The total for those four years alone was $5.7 billion.96 As a point 
ofreference the United States national income in 1924 was estimated at $72.1 billion and 
$81.7 billion in 1928.97 A concerned Hoover attempted to curb the outflow of American 
money. Bankers and businessmen, however, did not welcome the commerce secretary's 
94 Brandes, Herbert Hoover and Economic Diplomacy, 183. Also Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of 
Herbert Hoover, II, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), 182. 
95 Marks, The Illusion of Peace, 112. Kindleberger noted that "Germany restricted long-term borrowing 
abroad in the late 1920s, [ ... ]but failed to limit short-term" Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-
1939, 130. 
96 Ibid., 39-40. 
97 Yves-Henri Nouailhat, Les Etats-Unis: /'avenement d'une puissance mondiale, 1898-1933, (Paris: 
Editions Richelieu, 1973), 153. According to the Encyc/opcedia Britannica America's national income in 
1924 was $69,221 millions and in 1928 it was $79,100 millions. "United States of America" Encyc/opcedia 
Britannica, A New Survey of Universal Knowledge, vol. 22 (Chicago: Encyclopredia Britannica, 1942), 
746. 
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initiative.98 They found an ally in Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, the steel 
magnate from Pittsburgh, who argued that Americans wanted to invest in Germany and 
nothing was to get in the way of free enterprise. All Hoover could do without upsetting 
the business world was to disengage his government of responsibility in this matter. 
Germany's economic ties were not limited to loans. The United States was 
Germany's most important trading partner, with Great Britain a close second. The 
likelihood of an American intervention, whether political or military, against Germany 
became unthinkable.99 This only added to the French frustration and resentment at the 
American failure to ratify Versailles. 
The thought of abolishing the German reparations altogether received support 
among many Americans, however, the cancellation of the allied war debts did not. The 
French and British argument, that the blood of their soldiers was worth as much if not 
more than all the American gold borrowed during the war, was not widely accepted in the 
United States. Calvin Coolidge, in office from 1923 to 1929, was of the same view. The 
president reflected the opinion of the great part of the American public by flatly 
remarking: "They hired the money, didn't they?" 100 In 1926, in an agreement between 
98 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Norton, 1972), 132. 
99 In 1927, 14.4 percent of Germany's total imports came from the United States, 6.5 percent from Great 
Britain and 4.1 percent from France. In that same year 10.9 percent of Germany's total export went to 
Great Britain, 7.2 percent went to the United States and 4.4 percent to France. "Germany," Encyclopcedia 
Britannica, 1942, vol. 10, 251. 
100 Donald R. McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, The Quiet President (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), 
190. 
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Andrew Mellon and Henry Beranger of the Paul Painleve government, France agreed to 
pay its debt in sixty-one annuities totaling, with interest, 6.8 billion dollars. 101 Britain had 
come to a similar agreement with the United States in 1922 and paid her first annuity in 
1923. 102 
If the Americans refused to cancel the debt, they felt they did prove their good 
will by asking very low interest rates. 103 To the touchy Europeans any interest was 
outrageous. In reference to the perceived American greed, British and French renamed 
Uncle Sam, "Uncle Shylock."104 
E. The German economy and the reparations. 
Germany had made its first reparation payment of one billion gold marks on 
1 September 1921. 105 With the economic crisis developing it became apparent that 
Germany would not be able to come up with her second payment in 1922 and had already 
begun defaulting on her deliveries in kind (lumber, coal, etc.). On 11 January 1923, to 
101 Georges Bonnet claimed that Beranger had obtained from the United States an agreement to cancel the 
debt contracted by the French government from the United States treasury during the war! France was only 
limited to the post-war debts. Georges Bonnet, Le Quai d'Orsay sous trois republiques (Paris: Fayard, 
1961), 102. I have found no evidence substantiating this. 
102 In 1929 President Hoover even offered to cancel the British debt in exchange for Bennuda, Trinidad 
and British Honduras. Great Britain refused. Mc Coy, Calvin Coolidge, 191. 
103 
"On February 9, 1922 the United States Congress set up the World War Foreign Debt to collect debts 
by 1947 with at least 4.5 percent interest." Madan Gopal Gupta, International Relations, 44. 
104 Shylock: Rapacious character in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice. 
105 I gold mark= 6.146 grains of gold, I gold dollar= 25.08 grains (before 1934 devaluation). 
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force the transfers of raw materials, France, Belgium, and Italy sent technicians --
protected by French and Belgian troops -- into the Ruhr to collect the urgently needed 
coal. 106 In retaliation the German workers, financially supported by their government, 
went on strike, the German heavy industry stopped production. 
The events in the Ruhr sent the already high inflation out of control; by 
September, Gustav Stresemann, who had become chancellor in August 1923, had to call 
off the strike. Germany had brought on the disaster upon itself by first financing the War, 
the reparations and the Ruhr strike through inflation, but because of the occupation, 
Germany was seen as the victim of French vindictiveness. 107 
Moved by the struggle of the German underdog, the United States government 
encouraged a plan to aid Germany and to resolve the dual problem of debt and reparation. 
On 14 January 1924, the Dawes Committee began its meetings in Paris. It was to 
propose to stabilize the currency and balance the budget. On 9 April 1924 the plan was 
made public, it made possible the financing of the German recovery with the creation of 
the Reichsmark distributed by a centralized Reichsbank. 108 The Dawes plan also set a 
106 The direct consequence of the occupation of the Ruhr was the unification of all Germans. Jacquemin, 
La vie publique, 77. 
107 The notion that Germany had brought on the crisis upon herself was denied by prominent Germans 
such as Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, of the Reichsbank. He argued that no German government 
would willfully deprive its people of their savings and "that no country which participated in the War 
escaped inflation." Hjalmar Schacht, The End of Reparations, The Economic Consequences of World War, 
trans. Lewis Gannett. Introduction by George Glasgow, ed., (New York: Jonathan Cape & Harrison Smith, 
1931), 32-33. 
108 Madan Gopal Gupta, International Relations, 45. 
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schedule of payment for the reparations but did not deal with the total of reparations nor 
set a date for the last payment. 
In 1929 a new plan had become necessary because the German economy was 
growing exponentially on a very weak foundation. The easy credit and inflation had not 
encouraged savings and Germany still had to contend with the reparations. As with 
Dawes, an unofficial American delegation was invited by the reparation commission. It 
comprised Owen D. Young, J.P. Morgan, and other "heavy" financiers and experts. The 
American delegation was to join, in Paris, the delegations from France, England, 
Belgium, Italy, Japan, and Germany to form a committee to settle the reparations 
problem. Dr. Schacht of the Reichsbank represented Germany. 
The Young committee had to come up with a new amount that would satisfy the 
former allies and Germany. 109 After four months of tense negotiations the committee 
came to a compromise solution acceptable to all parties on 7 June 1929. Germany was to 
meet her obligations in fifty-nine annual installments, divided between the "unconditional 
portion corresponding to the reparations [ ... ] and the conditional portion strictly 
equivalent to the obligations of the German creditors to the United States." 110 
Conditional meant that if the United States lowered or cancelled the funds owed them, the 
allies would lower or cancel the conditional portion of the reparations due by Germany. 
109 Ida Minerva Tarbell, Owen D. Young, A New Type of Industrial Leader (New York: Macmillan 
Company, 1932), 190. 
110 
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45 
The installments would begin at 1.65 billion gold marks, to rise to 2.3 billion. 111 For the 
first time, a final date for the final payment was set: 1988.112 The Reparation 
Commission was replaced by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) based in Basie, 
Switzerland. The creation of the BIS was significant because it meant the removal of 
foreign control over Germany's economy. The other purpose of the BIS was to ease 
central bank cooperation. The isolationists in the United States Congress, however, 
refused the participation of the Federal Reserve Bank.113 Also significant was that 
Germany could request a two-year moratorium on the conditional annuity. Again, 
Germany was also to benefit from any reduction of the debt to America. The Young plan 
recognized the link between debt and reparations, meaning that if Germany defaulted on 
the reparation, the allies could default on their debts. 114 The plan had also received the 
unofficial blessing of outgoing President Calvin Coolidge. 115 On 31 May 1929, the 
French National Assembly ratified the Young plan despite right wing opposition. In 
Germany, Hitler and Alfred Hugenberg, head of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
(DNVP) failed to prevent the ratification of the Young Plan with a plebiscite held on 22 
111 Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, 67. 
112 Eubank, World War II, Roots and Causes, 27. 
113 Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, The Gold Standard and the Great Depression (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 259, 264. 
114 
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115 Ibid., 6. Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 86. 
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December 1929. 116 Politically it was significant that the plan was accepted voluntarily by 
Germany, however, reluctantly, rather than imposed. The question of the debt was thus 
settled -- or so it seemed. 
A few months later, Wall Street crashed, an event which would eventually wreak 
world-wide havoc: bankruptcies, falling prices and unemployment. Particularly hard hit 
were three of the United States's chief clients: Great Britain, Germany, and Austria. 
France alone seemed unaffected. The typical response of all governments to the crisis 
was a policy of deflation which resulted in the tightening of the budgets. The other 
option would have been an inflationary process, but the example of Germany in 1923 was 
too frightening. Herbert Hoover and Ramsay MacDonald wanted to cut their military 
budgets, and thus called for a disarmament conference. 
Disarmament found few partisans in France -- the rattling of sabers across the 
Rhine by Theodor Dilsterberg and Franz Seldte's Stahlhelm (Steel Helmet), and Hitler's 
NSDAP (Nazis) made for a powerful deterrent. 117 The French were further appalled by 
renewed pressure from the United States and Great Britain to cancel the German war debt 
all together. The French would not yield on either account and appeared to many British 
and Americans as stingy warmongers and bullies. 
116 Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, translated from the Gennan by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: 
Random House, 1975), 262-266. 
117 Ibid., 87. Also in existence were the monarchist "Black Reichswehr" or "Free Corps" as well as the 
republican "Reichsbanner." 
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F. The Franco-American relations. 
Many Americans viewed the French unfavorably by 1931. Difficulties raised 
over Versailles, reparations, war debt, the military occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 harmed 
Franco-American relations. In addition, barriers raised by the United States, whether 
political or economic, hindered closer ties. 
French diplomacy had since the mid-twenties relaxed its ties with America and 
had let Great Britain become the go-between. The coming together of Secretary of State 
Frank B. Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand was a brilliant exception. 
Together, in 1928, they conceived of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war. 
French diplomacy was focussed essentially on the League of Nations and thus had 
only limited contacts with the United States through the American delegates present in 
Geneva in semi-official capacities. Because of their diminutive status, these men held 
little recognition in Washington. They were nonetheless key in diplomatic efforts such as 
the Young plan. 
Aristide Briand directed the French foreign diplomacy. He had held the French 
Foreign Ministry during the World War and by 1931 he was, despite many changes in 
governments, a quasi-permanent feature of the Quai d'Orsay. 118 When Pierre Laval 
118 Briand was foreign minister October 1915 - March 1917; January 1921 - January 1922; April 1925 -
January 1932. The last term was only fleetingly interrupted by Edouard Herriot in July 1926. Graham 
Ross, The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System, 1914-1945 (New York: Longman, 
1983), 148-149. Also Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, The First Institutional Responses 
to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), 235. 
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formed his government in 1931, Briand was naturally confirmed in his post as foreign 
minister. The old diplomat's greatest accomplishment had been to lay the foundation of 
normal relations between France and Germany down, at Locarno in 1925. It was ironic 
that what Briand was probably best known for, the outlawing of war, did not occur by 
design. It stemmed, not from some high minded aim, but, from France's craving for 
security and Briand's attempt at drawing the United States out of isolationism. Briand 
thought to lay the basis of a Franco-American alliance by stating in a pact that France and 
the United States would never wage war against each other. Kellogg was reluctant to 
engage the United States in any bilateral treaties but was pressured by pacifists at home to 
pursue the idea. Eventually Briand's idea broadened into a general condemnation of war 
as instrument of national policy which was eventually signed by almost every country in 
the world. Though devoid of any means of enforcement, the treaty did have the merit to 
clearly state the objectional nature of war. Briand had not obtained what he had sought 
but gained immense popularity in France and abroad. It also earned Kellogg the 1929 
Nobel Peace Prize. 
Briand's quest for national security led him also to consider a loose European 
Federation. The logic here was of course that nations who governed together were less 
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likely to wage war on each other. Briand surveyed the European heads of state but the 
proposal for a European Federation did not generate much enthusiasm. 119 
G. Franco-German relations 
Much French good will vis-a-vis Germany was lost overnight when Stresemann's 
personal papers were made public in France in April 1931. The former foreign minister 
and chancellor, who had passed away on 3 October 1929, had allegedly written that he 
had duped Briand at Thoiry to obtain greater concessions from France. 120 This latest 
119 Graf Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi ( 1894-1972) developed the concept of a pan-Europe. He 
argued that the 25 (Continental) European States needed to form the United States of Europe to counter 
balance the Soviet Union, the British Empire and the United States. This idea developed in the Austrian 
and German Press since 1922 found a French audience in 1924 after the victory of the Cartel des Gauches. 
Briand was interested in the idea. On l May 1930, Briand under the hospices of the League of Nation sent 
out a memorandum to all 27 European governments essentially requesting them to state their position on the 
idea ofa loose European Federation. Only Yugoslavia and Bulgaria fully endorsed the concept. Greece, 
Norway and Czechoslovakia had but minor reservations; the other nations politely rejected the idea. Jean 
Baptiste Duroselle, L'Europe l'Histoire de ses Peuples (Paris: Perrin, 1990), 358-360. 
120 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 43. Thoiry, a small French village near Geneva, was the 
scene in mid-September 1926 of the first of several secret negotiations between Stresemann and Briand. 
France was experiencing grave financial strains and the two diplomats discussed the retrocession of Eupen, 
Malmedy and the Saar, as well as the evacuation of the Rhineland in exchange of the commercialization of 
the German reparation bonds under the Dawes Plan. The bonds, payable over thirty-seven years 
represented mortgages on the German state railways and German industry. Their commercialization would 
make funds available immediately. Sally Marks, The Jl/usion of Peace, International Relations in Europe 
1918-1933, 80, 82-84. Blumenthal, Illusion and Reality in Franco American Diplomacy, 136. 
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development only compounded the awful impression made by Hitler's success in the 
elections of 14 September 1930. The Nazi Party went from 12 to 107 seats in the 
Reichstag and had become the second largest party after the Social Democrats. Many 
Frenchmen felt that they had been tricked in evacuating the Rhineland, especially since 
they were barred, by the 1925 Locarno agreement, from reoccupying it. 121 
On 3 March 1931 the approval of the foreign ministry's budget by 551 votes 
against 14 at the National Assembly marked enthusiastic support ofBriand's policy. 122 
Now a few weeks later, Briand, aging but still sharp, had to defend the same policies in 
the National Assembly against his enemies -- chiefly, Deputy Henri Franklin-Bouillon --
who always opposed his politics. He had barely fended off one barrage of attacks, when 
news of the 19 March 1931 Protocol of Vienna outlining an Austro-German Zollunion 
(custom union) project reached Paris. 123 This brought the Chamber of Deputies to a boil. 
Franklin-Bouillon denounced Briand's lack of foresight. Briand successfully countered 
the attack with his usual bite and wit, but he was just as upset by the Austro-German 
121 Bonnet, Le Quai d'Orsay, 106-107. 
122 Bonnefous, Histoire Po/itique, tome cinquieme, 78. 
123 For the text of the Protocol of Vienna see Documentation on International Affairs, 1931, ed. John W. 
Wheeler-Bennett, (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), 3-6. Hereafter referred to as DIA. A very 
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Scroggs, The United States in World Affairs, An Account of American Foreign Relations, 1931 (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1932), 107-123. 
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proposal as the rest of the assembly. 124 Laval closed the debate in a speech endorsing the 
policy of his foreign minister and condemning the Zollzmion. 125 
A few weeks later, on 13 May, Briand lost the presidential elections which could 
have been the crowning achievement of his illustrious career. Though he had declared his 
candidacy at the last moment, it was thought that Briand would win easily over Paul 
Doumer and the other candidates. The first ballot put Doumer in the lead with 442 votes 
for 401 for Briand, along with 15 votes for Jean Hennessy and 10 for Cachin. 126 
Disheartened, Briand chose not to compete in the second round and withdrew his 
candidacy. 127 Authors Rene Escaich, Edouard Bonnefous, to name but a few, repeated 
the rumors heard in Briand's entourage; namely that it was Premier Laval's fault for 
supporting Paul Doumer. 128 Or even worse, that it was a deliberate maneuver by Laval to 
124 Bernard Oudin, Aristide Briand. La paix: une idee neuve en Europe (Paris: Laffont, 1987), 540. 
125 
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compromise Briand's prestige in the world. 129 These assumptions, however, makes little 
sense since Laval was a supporter of Briand and his policy. If indeed Laval wanted 
Briand out of the Quai d'Orsay, as some contended, what better way than having Briand 
win the presidency! In part the rumor mill got its grist because many thought, wrongly, 
of Laval as a creature of Tardieu, and he is said not to have supported Briand in this 
instance. Though they were in the same cabinet, Tardieu and Briand did not always see 
eye to eye on foreign policy. Blaming Laval or Tardieu was to ignore that the recent 
troubles from Germany influenced the vote and was to dismiss the valid candidacy of 
Paul Doumer. It should be noted that none of the accusers presented the testimony of a 
deputy or a senator to substantiate their accusations. 
Furthermore, Briand himself had supported the candidacy of Doumer, before 
Briand's entourage (namely Alexis Leger and Gilbert Peycelon according to British 
coincided with those of Briand. Binion, Defeated Leaders, 310. 
Briand's entourage: The Quai d'Orsay appeared to be the center of an unusual amount of intrigue. 
At the heart was Philippe Berthelot who had entered the diplomatic corps in 1889 and eventually became 
Secretary-General in 1920. Despite being involved in no less than two financial scandals, Berthelot 
managed to always come back to the Foreign Office. His resilience was attributed in part to his Freemason 
connections. Berthelot surrounded himself with a "remarkable band of subordinates" devoted to him. At · 
the time of the Laval government his influence on Briand was challenged by Briand's "Chef de Cabinet" 
Alexis Leger, and Briand's private secretary, Gilbert Peycelon. Berthelot, a friend of Leon Blum, was 
distrusted by Poincare and Tardieu. Outside the Quai, women played an important role of influence through 
political salons such as the one of Mme de Vilmorin. "Berthelot, Philippe," "Biographies of Leading 
Personages in France." BDFA, Doc. 59, pp. 167-168. "Leger, Alexis," ibid., pp. 179-180. "Blum, Leon," 
ibid., p. 168. 
129 In analyzing the event through the prism of World War II, Edge wrote: "In view of Laval's later 
treachery I am inclined to accept the latter view [Laval's maneuvering to defeat Briand]." Walter Evans 
Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal, Fifty years of American Business and Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1948), I 90. 
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Ambassador William George Tyrrell) convinced him he should run himself. 130 Yet he did 
not clearly declare himself a candidate until the eve of the election. 131 Also why did 
Briand withdraw after the first ballot? He could have regained the support of Edouard 
Daladier's left-wing Radical Socialists whose votes had failed him the first time. 132 
Briand got involved in a race he had not wished to enter, yet the defeat crushed his spirit. 
Bitterly disappointed, perhaps believing that he had been betrayed, Briand offered his 
resignation, which Laval could not accept. 133 Indeed, Laval succeeded in convincing 
Briand to stay. 134 As Ambassador Tyrrell pointed out, the capital of sympathy generated 
for Briand because of his defeat ensured the continuance of Briand's policy.135 
130 
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H. Laval and Briand 
No doubt, Briand was physically diminished. Slowly poisoned by the effects of 
uremia, he fell asleep at inopportune moments and lacked the drive he once had. Yet he 
could still surprise his interlocutors with his knowledge and sharp analysis. 136 During the 
year 1931, Laval took an increasing interest in France's foreign diplomacy, which greatly 
upset the staff of the Quai d'Orsay. Possibly the entourage could not admit to the fact that 
the poet of peace no longer was the man he had been, and certainly did not appreciate that 
Laval should tramp on the diplomatic turf. Despite allegations to the contrary, no 
evidence supported that Laval aimed at eliminating Briand. In fact, Laval generally 
followed the foreign policy established by Briand; Laval's methods; however, were 
different. 137 
Briand and Laval's friendship dated from the days of the "Stockholm, etoile 
polaire" speech. Briand had then showed kindness, when few others dared, to the young 
deputy who had dangerously exposed himself. 138 At the exciting times of Locamo, 
Briand, then premier and foreign minister, brought Laval from the ministry of public 
works to the trusted position of under-secretary to the premier. Briand also gave Laval 
136 Heinrich Bruning, Memoiren, 1918-1934 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), 340. 
137 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 44. Jacquemin, La vie publique, 81. 
138 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 31-32. 
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the prestigious post of minister of justice, an essential stepping stone on the path to 
premiership. 139 
The two men resembled each other. They had similar backgrounds: Briand's 
father owned a drinking establishment, Laval's an inn. They were emotionally attached to 
the land and delighted in their farms. They were hommes de gauche (men of the left) 
though they had abandoned the Socialist Party to become independents. They abhorred 
war. Their likeness extended to their personal habits, they were avid smokers of heavy 
tobaccos and tended, by 1930s standard, to be slovenly.140 
Their difference revealed itself in their respective diplomatic methods. While 
Briand was a great believer in the League of Nations and used his orator's talents in its 
arena, Laval never shared Briand's faith in the League and preferred personal contacts 
with the other heads of state. 141 Laval also frequently used the telephone to contact his 
interlocutors directly and get their immediate reaction. 142 It was this personal approach 
139 Cole, Laval, 89. 
140 Bernard Oudin, Aristide Briand, 537-538. Laval would smoke two to three packs ofBaltos daily, harsh 
tobacco which would yellow his fingers and blacken his teeth. Cointet, Pierre Laval, 93. Kupferman 
reported that he would smoke anything Gitanes, Bastos, Gauloises as well as American cigarettes one after 
another transforming everything in a smoke den. Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 74. 
Madame Boussard noted Premier Laval's sloppy eating in a chance encounter in a dining car. 
Conversation with Madame Jacqueline Boussard, June 1991. 
141 
"voir ce qu'ils ont dans le ventre" (lit. to see what they have in the gut). Jacquemin, La vie publique, 81. 
"Laval[ ... ] a le mepris de la SDN." (Laval[ ... ] has contempt for the league) Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 77. 
142 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 48. 
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that allowed him to meet with many significant leaders of his time: Ramsay MacDonald, 
Benito Mussolini, Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and Herbert Clark Hoover. 
America's isolationism, the war debt problems, France's difficult relations not 
only with its former enemy but also its British and American allies, the economic chaos 
in Germany and the effects of the Wall Street debacle on global economies had the 
diplomatic field on edge. Briand's diplomacy which had generated so much hope for the 
reconciliation of France and Germany was under attack at home. The announcement of 
President Hoover's moratorium, against a backdrop of international and national tension, 
gave Laval his first diplomatic challenge. 
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CHAPTER 
III 
THE HOOVER MORATORIUM 
The Hoover Moratorium of 1931, the proposal of the American president to freeze 
all intergovernmental debt for a one-year period, according to author and political advisor 
McGeorge Bundy, was "the most significant action taken by an American president for 
Europe since Woodrow Wilson's administration." 143 The reality was that the United 
States had enormous stakes in Germany: long-term German borrowers owed the United 
States private sector more than $1.25 billion; the short-term debt neared $1 billion. By 
comparison, the entire United States national income in 1931 was just $54 billion. To put 
it into perspective, authors Walter Lippmann and William 0. Scroggs stated in The 
United States in World Affairs, An Account of American Foreign Relations, that "the 
American stake in Germany's government and private obligations was equal to half that 
of all the rest of the world combined."144 
The proposed moratorium would also benefit Great Britain's investment in 
Germany's private sector making more likely the repayment of those loans while the 
143 Herbert Hoover, "Proposal of the American Government, June 20" in Press Releases, 3 January- 27 
June 1931, weekly issues nos. 66-91A (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), 481-484. Papers 
relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1931, vol. I (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1946), xxiii, xxv. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 205-206. 
144 Lippmann, The United States, 152. 
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public indebtedness was frozen. It certainly was in Hoover's interest to offer aid to an 
ailing British economy in light of Great Britain's indebtedness to the United States. 
France, on the other hand, had a relatively small stake in Germany's private debt but a 
huge interest in German reparations; and payment to France would be compromised 
under Hoover's moratorium. 145 
A. The Zollunion 
The impetus for Hoover's proposal for the moratorium emerged from a new 
financial crisis in central Europe. The customs union (Zollunion) between Germany and 
Austria was at the root of the problem. 
On 19 March 1931, Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Johannes 
Schober and German Foreign Secretary Julius Curtius publicly expressed a desire to 
create a customs union, an economic agreement specifically forbidden under the 1919 
Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye as was "any act which might [ ... ] compromise 
[Austria's] independence." 146 This prohibition was further underscored in the Geneva 
Protocol of October 1922, in which, in exchange for aid, Austria agreed to "not violate 
145 Ibid., 147-153. 
146 Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (1919), article 88: "The Independence of Austria is inalienable 
otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League ofNations. Consequently, Austria undertakes 
in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly 
or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to 
membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another power." Article 80 in the 
Versailles treaty held similar conditions for Germany. DIA, I. 
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her economic independence by granting to any State a special regime or exclusive 
advantages calculated to threaten this independence. " 147 The Austrian and German 
financial markets reacted favorably to the announcement, but of course the proposed 
formation fell under immediate scrutiny. 
Public opinion in France, fearing any resurgence of the Teutonic threat, was 
loudly reflected in the French press. The Council of the League of Nations started 
debating the legitimacy of the customs union. To avoid further turmoil Schober and 
Curtius withdrew the Zollunion project which announcement caused the German and 
Austrian markets to falter. 148 Eventually the International Court at The Hague would 
strike the proposal down and confirm its demise. 
Schober and Curtius, attempting to justify their actions, claimed they revealed 
their project in response to rampant rumors that arose when the two met in Vienna. They 
continued they wanted to avoid surprising the world with afait accompli and that they 
saw the Zollunion as a precursor to a greater European free trade union. They added that 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid, 2. The Zollunion project was planned by Curtius in order to prevent Schober's Austria from 
falling in the Italian sphere of influence. This enterprise might not have been sanctioned by Chancellor 
Bruning and went against Hoesch's (German Ambassador in Paris) councils of prudence. William G. 
Ratliff, Faithful to the Fatherland, Julius Curtius and Weimar Foreign Policy (New York: Peter Lang, 
1990), 126-8, 139. Further reading on background to the Zollunion: Klemens von Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel 
Christian Statesman in a Time of Crisis (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972). On 
Schober read Petra Holzer, Johannes Schober: eine ''persona non grata" (Master's Thesis, Wiener 
Universitat, Diplomatische Arbeit, 1990). 
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they were well aware of their treaty obligations and intended to submit their proposal to 
the League ofNations. 149 No one believed them. 
Looking back, it appeared the Zollunion project could have existed since February 
1930, and possibly as far back as 1927.150 According to German Foreign Ministry 
Staatssekretiir Bernhard von Billow, its release was timed to coincide with the review of 
Briand's European union proposal "to give it a pan-European cloak." 151 
Curtius retained his ministry but as a diplomat he was finished, from then on the 
foreign policy of Germany would be conducted by Chancellor Brilning. 152 The entire 
diplomatic debacle only led to distrust and bruised pride. It was yet another event that 
perpetuated the widespread belief that "German diplomacy" was an oxymoron in any 
language. 
149 
"Note by Sir R. Vansittart," 21 March 1931" and enclosure "Documents communicated by the Austrian 
Minister," DBFP, vol. II, 1931, 2-4. 
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B. The Credit Anstalt' s Crack 
Author William Starr Myers wrote that the French recalled the short-term 
securities held in Austria and Germany to force the withdrawal of the customs project.153 
The assumption that French financial sanctions rippled through the already fragile 
Austrian economy and caused the ruin, in May 1931, of the Credit Anstalt, the largest 
bank of Austria, was tempting but wholly unsubstantiated. 154 If the French did take part 
in the monetary disaster, it was by refusing to open new credits without political 
concessions after the Credit Anstalt's crack. 155 The French conditional assistance 
denounced as blackmail did of course not help Franco-German relations. 156 
Central Europe was panic-stricken. Banks runs were especially acute in Austria 
and in Germany; foreign investors followed suit. Hoover thought Germany and Austria 
were heading for disaster. The President feared that a new financial collapse of Germany 
would have grave consequences for American investors and the American economy. The 
153 William Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-1933 (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1940), 175. 
154 The Credit Anstalt founded by the Rothschilds in 1855 survived the collapse of the Dual Monarchy and 
the end of World War I. In 1929 the Credit Anstalt was forced by the government to merge with the 
bankrupt Boden Credit Anstalt. With the Anglo Austrian Bank it had acquired in 1926 the Credit Anstalt 
controlled no less than three fourths of all Austrian banking operations. In Austria the Credit Anstalt 
propped up the ailing industry, world-wide it was intimately bonded with all the major banks especially 
those of Central Europe. Lippmann, The United States, 126-128. 
155 Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War, 338. John W. Wheeler-Bennett who wrote an indictment of the French 
financial policy of the 1930s did not even allude to France with regards to the failure of the Credit Anstalt. 
Wheeler-Bennett, The Wreck of Reparations, 36; 110-113. 
156 Lippmann, The United States, 130. Wheeler-Bennett, The Wreck of Reparations, 110-113. 
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American national income was dropping steadily. From $82.7 billion in 1929, it fell to 
$69 billion in 1930, and $54 billion in 1931, reaching its lowest point at $40 billion in 
1932.157 Hoover felt he had to intervene to advert a new financial disaster for America. 
On 5 June, Hoover confided to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson that he 
thought a moratorium was necessary. 158 Stimson approved wholeheartedly but the 
president now hesitated, wondering if it would do more harm than good. One of his 
concerns was that it would link the war debts and the reparations, a link that had only 
been admitted unofficially because of the Young plan. 159 The situation in Europe grew 
worse and on 18 June Hoover made his decision and thought and obtained the support of 
the leading members of the House and Senate including, of course, the all-important 
Senator Borah. 160 
C. Announcement and Reception of the Moratorium 
To succeed fully the moratorium needed the endorsement of the other large 
creditor nations, in particular France. On the afternoon of Friday, 19 June 1931, Stimson 
informed French Ambassador Paul Claude! of a proposed suspension of all 
157 
"United States of America" Encyc/opcedia Britannica, vol. 22, 1942, p. 746. 
158 Henry L. Stimson, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries (New Haven: Yale University Library), 5 June 1931, 
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intergovernmental debt. 161 McGeorge Bundy reported that the next day President Hoover 
was forced to announce the moratorium because of rumors originating from Capitol 
Hill. 162 The president released a press statement that mentioned a plan "directed to 
strengthening the situation in Germany" which had received a "gratifying" response from 
the "leaders of both parties." 163 
At the time Stimson communicated Hoover's moratorium in Washington on 
Friday afternoon it was evening in Paris, and Briand had left for the country, probably for 
his property in Normandy. Philippe Berthelot, Secretaire General du Quai d'Orsay, was 
on hand to receive Claudel's telegram. 164 Most members of the government and the 
National Assembly, however, were informed of the Moratorium through the weekend 
press. It was not until late Sunday morning that United States Ambassador in Paris, 
Walter Evans Edge, who had not been fully informed of the new proposal either, was able 
161 
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164 For Philippe Berthelot see "Briand's Entourage" in footnote 128. 
64 
to get a clear picture from the decoded telegrams.165 It was now Edge's privilege to 
explain the United States' actions at a reception which happened to be held that day by 
President Doumer for the members of the Diplomatic corps and the French Government 
officials at the Longchamps races. Edge recalled: 
My arrival at Longchamps was something of a sensation because 
the announcement of the moratorium had already appeared in the early 
afternoon newspapers, and members of both the French government and of 
the diplomatic corps were waiting for an explanation. After presenting my 
compliments to the President, I drew aside M. Flandin, the Minister of 
Finance, told him briefly what I knew of the President's announcement, 
adding: 
"The President has certainly made a remarkable contribution to a 
solution of the pressing financial problem, hasn't he, Mr. Minister?" 
Mr. Flandin unhesitatingly replied: "Yes, Mr. Ambassador, but 
you must realize that France occupies a very different relationship to 
German obligations compared to Great Britain or any of the other allies, 
including the United States." 166 
Despite his bravado, Edge knew full well that the moratorium and the events leading up 
to the moratorium -- in addition of Hoover's poor sense of timing -- had several elements 
that could only enrage the French. 
Not only had the French not been consulted, but the British and the Germans 
appeared to have been. The impression was created by a meeting held at the country 
residence of the British prime minister MacDonald in Chequers, England. from 5 to 9 
165 Walter Evans Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal, 190. 
Walter Evans Edge, a republican, governor of New Jersey "old friend, [of] Senator William E. 
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June 1931. MacDonald and his Foreign Secretary Henderson met with German 
Chancellor Heinrich Bruning and Foreign Secretary Curtius. 167 
Chequers was essentially a public relations ploy, the British hoping to strengthen 
the position of Bruning after another Nazi success in the elections in Oldenburg.168 On 
the one hand they did discuss the feasibility of a moratorium: on the other no word of it 
had been given to the press.169 Henderson, however, had duly briefed Briand of these 
developments. 170 Soon after the Chequers meeting the British statesmen met with United 
States Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon, who arrived in London on 16 June. 
These meetings, in combination with the formal announcement of the 
moratorium, now excited suspicion in French parliamentary circles always wary of the 
perfidious Albion. 171 Again, suspicion was not justified, for Stimson referred to this 
167 Also present Sir Robert Vansittart, Sir Francis Leith-Ross, Dr. Schmidt (Interpreter), Governor of the 
Bank of England, Montagu Collet Norman, German Ambassador and Count Bemstoff. "Summary of the 
Discussion with the German Ministers at 'Chequers,'" Saturday, 7 June 1931, in "Mr. A Henderson to Mr. 
Yenken (Berlin)," 13 June 1931, DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. II, 71. 
168 
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169 
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170 
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specific moratorium in a phone conversation with Ramsay MacDonald only as early as 19 
June, the same day on which French ambassador Claudel was notified. 172 
The awful misunderstanding was further strengthened by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht of 
the Reichsbank. Schacht had become an active pro-Nazi after the December 1930 
election and was, at the time of the announcement, on a conference tour in the United 
States advocating the end of reparations. 173 This was of course echoed by the American 
bankers who were concerned about their foolish investments in Germany and hoped to 
alleviate the German burden so that they might be reimbursed. 174 
Suspicion was compounded by the plea made by President Paul von Hindenburg. 
Author William Starr Myers believed it was "spontaneous." 175 It was in fact staged at the 
request of President Hoover to justify his actions to the American public. As Robert 
Lambel, journalist for the weekly L 'Illustration, remarked, normal protocol would have 
172 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 205. "Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone 
Conversation," 19 June 1931, FRUS, 29-30. 
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had Chancellor Briining make the call. 176 The study of the telegrams and dispatches 
clearly showed that the plea had been requested. 177 To Hoover's credit, the request was 
only put out on 19 June 1931, again on the same day Claudel was apprised. 
The question of "conspiracy" aside, the moratorium procedure established in the 
Young plan had been blatantly disregarded by President Hoover. Under the Young Plan 
any moratorium had to be announced three months in advance. The impending financial 
catastrophe that caused Hoover to act without taking into consideration that the French 
and the British had just made their payments to the United States, while Germany had not 
paid America's European allies. 178 Even worse, the president took a stand against the 
reparations: 
We [the United States government] purposely did not participate in either 
general reparations or the division of colonies or property. The repayment 
of debts due to us from the Allies for the advances for war and 
reconstruction was settled upon a basis not contingent upon German 
reparations. Therefore reparations are necessarily wholly a European 
problem with which we have no relation. 179 
176 Lambel, L 'Illustration, 4 July 1931, 342. 
177 
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,------ --------------------- -----------------------------
If the Chamber of Deputies accepted the moratorium as it was, the Young plan would 
become obsolete. The prospect and the uncertainty of new negotiations was, at best, 
upsetting. The deputies also had to consider public opinion: after all had the army not 
occupied the Ruhr only eight years earlier to secure these reparations? Had the Rhineland 
not been evacuated by Tardieu the year before in response to the Young Plan?180 The 
French had been extremely disappointed, for rather than subsiding, the revisionist 
diatribes in Germany against France, the Versailles treaty, and the Young plan had only 
grown in intensity. 181 For many French, force seemed the only language the Germans 
understood. Only concerns of France's position and reputation in the world moderated 
the outcry for an outright rejection of Hoover's moratorium. 
D. Franco-American Negotiations 
The negotiations, which could have been conducted with discretion prior to the 
announcement, were now held under world scrutiny. France had been placed in a 
position which could have national and international repercussions: the coalition 
supporting Laval's government could disintegrate over this issue or Hoover might 
withdraw his proposal and lay the blame on France. 
180 The German press was bitter in its response to the evacuation, generally denouncing the cost (the 
Young Plan), and the timing (four years after Rapallo ). "Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin) to Mr. A. Henderson," 3 
July 1930, BDFA, part II, series F, Europe, vol. I, Germany 1930, doc. 75, pp. 173-174. Ibid., doc. 76, pp. 
174-175. 
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As mentioned above, on Sunday, 21 June 1931, Edge met informally with the 
French government at Longchamp. Pierre-Etienne Flandin made it clear at that time that 
the circumstances surrounding the proposal of the moratorium were thought to be 
suspicious in French parliamentary circles. 182 Flandin also suggested that a visit of 
Andrew Mellon to Paris would help allay these suspicions. Laval wondered: "Ifwe do 
renounce our right to reparation payments for our devastated regions, what guarantee will 
be given us by the United States and Great Britain that these payments will be resumed at 
the end of one year?" 183 Without Briand, expected back on Monday late afternoon, 
Berthelot was a privileged interlocutor. The Quai d'Orsay's second-in-charge 
characterized the proposal as "very interesting." 184 
Edge, who had a clear understanding of the French reaction, was able to convey it 
to his government. Washington took the words of Plandin very seriously, and Hoover 
asked Mr. Mellon to travel to Paris "as soon as possible." 185 Stimson also cabled 
Frederick M. Sackett, United States Ambassador in Germany, to urge Bruning and 
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Curtius to "do whatever can be done to clear away any [French] misapprehensions which 
may [ ... ] exist." 186 
The French outcry was particularly frustrating for Hoover in the light of the 
generally positive world response to his proposal. 187 Some nations, such as Great Britain, 
Belgium, Hungary had reservations about the breadth of the proposal but would bend to 
what was hoped to be the greater good of the majority. 188 
Edge met again with Berthelot on Monday. Berthelot reassured the American 
ambassador that he knew that the French government had been kept properly appraised 
despite the allegations in the French press to the contrary. Berthelot agreed that 
international measures such as the Hoover proposal were necessary to respond to the 
situation in Germany. However agreeable the Quai's number two was, the decision 
makers were Briand and Laval. Berthelot could only promise that the matter of the 
proposal would be the first item on the agenda for the Tuesday cabinet meeting. 189 
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Edge was finally able to meet with Briand. He hoped that Briand would exert a 
moderating influence on the discussion. He was disappointed. Briand felt that Hoover's 
proposal was but another blow against his efforts at Franco-German reconciliation. 
Briand was particularly rankled by the method Hoover had chosen to announce the plan. 
France was being treated as an enemy nation not an ally. He suspected that the president 
of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, had had a hand in the plans during his visit to 
New York a few weeks back. Finally, he surmised that the Germans must have intimated 
that the French not be consulted. Yet despite his ire, Briand promised he would make the 
French reply as conciliatory as possible. 190 
Flandin, the finance minister, in a meeting with Laval underscored the tremendous 
cost for France, two billion francs, and favored rejection of the moratorium. 191 Tardieu 
and the war minister Andre Maginot agreed with Flandin. Maginot might have been 
additionally irritated at Hoover's call for French disarmament. The "cheerless giant" 
Flandin represented the Alliance Democratique, a small but essential party in Laval's 
majority in the chamber.192 Laval, however, sought a compromise solution. He was 
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much more receptive to the Berthelot's idea of conveying the unconditional portion of the 
German reparations to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 193 
J. Theodore Marriner, the United States Counselor of Embassy, met with Laval on 
Monday afternoon. Laval indicated that his government would accept the proposal under 
the stipulation that the unconditional portion of the debt should be given to the BIS. 194 
This was not acceptable to Hoover, and Edge was urged to convey this to Laval as soon 
as possible, preferably before the Cabinet meeting. 195 
Laval received Edge at the Ministry of the Interior between cabinet sessions. To 
avoid the press hounds, Edge made a discreet entrance through a side door. Laval 
"apologized for the tone of the French press and the tendency of some parliamentarians to 
go, as he described it, 'beyond the bounds of decency' in their attack on President Hoover 
and his proposal." 196 Edge explained the purpose of his visit, to which Laval responded 
that the French government wished the German government to pay the unconditional part 
193 The Bank oflntemational Settlements (BIS) had been set up by the Young Plan. Bruce Kent The 
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to the BIS so that these funds not be diverted to the construction of pocket battle ships, 
unfair competition (dumping) or "exploitation of the countries to the east." 197 
Laval and Edge met again after the cabinet meeting. Laval's position remained 
unchanged, and he urged the United States government not to do anything until Friday 
when the French response would be up for a vote at the National Assembly. The 
National Assembly vote was necessary because the proposal breached the Young Plan, 
and only the Assembly had the power to approve these changes.198 He also indicated that 
he had already arranged to invite Bruning to Paris. Laval was appreciative of Briining's 
radio speech in which he had thanked Hoover for his proposal and hoped for a Franco-
German understanding. 199 
On 25 June Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon made it across the 
Channel.200 Mellon had been sent to Paris from London both to allay French suspicion 
and to obtain an agreement.201 Flandin met with his American counterpart but was clearly 
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unimpressed by Mellon's justifications.202 After a few days of inescapable negotiations 
between the government and the key members of the National Assembly on the one hand 
and between the French and Americans on the other, Laval addressed the National 
Assembly at 3 :00 p.m. Friday, 26 June 1931. As author Kupferman put it: "the jurist of 
the Quai prepared him a speech, which spared the goat and the cabbage. 11203 It agreed in 
principle to the moratorium but insisted that the sanctity of the Young plan should be 
maintained. Despite their aversion to the moratorium Flandin and Tardieu stood by 
Laval. 
The gathered deputies had to vote on the survival of the Laval government. The 
ensuing debate lasted until the wee hours of the night. Finally at 6:30 a.m. the following 
day, the Laval "Government obtained a vote of confidence, the result being 386 to 
189."204 If Laval did not obtain the full support of his own majority, he did receive the 
support of the Socialists (SFIO), won over by the Premier's intervention.205 Laval's 
Minister of Agriculture, Tardieu stifled a great deal of the opposition on the right. Again 
Tardieu wanted to reject the moratorium but out of governmental solidarity and 
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friendship he gave his support to Laval.206 Some deputies had also been in part mollified 
by Chancellor Brilning's radio address to the German people, in which he had welcomed 
the Hoover initiative, but more importantly expressed his confidence in improved Franco-
German relations.207 The Chamber, while approving Laval's response to the Hoover 
proposition, underscored its attachment to the Young plan, which Hoover had badly 
bruised in his announcement of the moratorium.208 
While the vote had for all intents and purposes been an endorsement of the 
Hoover moratorium, Laval's enemies made great issue of the negotiations held after the 
vote which had extended until 6 July 1931. These negotiations between Edge, Mellon, 
Marriner, and Pell on the American side, and Laval, Briand, Flandin, Pietri and 
Franc;ois-Poncet on the French side essentially imposed on a reluctant Hoover a face-
saving measure: the German payment was to be turned over to the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) as bonds guaranteed by the German railways.209 
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207 
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Mellon at the microphones and, from left to right, Pietri, Laval, Edge, Briand and Flandin. 
L 'Illustration, 4 July 1931 
The delay of seventeen days, following the Hoover's announcement, was blamed 
for the moratorium's lack of success.210 Undeniably the initial response had been 
extremely positive. The American, British and German financial markets responded 
favorably to the Hoover moratorium.211 The euphoria, however, was short-lived, and it 
was easy to argue that France's delayed response had undermined the psychological 
impact of the moratorium.212 
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friendship he gave his support to Laval. 206 Some deputies had also been in part mollified 
by Chancellor Briining's radio address to the German people, in which he had welcomed 
the Hoover initiative, but more importantly expressed his confidence in improved Franco-
German relations.207 The Chamber, while approving Laval's response to the Hoover 
proposition, underscored its attachment to the Young plan, which Hoover had badly 
bruised in his announcement of the moratorium.208 
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This was essentially a weak argument, as for all intents and purposes the plan 
received French endorsement the day of the vote at the National Assembly.213 
Furthermore, American investors weakened the moratorium as they resumed their 
withdrawal of funds from Germany which had been only temporarily checked 
immediately after the announcement of the moratorium. Henderson noted: 
The arrangements proposed in Franco-American agreement have not 
sufficed to restore confidence in [the] future economic position of 
Germany, and it is to be feared that markets tend now to regard the year's 
moratorium as an opportunity to withdraw their remaining credit from 
Germany rather than as an inducement to leave them there, still less to 
increase them.214 
The grave misunderstanding between the French and American governments was 
a direct consequence of the United States and France's lackadaisical diplomatic ties. 
Stimson was well aware that prior negotiations were necessary but felt he had to wait for 
the president's decision before he could submit the plan to the French.215 
Again, had the bond between America and France been closer, Hoover or Stimson 
could have communicated directly with Briand or Laval, as Hoover, Edge and Mellon did 
unable to confirm British involvement in the talks. 
213 Bonnefous for example did not even mention the negotiations, po.ssibl_y considering that the vote 
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over the transatlantic phone during the above-mentioned negotiations.216 Instead, these 
events created additional ill will between the two countries. 
The Hoover moratorium, even if applied in full force, would not have triggered 
the hoped for world recovery. Internationally, the success of the nationalists, in the 
elections of September 1930, had already lessened the confidence in Germany.217 David 
Carlton argued "Hoover's plan was in any case inadequate, because it failed to tackle the 
essential destabilizing factor, which was German self-pity and not intergovernmental 
debts."218 
An additional consideration was the supposition of deliberate sabotage by the 
Germans of their own economy to avoid payment. Such a concept was alien to 
mercantile British and Americans. To cynical Frenchmen it was plausible.219 Undeniably 
216 Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal, 198. 
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the high inflation before 1924 allowed the German government to wipe its internal debt 
and permitted the industry to clear its mortgages and bonds. Of course it did mean the 
ruin of the middle class. 220 
Because of poor communication France and the United States missed an 
opportunity to help the world economy. Though the Hoover Moratorium was put in place 
the hoped for positive impact on the German market did not occur and in the end it 
generated much ill will between Washington and Paris. Secretary of State Stimson, more 
worldly than his President, thought to improve this state of affairs by traveling to Europe. 
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CHAPTER 
IV 
NEW FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GOLD STANDARD 
A. All roads lead to Paris 
Secretary Stimson had planned a visit to Europe long before the moratorium 
cns1s. Since the affairs of the planet seeming somewhat stable after the moratorium, 
Stimson left for Europe with the president's blessing. He wanted to observe the Old 
World's problems first hand and to establish personal contacts with the European 
leaders.221 
Stimson's intention was to dedicate most of his trip to leisure and only a small 
portion to work. In Italy he was able to do just that. He met with Benito Mussolini and 
visited the sights. When he reached France, however, the German economy had taken a 
turn for the worse. As mentioned above, Hoover's call for a moratorium caused the 
American banks to increase the withdrawal of their investments in Germany and German 
capital to take flight. Dr. Hans Luther, president of the Reichsbank since 1930, had 
attempted to secure more loans and called for assistance causing renewed panic. 222 On 13 
221 Secretary Stimson's amiable appearance hid a strong will. A Yale and Harvard Law graduate he had 
fought in the World War as colonel. During the William Howard Taft administration he served as war 
secretary, post he also held under Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1940 to 1945. 
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July the Darmstadter und Nationalbank (Danat), after having supported a number of 
failing industries, collapsed with the bankruptcy of the Nordwolle, the textile giant of 
Bremer.223 To avoid further panic the Berlin Stock Exchange was closed.224 Premier 
MacDonald called for an international conference to be held in London possibly to revise 
the Versailles treaty. 225 The relief if any provided by the moratorium had been short 
lived. 
Stimson arrived in Paris on 15 July 1931 and went directly to the American 
embassy. There, United States Ambassador Walter Evans Edge had arranged for a 
meeting with British Foreign Secretary Henderson, who was in Paris to initiate 
negotiations between the French and the Germans.226 In response to Chequers, 
MacDonald and Henderson had been invited to come to Berlin the weekend of 18-19 
July. Henderson had planned to travel to Berlin later that week. The trip was not to be: 
MacDonald contacted Henderson earlier that morning to cancel the travel plans in favor 
of an international conference to be held in London.227 This did not particularly suit 
Henderson, as he was convinced that a solution to the German problem had to involve the 
223 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 264. 
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French. He had hoped to convince Bruning to make some concessions to the French such 
as halting the construction of new pocket battleships. 228 The cancellation disappointed 
Bruning as well. 229 
On the afternoon of 15 July, Henderson was fresh from a conference with Laval 
and Briand with whom he had been discussing a long-term loan to Germany, met with 
Stimson. Henderson, for whom finance was apparently not a forte, had difficulty 
conveying what had been talked about.230 According to author David Carlton, 
Henderson's lack of financial savvy was compounded by the demeanor of Governor of 
the Bank of England Montagu Collet Norman. Indeed the latter distrusted the former and 
in their dealings purposely kept him in the dark as to the financial situation of Britain. 
Thus, Henderson could not evaluate the feasibility of British loans to Germany.231 A 
few days after this conversation, Chancellor of the Exchequer Viscount Philip Snowden 
informed Henderson of England's incapacity to open further credits to Germany.232 
Stimson told his British colleague that for financial reasons loans guaranteed by the 
United States were out of the question. Hoover had been quite adamant on this subject. 
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The British foreign secretary further reported to Stimson of his meeting with 
Laval and Briand, stating that the French were also unwilling to extend credits to 
Germany. Their motivations, however, were essentially political. According to 
Henderson, Laval and Briand "had remarked that they did not care to lend money to 
Bruening and then have it spent by Hitler."233 
In his discussion with Laval and Briand, Henderson also debated the Conference 
in London. The French thought that calling a consultation without defined objectives was 
a mistake. According to Henderson, Laval and Briand wanted to hear his report on the 
situation in Berlin before making their final decision on the Conference.234 
"We must know" said M. Laval [ ... ]"exactly what the situation is." 
"Can the present government commit itself in the name of the country? 
Does it represent her? Is there a danger of its being replaced by 
Hugenberg and Hitler? Is Germany ready to accept our conditions?"235 
Carlton reported that Henderson had mentioned a "political moratorium of five 
and even ten years" to Laval and Briand.236 In his memorandum of20 July, Henderson 
refers to such a moratorium without claiming patemity.237 Whether this idea was the 
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brainchild of Laval or Henderson is but a point of detail. The fact was that Laval 
embraced the concept and would make every effort to achieve such a political 
moratoriU.m between France and Germany. 
After his meeting with Stimson, Henderson went to the Colonial Exhibition for a 
dinner where he was the guest of honor of Colonial Minister Paul Reynaud.238 Henderson 
was contacted there by the British Embassy. Because Germany seemed unable to meet 
its private obligations to the Bank of England, grave financial problems were brewing in 
London, and MacDonald requested immediate action. 
Because Laval present at the dinner, Henderson initiated an impromptu meeting 
with the premier. Laval called upon Reynaud to join them. Conveying the gravity of the 
British situation, Henderson, despite considerable resistance, "induced M. Laval to agree 
[ ... ] to attend a conference in London on Tuesday (the 21st July) on the condition that 
the German Ministers would first visit Paris [ ... ]."239 A later telegram informed 
Henderson that the conference had been moved up to Monday, 20 July. Henderson 
telephoned Laval, who made no objections as long as he could meet with the Germans 
beforehand. Henderson then called MacDonald to report the latest developments. 
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Some time after midnight, German ambassador in Paris Leopold von Roesch 
came to the British Embassy at Henderson's request.240 Henderson communicated the 
urgency of a meeting and requested that the German Chancellor leave immediately for 
Paris.241 Brilning could of course not comply immediately, as he was dealing with the 
consequences of the collapse of the Danat. The flight of capital compounded this 
problem and directly affected his government's capacity to meet payroll. In his 
desperation, Brilning even flew in Harvard professor and financial expert Oliver Sprague 
to help find a solution to the emergency.242 Having contemplated and rejected the 
printing of "ersatz" money with Reichsbank President Luther and the director of the 
Commerz- und Privatbank, Friedrich Reinhart, Briining enacted several decrees that 
allowed him to close the banks and the bond-market on 14 and 15 July for the rest of the 
week, leaving only the Reichsbank open for selected transactions.243 The one positive 
element to the financial chaos was that Hugenberg and Hitler did not have access to their 
funds to back anti-government manifestations.244 
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With Germany's finances under control, al least temporarily, at 2:00 a.m. on 16 
July, Bruning heard from Billow that the German Foreign ministry did not object to the 
voyage. It is possible that Laval's warm answer to Brilning's radio address of 23 June 
1931 encouraged this willingness. 245 Briining also received the blessing of 
Hindenburg. 246 
Hoesch was informed that the German delegation would leave for Paris on Friday, 
17 July, provided the French extend an invitation.247 Despite the certainty in France of 
right-wing opposition to a German visit, Laval and his cabinet extended an invitation to 
the representatives of the Weimar Republic, which in itself was a positive step for the 
Franco-German relations. 
On 16 July at the American embassy, Secretary Stimson, Ambassador Edge and 
embassy staffer J. Theodore Marriner met with Premier Laval and the ministers Briand 
(Foreign Affairs), Pierre-Etienne Flandin (Finance), Fran9ois Pietri (Budget), and Under-
Secretary Andre Fran9ois-Poncet (National Economy).248 Secretary Henderson and 
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Brilning's speech. Curtius, Sechs Jahre, 217. Possibly an example of Laval not using official channels or a 
mistake by Curtius as in a footnote he made ambassador Fran~ois-Poncet responsible. Fran~ois-Poncet 
would not be in office in Berlin until September. Ibid. 
246 Bruning, Memoiren, 325. 
247 "Memorandum by the Secretary[ ... ]," 20 July 1931, BDFA, Germany 1931, Doc. 178, p. 200-201. 
248 J. Theodore Marriner was Counselor of Embassy in Paris. He had been appointed on 1 April 1931. He 
participated to all major conferences such as the London Conference of Financial Experts. Foreign Service 
List, 1July1931 (Washington D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1931), 10. The American team also 
included Robert T. Pell, Edge's assistant and interpreter for the occasion and Allen Trafford Klots assistant 
to the Secretary of State (1931-1932), Who was Who in America, with World Notables, vol. IV, 1961-1968 
87 
Ambassador Tyrrell represented the British.249 The purpose of this gathering essentially 
aimed at setting the agenda of the upcoming meeting with the Germans and the London 
Conference. 
Laval opened the talks by suggesting they should invite the Italian delegation, as 
they would pass through Paris on their way to London, to join the parties present. 
Stimson reported: "Henderson immediately objected indignantly to a conference on 
Sunday [19 July] of all nations. "250 The compromise solution to Laval's proposal of a 
widening of the talks to include the Italian delegation was found. The French would meet 
with the Germans Saturday. On Sunday, in addition to the parties already involved, a 
general "conversation" would be held with the Italians, the Belgians and the Japanese.251 
Henderson's opposition to a widening of the "conversations" to include the 
Italians was due less to MacDonald's desire not to allow anything that would undermine 
the London Conference (Stimson had received similar directives from Hoover), than to 
his wish that the French and the Germans meet alone.252 Henderson and MacDonald had 
(Chicago: Macquisy, 1968), 535. 
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diverging views on foreign politics and in this instance the British prime minister had 
called for the London Conference without consulting his foreign secretary.253 
Henderson was thus prevented from going to Berlin and, in tum, from updating 
the French on the German situation. Against MacDonald's will, he invited the German 
ministers to come to France through the good offices ofHoesch.254 MacDonald was kept 
unaware of these developments and indubitably would have opposed had he known of 
them. Laval and Henderson agreed that nothing could be accomplished in London 
without prior negotiations.255 
Another obstacle to full attendance at and success of the London Conference was 
MacDonald's prior allusion to a possible revision of the Versailles treaty. The timing of 
this suggestion was terrible. French public opinion could not possibly be asked to 
swallow another affront on the scale of the Hoover moratorium. Henderson understood 
this and so did Stimson, together they leaned on MacDonald so that only the financial 
situation in Germany would be discussed in London.256 There was added incentive for 
Stimson to control the scope of the London Conference, as Hoover did not want America 
involved in any discussion ofreparations. The final obstacle for an effective London 
Conference was the as yet unresolved issue of the French attendance. Laval was under 
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great pressure not to consent to the London conference altogether, both from the press 
and members of his cabinet, namely Tardieu, Flandin and Maginot. British Ambassador 
Tyrrell hoped that Laval's moderation would prevail.257 From a conversation he had with 
Flandin on the 17 July and with Laval on the morning of 18 July, Stimson was hopeful as 
well.258 Nevertheless, ifthe French did not come to an agreement with the Germans at the 
upcoming meeting, Laval would have the greatest difficulties convincing his cabinet to 
participate in the London Conference.259 
B. The Paris Meeting 
The "ambassadors of German misery," Bruning and Curtius, arrived in Paris, 
Saturday, 18 July 1931, after a fourteen-hour trip. 260 Bulow, the secretary-general of the 
German foreign ministry, and Graf Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, Director at the Ministry 
of Finance, and the interpreter Paul Schmidt accompanied them.261 Ambassador Roesch 
257 
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met his countrymen at Jeumont near the Franco-Belgian border to inform Bruning of the 
latest developments in Paris.262 
Laval, Briand, and other members of the French cabinet, surrounded by a friendly 
crowd, received the German ministers at the train station.263 Outside the station, however, 
demonstrators of the Action Fran9aise were lying in wait. The adverse impression made 
by the protesters was in part mollified by pension minister Jean Champetier de Ribes, 
described by Bruning as "extraordinarily congenial."264 De Ribes told Bruning that he 
Bernhard Wilhelm von Bulow (1885-1936) should not to be confused with Prince Bernhard von 
Billow (1849-1929), Kaiser Wilhelm Il's foreign minister and later ambassador to Italy. Bernhard Wilhelm 
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could trust Laval fully and hoped that after the meeting, the political questions could be 
laid to rest for the next ten years. 265 
Laval and Bruning "had an hour [and a half] long tete-a-tete" before the opening 
of the Franco-German talks later that aftemoon.266 Briand conversed with Curtius.267 As 
Bruning was fluent in French, there were no translators nor any other witnesses. 
According to Bruning's record of the conversation, 
Laval began the conversation by apologizing for the demonstration of the 
Action Fran9aise at our [Bruning, Curtius ... ] arrival. He was 
extraordinarily amiable. No doubt, he fully understood the significance of 
the hour and heartily and completely believed in a reconciliation with 
Germany. He also spoke of hard opposition in his cabinet against this 
idea. I assumed that he meant Tardieu.268 
Bruning expressed his regrets over the Zollunion misunderstanding and discussed 
the necessity of "economic cooperation in southeastern Europe" modeled after the Briand 
project. Laval's response to this argument was polite.269 Indubitably because of the 
Zollunion blunder, the position of Laval and especially Briand's was uncomfortable. As 
265 Brilning, Memoiren, 327. 
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mentioned above, Briand's detente policy toward Germany had been greatly tarnished by 
this episode. 270 
Laval and Brilning further discussed the mood of Germany. Laval saw the rise of 
Nazism as a direct consequence of the Germans' toleration of anti-French agitation. 
Bruning responded that the anti-French feelings were the result of the oppression by 
French generals in the once-occupied territories. To moderate these words, the German 
Chancellor added that a solution should have been found in Geneva. Laval agreed. 
The French premier then opened with the concept of a ten-year political 
moratorium. France would extend a loan of several billion francs, about 500 million 
dollars, in exchange for which Germany would not call for revisions for ten years. 271 
Brilning wondered what this would mean with regard to the reparations. Assuredly 
Germany would be able to pay for reparations, but Brilning did not want that. 272 As 
Franyois-Poncet, then under-secretary to the Premier, saw it, Brilning did not seek more 
loans for Germany. Loans had been Germany's downfall: 
Truth to tell, what he wanted was the scrapping of reparation payments, 
That and that alone could allay nationalist agitation within the Reich. But 
he dared not say so; he feared quite rightly, that such pretensions must 
create a scandal and loose a new tempest in France if not elsewhere. He 
preferred to wait, to procrastinate, to prepare the ground, trying, 
meanwhile, to gain the sympathy of his interlocutors and to convince them 
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of the honesty of his intentions. In point of fact his game was not so 
honest as he gave one to believe; it was full of mental reservations 
[ ••• ].273 
It appeared, however, that Brlining rejected the loan on the bases of the conditions 
for later that day he discussed with the Americans: Germany's need for further credit.274 
Briining thought and said that the political moratorium was a political impossibility. He 
reported in his memoirs that he was particularly concerned that it would crush the 
glimmer of hope in Germany, especially that of the youth. Should he renounce the 
revision of the Versailles treaty he would be swept out ofpower.275 According to 
Geoffrey Warner -- who consulted the Documents of the German foreign ministry and 
chancellery at the Foreign Office Library in London -- Briining agreed with the concept 
but proposed to limit it to one year.276 
This short tete-a-tete was a turning point for Laval. He had prepared for a 
confrontation, and there the heavy hand of the hardliners Tardieu, Maginot, and Flandin, 
was apparent. The French had banked that Germany's desperate financial situation would 
induce her to any conditions, however, drastic. The scenario that would have had 
Germany accept a margin of international control over its finances and refrain from 
273 Fran~ois-Poncet, The Fateful Years, 8. 
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political revisionism for a period of ten years, in exchange for a generous loan of 500 
million dollars, was annihilated by Brilning's unexpected refusal.277 
Joii:it Franco-German economic development was not in the plans for this 
meeting. Yet the two leaders found themselves discussing such a development as a basis 
for Franco-German understanding.278 This theme would be developed further in the 
coming months. This is not to say that Franco-German economic cooperation did not 
exist prior to this meeting. The International Steel Agreement of 1926 was an example. 
But this showed that Laval was able to reassess a situation at a moment's notice and 
embrace a new altemative.279 
Not unnaturally the two statesmen rapidly developed an affinity. After all, Laval 
never shared in the virulent nationalism or the anti-German passion of some of his 
compatriots. And Bruning had nothing in common with the caricature of a screaming 
bloodthirsty Hun: he exuded honesty and moderation. His command of the French 
language could only ease the free exchange of ideas. 
Nevertheless, affinity, even friendship, did not mean the surrender of their 
respective goals. Brilning aimed to bring an end to reparations and the Versailles treaty. 
Laval would persist with the idea of the political moratorium. Still, they did find 
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common purpose in the notion of economic cooperation. 280 The hour and a half 
conversation ended with a note on the upcoming February disarmament conference. 
By refusing the French loan,Briining removed all means of French pressure, 
essentially putting France and Germany on equal footing. 281 This did nothing to ease the 
talks later that afternoon. 
Briining recalled, "The circle grew. Curtius and Briand entered, followed by 
Flandin, Pietri, Berthelot and briefly Champetier de Ribes. "282 They developed the 
themes of the previous conversation, again. Briining did not go into detail but apparently 
Laval had to temper Flandin's undiplomatic sallies. Briining was, however, able to 
explain his position to the other participants during a brief absence of Flandin. 283 
The ten-year moratorium was discussed again and more of the French demands 
were brought out such as: German disarmament or armament freeze, dissolution of the 
Stahlhelm and interdiction of nationalistic propaganda in the Universities.284 The German 
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delegation protested that they could not possibly agree to "a temporary sacrifice of their 
legal rights."285 To the relief of Briining, Laval agreed with him and open to true Franco-
German understanding. Unfortunately Laval was frequently called away to talk on the 
phone. Briining surmised it was Tardieu, for every time Laval returned more determined 
and less amenable. 286 
In the face of these new difficulties Bruning is believed to have said: "Will the 
same tragedy always exist between our two countries? Will we never be able to 
pronounce the same words and make the same gestures at the same time?"287 Moved by 
the words of the Chancellor, Laval declared that he could not "dishonor the head of the 
German Government" by forcing demands upon Germany.288 Laval put an end to the 
moratorium discussions that day.289 
Flandin stated openly that as finance minister he thought the London conference 
useless and that he would not go. It took the combined influences of Laval and Briand to 
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convince Flandin to postpone such decision until the next day.290 At some point that day 
Laval had already specified publicly that he would go to London.291 
After a quiet dinner at the German Embassy, the exhausted Briining, Curtius, and 
Billow went for a stroll on the Champs Elysees. At ten thirty that evening, at the 
invitation of Edge, the Germans went to the American Embassy to talk with Mellon and 
Stimson. 292 
Briining found Edge frosty and Mellon lukewarm. Stimson fortunately was 
friendly and they engaged in financial talks. On the whole, Briining felt that the 
conversation was unfruitful and at 1 :00 a.m. Edge broke up the meeting.293 Stimson and 
Edge had a more positive outlook of the evening. They were able to determine that 
Germany needed about 400 million (the currency was not specified but we can assume 
that they talked in dollars) of credit to make "Germany go." Stimson thought that "the 
whole talk was searching, thorough, frank, but entirely friendly and left us with a good 
290 
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deal ofrespect for Bruening."294 Bruning apparently misjudged Edge's attitude, for the 
American ambassador in his memoirs spoke highly of the Chancellor.295 
Laval's invitation to have breakfast at his home with Madame Laval particularly 
touched Bruning.296 At eight in the morning, Bruning, a Catholic himself, had been 
invited, perhaps by Champetier de Ribes who was also present, to celebrate a mass for 
peace at Notre Dame de la Victoire. Brilning's action was not appreciated in Germany.297 
At half past ten the French and Germans met again. This time they were joined 
by Henderson, Tyrrell, Stimson, Edge, Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi, Belgium 
Prime Minister J. Renkin, Belgium Foreign Minister Paul H. Hymans, Belgian Emile 
Francqui, architect of the BIS, and the Japanese Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshisawa.298 
Flandin, his usual undiplomatic self, greeted Bruning by announcing that he would not go 
to London without German political concessions. The group gathered in Laval's office at 
the interior ministry. Italy, Belgium and Japan said the habitual diplomatic niceties but 
offered nothing tangible.299 Laval and Flandin resumed their tug-of-war. This did not 
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bode well for the London conference. Fortunately Briand awoke from an uremia induced 
slumber and expanded the scope of the discussion to the world crisis. Bruning was able 
to expose his fear of a Bolshevik takeover if a solution was not found to the present crisis 
and to emphasize the importance of French participation in the London conference. 300 
Apparently this was enough to win over Flandin, for the French did partake in the 
London conference. The meeting was closed by a dinner at the French foreign ministry. 
Stimson and Henderson did not attend for they had already departed for London that 
aftemoon.301 
Preparation of the Communique for the newsreels proved difficult, but eventually 
Briand was able to smooth things over.302 The joint declaration stated that they were "in 
agreement in the recognition of the importance of this encounter" and that it affirmed the 
"beginning of a trusting collaboration."303 
During the gala dinner at the Quai d'Orsay, Bruning talked with Caillaux. Briand 
also gave Bruning the task of winning over Herriot. Though Herriot remained opposed to 
any alleviation of the reparation problem, the friendly exchange boded well. 
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A spectacular Franco-German reconciliation was not to be, but Laval and Brilning 
understood and appreciated each other's difficulties. In a letter he wrote to Chambrun 
after the war, Bruning recalled Laval's honesty toward him and Laval's true appreciation 
of the Nazi threat.304 If Bruning had not gained any major French concessions, The 
French had received him with dignity, which in itself was an accomplishment. 
C. The London Conference of Experts 
On the morning of 20 July 1931 all the parties to the earlier meetings who had not 
left already took the train for Boulogne. While Brilning and Curtius were boarding the 
train, Laval appeared and invited them to join him in the French government saloon 
carriage. Already present in the Pullman car were Briand, Flandin, Pietri, Berthelot and 
the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul H. Hymans. Brilning immediately directed Curtius to 
talk with the Belgian. Onlookers on board a commuter train and on the quay, convinced 
that the Franco-German reconciliation was imminent, cheered Briand on. Laval, Briand 
and Brilning conversed over the fate of Europe for over an hour and a half. As the train 
ran through the valley of the Eure, Briand poetically remarked about how the Americans 
and the Russians, unlike the Europeans, did not have hills to limit their ambitions: "I fear 
304 Heinrich Bruning to Rene de Chambrun in Chambrun, Pierre Laval devant l'Histoire, 340-341. 
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the people of the steppes and of the prairies, and I apprehend to see our poor old Europe 
crushed between them. "305 
Berthelot, the Quai d'Orsay secretary, sat next to Bruning pretending to read 
documents. Each time Laval or Briand tended to agree with Briining's vision on current 
affairs, Berthelot would join in and redirect the conversation. 306 On board the ferry, 
Briining sought respite from the traveling and the negotiating. He pretended not to have 
his sea legs and took a nap in his cabin.307 On the train from Dover to London, the French 
and the Germans discussed the schedule of the conference. Dr. Hans Schaffer of the 
finance ministry and Dr. Herman Schmitz of the giant chemical conglomerate IG Farben, 
met the Germans at the London train station. 308 
Even though the British had called the meeting, they had no solution for what 
ailed Germany and the world economy. The London conference started on the afternoon 
of 20 July. Similar conferences had been held in 1923 and 1929.309 Seven countries were 
present: Great Britain, France, the United States, Japan, Italy, Belgium, and Germany. 
The colloquium opened with the "usual unimportant speeches."310 France and Germany 
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reaffirmed "their desire for collaboration and confidence between the two countries."311 
Stimson was particularly pleased with Laval's "very temperate [and]-good statement full 
of good feelings toward Germany."312 Laval's friendliness did much to extinguish the 
hostility unleashed by the French press against Britain and America.313 
It was not until later that day that the conference truly began when more intimate 
groups formed to discuss the matters at hand. Bruning, supported by Schmitz and Dr. 
Vocke, a director of the Reichsbank, attempted to convince Flandin of the benefit of a 
purely commercial loan of 500 million marks guaranteed by German industry.314 This 
conversation, referred to in the British documents as the Committee of Finance Ministers 
was chaired by MacDonald.315 In the meantime, Curtius and Billow discussed with 
Henderson and Vansittart, the issues of the pocket battleships and the Zollunion.316 
The next morning at 10:00 o'clock, the French, the Germans and the English met 
at the Treasury. Snowden, at the instigation of Bruning, proposed the cancellation of the 
311 
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debt. Mellon, echoed by the French, protested the suggestion.317 Stimson's and 
MacDonald's objectives were twofold. First, they wanted to help stabilize Germany's 
short-temi credit, second they wanted to convince Germany and the other conference 
participants that loans were not the answer. Neither Stimson nor MacDonald offered an 
indication as to how the short term credit should be stabilized. As to their reluctance to 
offer a guaranteed government loan to Germany, that was directed by President Hoover 
on the one hand and Bank of England Governor Norman on the other.318 At 4:00 p.m. 
Stimson met with Curtius to examine the possibility of Stimson's visit to Berlin and 
halting the construction of pocket battleships, in particular the Deutschland.319 
On Wednesday the situation worsened for the Germans in London. Back home, 
the Reichstag was in turmoil. In Briining's absence, the ministry of agriculture had 
imposed a new export tax, and in protest the tax collection agencies were flooded with 
worthless checks from the bankrupt Danat.320 Bruning even received a hate-filled 
telegram from Hugenberg and Hitler.321 Bruning had given the impression that the 
finances of Germany were under control. The conference participants now confronted 
317 Ibid., 338. 
318 Stimson, Diary, Tuesday, 21July1931. 
319 Ibid.,"Memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Dr. Curtius, the German foreign minister, at 
the Hyde Park Hotel in London" 4:00 p.m., Tuesday, 21 July 1931. 
320 Bruning, Memoiren, 338. 
321 Ibid., 337. 
104 
him with pointed questions regarding Germany's foreign exchange. Brilning faced the 
barrage of questions alone. Vocke, who wanted to speak in the defense of the 
beleaguered Reichsbank, collapsed in utter frustration. Billow discreetly urged Brilning 
not to run the conference by himself and let the German experts talk. Schaffer and 
Schmitz were able to explain the situation of the Reichsbank.322 
The Committee of Finance Ministers was encountering difficulties in coming to 
any sort of agreement. Gold outflow from the Bank of England had Snowden on 
tenterhooks. To make matters worse, he believed the uncomfortable financial situation 
was the deliberate work of the French government.323 As mentioned above, France 
frequently used money as a political and diplomatic tool: in this instance, though, the 
franc rose in relation to the pound -- as did the dollar -- the French government, according 
to economist Barry Eichengreen, was not implicated.324 Laval needed Britain's finances 
to remain solid to back the German economy and preserve the diplomatic gains in 
Franco-German relations. The rush on British gold stemmed from the commercial banks 
of Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, "which having lost liquidity 
through the blocking of German credits, sold sterling to increase their gold reserves."325 
322 Ibid., 339. 
323 Stimson, Diary, Wednesday, 22 July 1931. 
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One of the items that Stimson and Mellon wanted to implement was the 
"rediscounting of certain commercial paper held by the Reichsbank [and] by the central 
banks of various countries." This proposition, however, met with the opposition of the 
Federal Reserve Bank, and Hoover would not pressure the Fed.326 Had the Federal 
Reserve not opposed this idea, it would have been taken out by Snowden: the distraught 
Chancellor of the Exchequer attempted scrap the entire proposal. Stimson intervened and 
with the help of Laval and Flandin offered an alternate solution to the rediscounting; the 
conference was put back on track. In his Diary Stimson did not specify what this solution 
was.327 The Committee of Finance Ministers came up with a declaration that met the 
following day with the approval of the conference at large. It stated that the "lack of 
confidence [was] not justified by the economic and budgetary situation" of Germany. 
The conference participants agreed, as far as was "within their power, to restore 
confidence" and to maintain credit already extended to Germany. A BIS loan of one 
hundred million dollars was renewed for an additional three months to stabilize the short 
term credit crisis.328 The participants further agreed to create a commission to study the 
326 Stimson, Diary, Tuesday, 21 July 1931. 
327 Ibid., Wednesday, 22 July 1931. Ibid., Thursday, 23 July 1931. 
328 Note that the BIS loan is not a guarantied intergovemment loan. 
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credit situation in Germany.329 In effect, the conference agreed to do very little. They 
hoped that their display of goodwill alone would do much to redress the situation. 
At the conclusion of the conference, the Germans received the French at their 
embassy. Though Briand had slept through most of the conference and never read a 
book, Brilning was amazed at how knowledgeable the old diplomat was on international 
finances. 330 A garden party at Buckingham Palace hosted by King George V, Queen 
Mary, followed the conference. Bruning found the royal family "charming."331 Stimson 
discussed the situation of South America with the Prince of Wales.332 The reception for 
the foreign press ensued. 
To close the day, Brilning invited Stimson, Mellon and Hugh Gibson, the 
American ambassador in Brussels, for dinner at the Carlton Hotel. Brilning hoped that 
the recent events in Germany would at least shake America from its isolationism. 
Briining and Stimson came to talk about their mutual World War I experience and found 
out that they fought each other in Bourlon (near Bapaume).333 Delighted by their near 
329 
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encounter, Stimson, according to Bruning, worked to obtain from Mellon a productive 
loan for his "friend" Bruning. Within a half-hour, Mellon agreed to lend nearly half a 
billion marks for the purchase of cotton, copper, wheat and silver.334 This portion of the 
conversation was not reported by Stimson in his Diary. Instead Stimson stated that a 
"fool story" from the Associated Press reported that a loan was made between him and 
Bri.ining but that "nothing like that took place."335 At half past eleven Stimson called up a 
press conference for the American journalists and talked with relish ofBriining's and his 
battle in the woods ofBourlon.336 
On the morning of Friday, 24 June 1931, Laval met with Stimson, and the two 
discussed the events of the last days. The French Ambassador in London, Aime Fleuriau, 
joined in towards the end of the conversation and helped Stimson with his French. Laval 
expressed his "warm appreciation" for Stimson's visit in Paris and how encouraged he 
was by his conversations with Briining. They discussed the Polish Corridor and how 
Laval thought it was the sole obstacle to improved Franco-German relations. Stimson 
mentioned the necessity of a naval agreement between France and Italy. They discussed 
Mussolini and how they thought, not withstanding the military blustering, that Mussolini 
wanted peace. Laval brought up the financial situation of Britain and how he intended to 
334 Bruning, Memoiren, 341. 
335 Stimson, Diary, "Memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Chancellor Heinrich Bruening, at 
dinner and after dinner, at the Carlton Hotel, London," Thursday, 23 July 1931. 
336 Bruning, Memoiren, 342. 
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pressure the French banks to stop their withdrawals of gold. They parted on excellent 
terms. Laval hoped that Stimson would be able to come to Paris again before leaving for 
America, for he felt that in the chaos of the last few days he had not received him in 
proper fashion. 337 
That same Friday, the Germans and the French left London together. On board the 
vessel Canterbury, Laval and Bruning were able to converse some more about the 
possibilities of a French visit to Germany.338 Laval took the opportunity to introduce 
Andre Fran9ois-Poncet as an expert in finance and foreign affairs in general and in 
"Briand-diplomacy" in particular. In an intimate conversation with Briining, Laval asked 
what he thought of replacing the French Ambassador in Berlin, Pierre de Margerie, with 
Fran9ois-Poncet.339 Laval thought Fran9ois-Poncet an ideal choice, to represent and 
foster the new found Franco-German understanding. 340 Briining recognized the high 
qualities of Fran9ois-Poncet but did not think him quite suitable for the task. Bruning 
preferred Margery who was of the "old school," but would not oppose the wishes of the 
French govemment.341 Andre Fran9ois-Poncet, the under-secretary to the Premier, would 
337 Stimson, Diary "Memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with M. Laval, Prime Minister of 
France, the Carlton Hotel, London," Friday, 24 July 1931. 
338 Bruning, Memoiren, 341. 
339 Pierre de Margery, French Ambassador in Berlin ( 1922-1931 ). 
340 Bruning, Memoiren, 342. 
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become the ambassador to Berlin. 342 In Calais, Laval and Bruning biade each other 
farewell. Briand had returned to France by way of Boulogne to meet up with some old 
friends. 343 
Stimson pursued his European tour to Berlin. He had always had a poor opinion 
of Germany. In 1870 in Berlin, he had seen his pregnant mother knocked of a sidewalk 
by a drunk saber-rattling German officer on horseback, causing the immediate leave of 
Stimson's father for Paris. This initial impression had only been worsened by the War. 
But Briining was able to show him a gentler Germany. Briining reassured the American 
secretary of state that the end of reparations would not mean massive rearmaments in 
Germany. They left each other on excellent terms. Stimson promised to return to Berlin 
in six months to discuss disarmament.344 Stimson also talked with Hans Luther, president 
of the Reichsbank, of the need for Germany to show "courage and self-help," adding 
"that bankers would not loan money to a man who said he was broke."345 Stimson had 
similar talks with Dr. Adam Stegerwald, the German labor minister, whom Stimson 
342 Fran~ois-Poncet, The Fateful Years, 8. Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 49. 
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dubbed a "weak sister."346 Stimson met with Hindenburg before flying to Amsterdam 
where he had dinner with members of the Dutch government before crossing over to 
England. 347 
On 28 July, MacDonald and Henderson made a goodwill visit to Berlin.348 They 
discussed disarmament, the overall financial situation, and especially the English gold 
losses. Bruning was convinced, incorrectly, that the French were exerting financial 
pressure on the British to alter their policy.349 
D. The collapse of the pound sterling 
and the forsaking of the Gold Standard 
Without a doubt the British were under enormous pressure. Britain's rate of 
unemployment was a constant concern with roughly 2.5 million jobless in 1931. 350 As 
the world crisis developed, new factors came into play: trade and tourism dropped by 
£ 10 million each from 1930 to 1931, revenue from financial transactions fell by £25 
million, and more than £60 million in interest, profits and dividends were lost. The latter 
346 Ibid., "Memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Chancellor Bruening while walking at 
Postdam," Sunday, 26 July 1931. 
347 Ibid., "Memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with President von Hindenburg, at Berlin," 11:30 
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348 Curtius, Sechs Jahre, 221. 
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stemmed in large part from the financial collapse of South America which had already 
cost Britain £40 million the previous year. The crisis in Germany, Austria, and Hungary 
froze over £75 million of British deposits in these countries.351 As mentioned above, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland had assets blocked in Germany as 
well and sought to balance their losses by trading in their pound sterling for gold at a 
moment that Great Britain could least afford it. 
Laval was still in London when he was approached to relieve the Bank of 
England. In the name of solidarity, Laval had the Banque de France purchase £50 
million. The pound was under attack; it was only a matter of time before another 
catastrophe would send the British currency tumbling.352 In August after drastic budget 
cuts and tax hikes Great Britain was able to borrow $200 million from J.P. Morgan & Co. 
with a matching loan from Paris. 353 
The catastrophe came in September. On 18 September in the middle of the night, 
in the absence of Ambassador Tyrrell, Charge d' Affaires Ronald Campbell called Laval 
at home. Campbell requested a meeting to be held right away. Laval agreed, and they 
met at the ministry of the interior, Place Beauvau. Campbell explained that the Bank of 
351 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 280-281. 
352 Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 95. Bruning, Memoiren, 362. 
353 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 284. 
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England was in dire straits. 354 In two months two hundred million pounds in gold had 
been withdrawn. At this rate in a few days the Bank of England would have to cease to 
honor its payment in gold. According to the British, President Hoover had already 
declined to offer assistance because Congress held the purse strings. 355 Laval promised to 
help. Campbell was moved to tears and said: "Mr. President, my country will never 
forget. 11356 
Laval immediately contacted the Banque de France. The French vaults were 
already stacked with British paper. With much reluctance the Banque de France opened a 
credit of three billion francs in gold.357 Campbell transmitted to Laval the British 
government's appreciation. 358 
Three days later, without even a courtesy warning to Laval the British government 
abandoned the gold standard and devaluated the pound by 40 percent, the French were 
left with depreciated paper pounds. London being one of the largest international 
financial centers, the world followed the British example. The gold standard was only 
354 Letter ofJosee de Chambrun to Winston Churchill in Chambrun, ... et cefut un crimejudiciaire .. ., 351-
352. 
355 Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 95-96. 
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Chambrun to Winston Churchill" ibid., 351-352. 
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always been dependent of the executive branch of the French Republics. Chastenet mentioned a credit of 
£40 million. Chastenet, Dec/in, 23. 
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maintained by a handful of nations: France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, 
Poland, South Africa and the United States.359 
359 Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 97. From 1931to1935 France, Belgium. Italy, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands formed the bloc-or (gold-block). Duroselle L'Europe l'Histoire de ses Peuples, 364. 
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CHAPTER 
v 
A CHANCE FOR RECONCILIATION IN BERLIN 
In the Summer of 1931, Briand was still at the helm of the Foreign Ministry but 
because of his illness not always in full control. Berthelot began to define his own 
foreign policy, hiding behind the authority that befell him as Briand's right-hand man. In 
collaboration with the radical Edouard Herriot, Berthelot engaged in talks with Soviet 
Ambassador Valerian Dovgalevski.360 The Soviet Union was not Laval's immediate 
concern: Germany and the United States were. 
The first encounter in Paris between Laval and Brilning had been a positive step, 
albeit a small one. The dividends of a true reconciliation between France and Germany 
would be tremendous. The fire would be taken out of the nationalists both in France and 
in Germany. It would put hope in the heart of Germans and Frenchman alike. 
A. Invitation 
On 15 August 1931 Leopold von Boesch, the German ambassador in Paris, 
officially invited Laval and Briand to come to Berlin.361 Half a century had passed since 
360 Herriot and Dovgalevsky signed the Franco-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on 29 November 1932. 
361 
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French minister William Henri Waddington had been in Germany to-sign the Berlin 
treaty of 1878.362 
The Frenchmen accepted the invitation. Briand unfortunately was so sick that he 
could not go immediately. Bruning was tom between relief -- because he feared protests 
from the Nazis, Stahlhelms or the Communists, all equally opposed to the Diktat of 
Versailles -- and disappointment. The chancery even thought it might be a "diplomatic 
disease. "363 Breaching protocol once again, Laval called Bruning on the phone. He 
promised his German counterpart that Briand wanted and would come as soon as possible 
to save peace. In a matter of minutes, Laval solved what would have taken days and 
numerous dispatches through the regular channels. While he had Bruning on the phone, 
Laval also read him passages of a speech he was about to give at the national assembly 
and that might be offensive to the Germans.364 
Oktober bis 1. Juni 1932. Tilman Koops, ed. (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1982), 14. 8. 
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B. The threat of demonstrations 
Reassured that his guest would come, Briining addressed his key concern 
regarding the visit: demonstrations. The situation in Germany was catastrophic. 
Government payroll was met with the greatest difficulties, private bankruptcies occurred 
in regular succession, hoarding was endemic and met with the blocking of accounts, and 
purchasing power was declining. All these ailments had a dreadful impact on the German 
moral, and the extremes exploited this.365 Yet the talks could not be sullied by the Nazis. 
Briining let the Nazis know that any disruption would be severely dealt with. 
What helped Briining most was that Dr. Josef Goebbels, the SA Gauleiter for Berlin, had 
his hands full. The recent beatings of Jews Goebbels had ordered along the 
Kurfurstendamm on the Jewish New Year had resulted in the arrest of his two 
lieutenants. 366 Furthermore, Hitler was engaged in a seduction campaign of the German 
elite.367 Violent demonstrations against foreign dignitaries did not fit in such perspective. 
Since Walter Stennes, who had contested Hitler's leadership, had been replaced in April 
by Ernst Rohm as head of the SA, the SA were for the time being sufficiently compliant 
365 Ibid., 362-366. 
366 Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 93. Brilning, Memoiren, 411. Fest, Hitler, 311 
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to bend to the will of the political wing of the NSDAP.368 Also talk of a visit by Laval to 
the United States showed that France was not isolated from the other major powers as 
some in Germany liked to believe.369 Brilning's government and France's representatives 
would not to be embarrassed. 
Briand & Laval on the train to Berlin 
courtesy Rene de Chambrun 
On 27 September 1931, the German government grandly received Premier Laval 
and minister Briand. Present in the French delegation were Berthelot and Alexis Leger.370 
The Friedrichstraj3e train station was decked out in the French and German colors, and 
368 
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little girls greeted the visitors bearing wild flowers.371 Instead of the dreaded SA, 
Secretary of State Dr. Robert Weismann lined the streets leading to the Hotel Adlon with 
plain clothed policemen who cheered the foreign visitors.372 The German police proved 
to be very effective in averting disruption, and no incidents occurred. 373 Briand, who 
must have guessed what Bruning had to do to avert troubles, greeted heartily the 
Chancellor with: "Ah, there is the young man who learns his craft better and better!"374 
C. Hindenburg 
President Paul von Hindenburg, the revered World War I Field Marshal, received 
the French delegation in a formal setting. Despite his mixed feelings toward the Weimar 
Republic, Hindenburg performed his task adequately. The conversation was mundane, 
save for an unexpected quip reported by Andre Frani;ois-Poncet the new French 
ambassador in Berlin. Pointing to an exhausted Briand, the Reich president whispered to 
Frani;ois-Poncet: "The journey must have been very tiresome for that old gentleman."375 
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Hindenburg repeated his concern to his State Secretary Otto MeiBner.376 The victor of 
Tannenberg was then eighty-four, Briand only sixty-nine.377 
Laval & Briand (Franr;ois-Poncet in Back) leaving Hindenburg's palace 
L 'Illustration, 10 October 1931 
376 Curtius, Sechs Jahre, 225. 
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D. "Vive Briand" 
The poor health of Briand was obviuos to all: He collapsed at the side of Mrs. 
Curtius, he dozed during speeches, and fell asleep in the car while driving with Curtius. 
The shouts of" Vive Briand'' and "Vive la paix" (long live peace) balmed the old 
diplomat's heart as he turned to Laval and said: "Ils m'ont compris" (they understood 
me).378 Of course the German who shouted "Frieden! Nie wieder Krieg" (Peace! War 
never again) demanded great concessions from France on the Versailles Treaty and on the 
Reparations. Biographer Bernard Oudin described Briand as consumed by the ephemeral 
moment of glory, not knowing or not wanting to know.379 The popularity of Briand was 
great among German pacifists. His efforts to reconcile France and Germany had not been 
forgotten. On 28 September, while the French delegation was dining at the French 
embassy a crowd of Germans shouted "Briand, retten Sie uns!" (save us!) which, 
according to journalist Lambel, deeply touched the old minister.38° Fran9ois-Poncet 
reports the same incident somewhat differently: "Suddenly a cry rose, uttered in French. 
We thought we understood what the purport was: 'Sauvez-nous! Save us!' But Briand, 
whose ear was still keen and whose mind was still shrewd, set us right. 'No' he explained. 
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That voice said: 'Sauvez-vous! Get out ofhere!"'381 It is possible that Lambe! did not 
think it would be good copy to have the foreign minister cracking jokes. Kidding 
notwithstanding, this diplomatic voyage would be Briand's last. 
E. Laval and Bruning 
The two-day conference had been thoroughly prepared in advance. Laval and 
Briining were well aware that public opinion in their respective nations had to be nudged 
gently on the path of reconciliation. They had agreed not to talk in public about the great 
concessions such as the repudiation of Versailles, and the resolution of the war 
reparations and debts.382 
The two premiers, free from any onlookers, met for an hour in the library of the 
Hotel Ad/on. Bruning, who had to swallow the rejection of the Zoll union by the 
International Court of The Hague fifteen days earlier, did not have the energy to endure 
another offensive from the right. Laval, whose freedom of movement was hindered as 
well, could only concur. Bruning, exhausted by many months of nonstop crisis, 
demanded to know whether the French politicians would prefer to do deal with 
"Hugenberg, Hitler, or Schacht." If so, he would gladly step aside. Laval urged Briining 
to remain steadfast. Laval knew that only Briining and he were capable of bringing 
381 Fran9ois-Poncet, The Fateful Years, I I. 
382 Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 94. 
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France and Germany together. Laval added that Madame Laval, whom Briining had met 
in Paris, shared in this intimate belief. 383 
This confidence reassured Briining, yet he was puzzled to hear that Laval, invited 
by Hoover, did not wish him to go to Washington at the same time. But this did not 
overly concern Bruning, as he trusted in his new found friendship with Stimson and 
Mellon. Besides, he had not yet been invited to America. 384 Furthermore, Briining was 
convinced that "Laval wanted a fair understanding with Germany." Not any Germany, 
but as Stimson qualified it, "the Germany of Dr. Briining."385 The two heads of 
government agreed to keep each other well informed by telephone of the developments in 
each other's countries, and to make every effort to improve Franco-German relations.386 
To the German press Laval spoke of restoring the trust between the two nations, 
candidly acknowledging that some of the more controversial items were not on the 
agenda. Instead, in the face of "crisis without precedents," an economic cooperation had 
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been deemed the best solution.387 Laval concluded: "The entente has to realize itself, for 
through it will come salvation."388 The official communique stated: 
The representatives of the German and French governments hope[ d] in this 
fashion to have laid the foundation of a constructive work open to all, a 
first step in a global effort responding to the needs of the moment.389 
A substantial portion of the stay was dedicated to official ceremonies and 
symbolic gestures designed to lay the bases of the Franco-German friendship in the mind 
of public opinion of both nations. After the conference Laval, Bruning, Briand, and 
Curtius held a reception for various French and German delegations. Laval and Bruning 
visited the Pergamon museum and the Zoo while Briand went to the grave of Stresemann 
and paid his respects to the widow. The whole trip was punctuated by excellent photo 
opportunities of the four statesmen dining, drinking and conversing together.390 
Brtining and Curtius did their utmost to make the visit of the Frenchmen as 
pleasant as possible. Curtius recalled: 
Especially enjoyed, on the second day, was the trip on the Havel in 
beautiful weather. It was a delight to see with what appetite both 
387 Papiers 1940, "Alexis Leger." No. 6. Notes pour la periode 1929-1931, ADMAE. Kupfennan, Laval, 
1987, 94. 
388 Papiers 1940, "Alexis Leger." No. 6. Notes pour la periode 1929-1931, AD MAE. Kupfennan, Laval, 
1987, 94. Robert Lambel, "Les ministres fran9ais a Berlin," L'lllustration, 190-191. 
389 
"Communique Officiel constituant la resolution adoptee d'un commun accord par les delegations 
allemande et fran9aises comme conclusion de leurs deliberations lors du voyage de MM. Laval et Briand a 
Berlin. II AD MAE; also Lambel, "Les ministres fran9ais a Berlin, II L 'Illustration, 191. 
390 Lambel, "Les ministres fran9ais a Berlin," L'lllustration, 190-191. Bruning, Memoiren, 414. 
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gentlemen [Laval and Briand] ate heartily of the pike-perch with butter 
and new potatoes and the pheasant with sauerkraut[ ... ].391 
M1't Curtius. Bruning, Laval et Briand tfovant leurs verres <le biere. 
L 'Illustration, 10 October 1931 
However much Laval enjoyed the pheasant with sauerkraut, according to 
Fran9ois-Poncet, he was still very disappointed not to have "been served frankfurters and 
sauerkraut at any of the official banquets." So on the last evening after the dinner at the 
embassy Laval ordered the coveted dish to share with his associates. For Laval, who 
always had a delicate stomach, this resulted in acute indigestion. He tried to walk off his 
391 Sie haben vor allem die Fahrt durch die Havelseen bei schOnstem Wetter am zweiten Tag genossen. 
Kostlich war es zu beobachten, mit welchem Appetit beide Herren dem Zander mit Butter und frischen 
Kartoffeln und dem Fasan mit Sauerkraut zusprachen, [ ... ]" Curtius, Sechs Jahre, 225. (Translation 
assistance M.E. Volcker Havelaar). 
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queasiness by going "up and down Unter den Linden -- to the discomfort of the sentries 
detailed to do him appropriate honors, for every time Laval passed, the guard of honor 
had to present arms. "392 
Upon their return Briand and Laval were welcomed at the train station by 
thousands of war veterans and "gueules cassees" as well as the entire cabinet. When they 
got into their cars, Tardieu's vehicle was assailed by a group of communists. Fortunately 
Laval's very own security team formed of the furniture movers and other strong arms 
from Aubervilliers dispersed the spoilsports. 393 
F. The Franco-German commission 
The Franco-German commission was established to help in developing the 
existing economic ties between the two countries and creating new ones. The French had 
the funds and the Germans the industrial might and know-how. The Germans even 
proposed a customs union, but it would be too much to the advantage of Germany 
because of her enormous industrial output and her devalued currency.394 
No doubt the commission was a far cry from lofty pacts to outlaw war. The 
popular impact was not comparable. Laval simply tried to tackle the world problems at 
392 Frarn;ois-Poncet, The Fateful Years, 10-11. 
393 Chambrun, Pierre Laval devant l'histoire, 34. 
394 Fred Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 94. Curtius, Sechs Jahre, 227. 
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their root. By preserving and enhancing the well being of the citizen one inhibits the 
need for emigration, revolution, or war. This was Laval's equivalent of the American 
"pursuit of happiness. "395 
Laval named his economist Claude-Joseph Gignoux as the French representative 
to the commission. The Premier took the project very much to heart, even chairing the 
commission when itmet in Paris. Within a few months agricultural and industrial 
agreements were put together. Projects of collaboration in air transports were on the 
drawing board. 396 
The Franco-German Commission was modest in scope but was only intended to 
be the beginning of a larger diplomatic endeavor which would take Laval to America. 
All Laval and Bruning needed was good will and time. 
Unhappily these commodities were scarce in Germany. France's new ambassador 
to Berlin wrote: 
The very day after the Laval-Briand visit the hopes and illusions which 
had brought me to Germany began falling away one by one, as so many 
leaves off a tree in autumn. The cause of Franco-German amity met with 
no sympathy brave enough to declare itself either in Berlin or in the 
Country at Large. Only a few newspapers, the Berliner Tageblatt for 
instance, dared openly uphold it. The new Economic commission and its 
subcommissions pursued their task amid general indifference.397 
395 
"Happiness" as a philosophical concept was developed by John Locke and immortalized by Thomas 
Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(Forge Village, Massachusetts: Meridian, 1974), 173-174. 
396 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 49. 
397 Fran\:ois-Poncet, The Fateful Years, 11. 
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Briining's position had been uncomfortable from his first day in office. He would 
discover that the military tapped his phone line, that strangers listened in on his 
conversations through the flue of his chimney, that his office was searched, and, worst of 
all, that important documents were secretly duplicated. The text of conversations and 
documents found their way either to the press (Vossische Zeitung), the Nazis or both.398 
398 Brilning, Memoiren, 396-398. 
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CHAPTER 
VI 
COMING TO AMERICA 
A. American Isolationism circumvented 
President Hoover was well aware that American public opinion, and especially his 
party in the United States Senate, were staunchly isolationist. The president's personal 
beliefs might have been otherwise: Indeed his orchestration of American relief for 
Belgium during World War I and his later endowment of the Hoover Institution on War, 
Revolution and Peace at Stanford University showed a man with keen interest in 
international matters. The Hoover Moratorium itself, however flawed, demonstrated a 
grasp of world affairs. Yet Hoover had remained a conscientious Republican deferring to 
the isolationists led by of Borah ofldaho. Hoover would never on his own accord have 
invited the French Premier so soon after the debacle of the Hoover Moratorium.399 Not 
all Americans, however, thought like Hoover or Borah. 
On 18 September, a week before Laval's departure for Berlin, James G. 
McDonald, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Association, stirred the Franco-American 
399 Claudius O. Johnson stated that on 19 January 1929, President-elect Hoover offered Borah the office of 
Secretary of State. Johnson, Borah, 432. 
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relations.400 McDonald, with the help of journalist Comte Femand de Brinon, of the 
evening financial organ L 'Information, arranged a meeting with Premier Laval. De 
Brinon was also Laval's confidential advisor on foreign affairs.401 During the 
conversation MacDonald suggested that Laval should visit with Hoover. De Brinon 
discussed in his article the benefits of personal contacts between the heads of state. He 
cited the meeting of President Hoover and Premier MacDonald, and that of Briining and 
Laval and deemed a Hoover-Laval acquaintance the logical next step.402 Ambassador 
Edge who had been sounded out privately rapidly contacted Secretary Stimson before the 
article was put to press. 403 
400 In 1918 James Grover McDonald (1886-1964) and a group of internationalists formed the "League of 
Nations Association," a study group on peace and international relations. After the Senate's failure to ratify 
Versailles in 1921, the association became the "Foreign Policy Association." McDonald was its chairman 
from 1919 to 1933. The association's goal was to achieve United States entry into the League of Nations 
and, failing that, to enlighten the public on matters of foreign policy. Warren F. Kuehl, "McDonald, James 
Grover" in Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement Seven, 1961-1965, (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1981), and, The Greenwood Encyclopedia of American Institutions, Political Parties and 
Civic Action Groups, ed. s.v. "Foreign Policy Association (FPA) (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1981 ). 
401 Edge, A Jerseyman 's Journal, 205. Brinon would be in the Laval cabinets between 17 April 1942 and 
August 1944. Mallet, Pierre Laval, Part II, De la reconquete du pouvoir a /'execution (Paris: Amiot-
Dumont, 1955), 62-65. Covering the latter period, Hubert Cole described Femand de Brinon as "shady," 
"pro-nazi," "the principal Nazi spy within the Government." Cole, Laval, 51, 110, 234. 
402 Femand de Brinon, "Les collaborations franco-americaines, Un entretien Hoover-Laval?," 
L 'Information (Paris), 19 September 1931. 
403 Ambassador Walter E. Edge, Paris to Henry L. Stimson, Washington D.C., "Personal", 18 September 
1931, 033.5111, Pierre Laval 62, United States National Archives, Washington, D.C. "The Ambassador in 
France (Edge) to the Secretary of State," Paris, 19 September 1931, FRUS, 1931, vol. II, 237. 
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B. Invitation 
Laval could not have planned it any better himself. A meeting with Hoover was 
an idea that perfectly suited his diplomatic style. The French public welcomed the idea of 
a visit to America. Laval could not show too great enthusiasm of course; Hoover could 
reject the concept. He let it be known, however, that his government was not opposed to 
the idea. On 19 September, Edge sent another cable reporting the article and the French 
enthusiasm.404 It was up to the Hoover administration to extend an invitation to the 
French government. Stimson reacted rapidly and that same day sent a positive response 
in the hopes of coordinating it with the celebration of the Battle of Yorktown. 405 During 
his stay in Europe that summer Stimson "had formed a high opinion of Laval. 11406 
404 Ambassador Walter E. Edge, Paris to Henry L. Stimson, Washington D.C., "In reference to 
L'Information," 19September1931, 033.5111, Pierre Laval 1, USNA, Washington D.C. 
405 Henry L. Stimson, Washington D.C., to Ambassador Walter E. Edge, Paris, "To the Ambassador", 19 
September 1931, USNA 033.5111, Laval, Pierre/2. "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France 
(Edge)," Paris, 19 September 1931, FRUS, 1931, vol. II, 238. 
406 "Memorandum by the Secretary of State" (Stimson), 24 September 1931, FRUS, 1931, 240. 
"Memorandum of Conversation with the Italian Ambassador Nobile Giacomo de Martino," 24 September 
1931, USNA 033.5111 Laval, Pierre/27. "Memorandum of Conversation with the German Ambassador 
Herr Friedrich W. Von Prittwitz und Gaffron," 24 September 1931, USNA 033.5111 Laval, Pierre/26. 
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C. Preparing the encounter 
Laval naturally reacted favorably. He had to wait of course for the approval of his 
cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies but on the 21 September 1931 he had already taken 
several steps to show his willingness to talk with President Hoover. He telephoned Edge 
to let him know that he had conferred with Doumer who advised him to "go to the United 
States. 11407 Laval also issued a statement to the press in which he expressed the 
satisfaction of French public opinion with the invitation.408 Laval contacted Director of 
the United Press Association in France Ralph E. Heinzen, and an old friend, to arrange a 
press interview.409 Heinzen, accompanied by journalist Karl Bickel, conferred with 
Laval that same evening. Bickel wrote: 
Personally I was tremendously and favorably struck with Laval, 
particularly so because I had gained a rather different idea of him prior to 
his visit. I have met most of the French leaders of the past six or eight 
years. This chap is really different. While he is essentially French in 
appearance, short, dark, very mobile expressive face, which his 
photographs do not indicate, with particular fine eyes, the dominant strain 
ofNorman [sic] blood in him, gives him almost an American or English 
directness and frankness in his conversation.410 
During this discussion Laval laid out what he intended to discuss with Hoover so that 
Heinzen and Bickel could pass it on to the president. The use of this unofficial channel 
407 "Edge to Secretary of State" 21September1931, USNA H-W 033.5111 Laval,.Pierre/4 (Section One). 
408 Ibid., (Section Two). 
409 Ralph E. Heinzen was also a friend of Tardieu. 
41° Karl Bickel, Paris to Roy W. Howard, New York, "Confidential talk with Heinzen and Laval," 22 
September 1931, USNA, 1. 
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was necessary because the voyage had not yet been approved. It was designed to offer 
Hoover a view freed from official diplomatic burden. Laval was, as always, building the 
bases of a personal rapport. In addition, the recent anti-American feelings caused by the 
moratorium would have bridled any communication through the normal channels of the 
Quai d'Orsay. Laval deemed the trip to the United States essential to avoid "surprises" 
like the moratorium in the future. 411 Laval hoped to talk about two great problems: 
reparations as a cause of trouble in Europe, and disarmament in anticipation of the 
Geneva conference to be held on the subject. Laval spoke of a partial reduction of 
reparations but could not for economic reasons allow an unrestricted abolition of the 
payments. For example, the profits of the German railroads served to pay reparations. If 
the railroads were released of this burden "they could then carry freight at very low cost [ 
... ] [and] dump coal [and] other materials into France and ruin certain of [ ... ] [the 
French] industries. "412 On the subject of disarmament, Laval felt that Hoover was "the 
most sincere and the most serious. "413 In this, Laval felt that Hoover differed from 
Mussolini and MacDonald who called for disarmament as well. The former could not 
afford a larger army, and the latter had difficulties meeting the cost of the British fleet. 
Laval wanted to be able to explain the French position on disarmament to come to an 
411 Ibid., 1-3. 
412 Ibid., 3. 
413 Ibid. 
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agreement and give Geneva a good chance of success. On a personal note, Laval 
mentioned he would like to take advantage of his stay in America to have a glance at the 
cattle operations in Chicago, an area of particular interest to him because of his own 
farms. On the whole he did not wish to accept any engagements save the governmental 
ones, as he was not fond of ceremonies and honors.414 Also, Laval most certainly did not 
want the talks to be sidetracked or, worse, lost in the fanfare. 
Ambassador Edge extended the official invitation to Laval and Briand on 25 
September 1931 after the French Council of Ministers unanimously approved Laval's 
visit to the United States.415 This was also the opportunity for Edge and Mellon to offer, 
on behalf of the United States, "silver inkstands in the eighteenth century American 
Colonial style appropriately engraved" to the participants of the moratorium talks, an 
elegant gesture which was well received by the French press as was the invitation itsel£416 
Gabriel Perreux of Paris Midi was simply elated, hoping that this marked the beginning 
of the end of American isolationism. It was he wrote, an opportunity for Laval "to 
inscribe his name next to Clemenceau, Poincare, and Briand on the frontispiece of the 
temple of great Statesmen."417 
414 Ibid., 1-4. 
415 
"The Ambassador in France (Edge) to the Secretary of State," FRUS, 1931, vol. II, 243. 
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Laval and Briand had both been invited. "M. Laval was most anxious that 
Foreign Minister Briand be in his party, but the aged statesman demurred, claiming that 
the voyage was too long and too arduous for one of his years."418 Later, French 
Ambassador Paul Claude! reported to Stimson that Briand was "peeved because Laval is 
coming without him."419 However, contradictory, both statements might have been 
correct considering Briand's illness. More likely this was yet another rumor started by 
Briand's entourage at the Quai. 
Laval prepared thoroughly for his journey. Capable of improvising a good 
speech from a few notes, he now studied the financial files with his team of experts: 
Fran9ois Albert-Buisson, Judge at the Court of Commerce; Charles Rist, former sub-
governor of the Banque de France; and finance inspectors Rueff, Boissard, and Henry 
Bizot.420 Heinzen and the Mayor of Versailles Henry Haye, were his consultants on 
American society. Laval handpicked the team that was going to accompany him.421 
418 Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal, 206. 
419 Stimson, Diary, 9 October 1931. Also Warner, Pierre Laval, 44-45. 
42° Cointet, Pierre Laval, 109. Fran9ois Albert-Buisson (b. 1881) was also mayor oflssoire (1923-1941) 
and Senator of the Puy-de-Dome. Dictionnaire Biographique Fram;ais Contemporain (Paris: Pharos, 
1954), 21. 
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In addition to these financial experts, the foreign ministry's legal consultant, Jules 
Basdevant, the naval specialist Louis Aubert, and a former official of the finance 
ministry, Jean Parmentier, would accompany Laval.422 Laval also invited Marriner, the 
American embassy counselor, and Pell, Edges's personal secretary and translator. Laval 
had appreciated their efforts during Stimson's visit and thought that they would like to see 
their families. 423 Laval's generosity caused some embarrassment to the American State 
Department. Inviting the two embassy staffs was one thing, but paying their way was 
quite another. This matter of protocol generated a few dispatches between Washington 
and the American Embassy. 
Laval was well aware that general American sentiments vis-a-vis France were 
unfavorable as she was blamed for the chaos in Europe, especially in the Hearst press.424 
In the weeks preceding Laval's voyage, the French press, namely the well respected Le 
Temps, started the rumor that the United States was about to abandon the gold standard. 
This of course caused a run on the dollar, infuriating Hoover.425 It was suggested that Le 
Temps yielded to French ammunition manufacturers as they did not look kindly on 
422 Cointet, Pierre Laval, 109. 
423 Robert Pell was accompanied in Paris by his wife and two "youngsters." Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal, 
149. 
424 Part of William Randolph Hearst's hostility towards France could be explained by the following: while 
vacationing in France in the summer of 1930, Hearst had been expelled, probably per Premier Tardieu's 
instructions, because of the publication of a secret naval protocol between France and Great Britain. 
Months later Edge was able to convince Premier Laval to rescind the order of expulsion, but Hearst never 
returned to France. Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal, 177. 
425 Stimson, Diary, 20 October 1931. 
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possible talks of disarmament. The Laval government had to pressure the Banque de 
France not to liquidate its dollars.426 The American press of course was justified, this 
time, in accusing the French of wrongdoing. 
Yet Laval aimed to charm the American public. He acquired elegant formal attire, 
complete with top hat. On board the Ile-de-France, he practiced for American style press 
interviews with a rolling barrage of questions. He had a trump card in the person of his 
beloved daughter Josee, who had just turned twenty. Her smile, for she was lovely, 
would do marvels in New York. Jeanne Laval was not fond of social happenings, 
therefore "it was her delight -- and his [Pierre Laval's] -- to see their brilliant daughter 
accompany him on the journeys abroad [ ... ]."427 Raymond and Jacqueline Patenotre, 
friends of Pierre and Josee, were also on board the steamer.428 Raymond Patenotre was a 
member of the national assembly and a press baron with precious American connections. 
D. Le Havre-New York 
Pierre and Josee Laval, the Premier's entourage, and a plethora of journalists 
boarded the Ile-de-France at Le Havre on 16 October 1931. Laval was careful to temper 
the extravagant enthusiasm engendered by the trip. He cautioned that if "frank 
426 Approximately $600,000,000. "The Ambassador in France (Edge) to the Secretary of State," 21 
October 1931, FRUS, 1931 vol. II, 249. 
427 Cole, Laval, 49. Cole also reported that Mrs. Laval was said to own only one formal dress, coat and 
hat. Ibid. 
428 Cointet, Pierre Laval, 109. 
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explanations between heads of state appear as the surest method to reclaim the rules of a 
normal economy, it would be excessive to expect definitive solutions."429 
The journey was divided between work and leisure where Laval was seen 
participating in the life and games of the ship. The Ile-de-France reached New York on 
22 October. Stimson had travelled to New York to welcome the French delegation. 
Johnny Walker, the flamboyant mayor ofNew York, grandly received Laval. In the early 
morning, Laval and Heinzen strolled Broadway, and visited the subway incognito. To 
the press who asked him what he thought of America he answered: "if I were twenty 
again, I would come and live here ... "430 At New York's City Hall after the welcoming 
words of Johnny Walker; Laval pronounced his first speech in America to "the great 
American people."431 
Laval spoke of his "pilgrimage among the capitals," explaining that unusual times 
required unusual diplomatic means. In response to the American press's criticism of 
France's position vis-a-vis Germany in particular and on disarmament in general, he 
clearly stated France's desire for peace albeit without compromising her security.432 He 
noted the American people's aspiration for "self-containment," but appealed to the 
429 Pierre Laval in Francois de Tessan, Le President Hoover et La Politique Americaine (Paris: Editions 
Baudiniere, 1931), 267. 
43° Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 101. 
431 
"Address of the President of the Council of Ministers of France" Press Releases, 4 July - 26 December 
1931, 355-357. 
432 Kupfennan, Laval, 1987, 100. 
138 
"generous impulse" and "noble idealism" of the American people to "respond if necessary 
to calls which may reach them from the old world. "433 
On that busy morning Josee Laval inaugurated the Empire State building by 
symbolically lighting the Statue of Liberty from the one-hundredth floor of the new 
skyscraper. Unknown to her, in the crowd cheering Pierre Laval was also her future 
husband Rene de Chambrum, a young French lawyer, who was captivated not so much by 
Pierre Laval as by his daughter's radiant smile and sky blue beret. The definitive 
encounter between Rene and Josee would not occur, however, until some three years later 
at a dinner at the home of the Patenotres.434 
The first leg of the American journey ended with the picture of Pierre Laval 
triumphantly riding down Broadway Avenue in a convertible under a shower of ticker 
tape.435 The ice was broken; Laval charmed the press. Yet the difficult part of the 
diplomatic mission had not yet begun. 
433 Press Releases, 4 July - 26 December 1931, 356-357. 
434 Rene de Chambrun, Mes combats pour Pierre Laval (Perrin: Paris, 1990), 230-231. 
435 See cover of L 'Illustration, at the front of this work. 
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E. The Washington Talks 
Laval boarded the train at Pennsylvania Station, he arrived in Washington in the 
early aftemoon.436 He was welcomed at Union Station by the Under Secretary of State 
William R. Castle, Jr. and Hoover's Military Aide Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell B. 
Hodges. As the French embassy could not accommodate the entire French delegation, 
Ambassador Edge had generously offered the use of his house.437 
That same afternoon, Pierre Laval and Ambassador Paul Claudel met with Herbert 
and Lou Hoover at the White House. The social niceties rapidly gave way to serious 
talks between the heads of state which started at 3:30 p.m. For the substance of this 
meeting the Stimson Diary was essential. It would have been logical for Claudel to be 
present at the meeting, but he was excluded. Laval probably did not want details of the 
meeting to travel back to the Quai d'Orsay until he was ready. 
It was a small gathering, Hoover and Stimson with Ogden L. Mills, Secretary of 
the Treasury, acting as the American interpreter and Laval with Albert-Buisson as his 
translator. The talks that first day were only interrupted by "the official dinner given in 
honor of the guests of the Yorktown Sesquicentennial Celebration. "438 Having little taste 
for formal happenings and wishing his trip to focus on world affairs, Laval did his utmost 
436 
"Program of the Visit in New York and Washington." Press Releases, no date, 353. 
437 Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal, 207. 
438 
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not to participate in the Yorktown celebration. Marshall Petain represented France at 
Yorktown and Laval easily deferred the honors to him, protesting that he could not 
possibly infringe upon the position of the hero of Verdun. The gala dinner, however, was 
unescapable. Within an hour the formality was over. A mediocre meal served without 
wine because of the prohibition offered no reason to linger. 
After the dinner, Laval, Stimson, and Hoover resumed their talks. Hoover, 
Hoover & Laval followed by Lou Hoover & Josee Laval 
courtesy Rene de Chambrun 
nicknamed in the American press as the man who never smiled, was not a convivial host. 
He had opened the discussions by defining America's position toward Europe. The 
141 
United States had become involved in Europe at the cost of75,000 men and some $40 
billion. Yet Europe was politically even more unstable than before. In light of this, the 
United States would do nothing more until the political and economic situation improved 
in Europe. 439 
Laval countered that German revisionism was a great obstacle to stability. Laval 
upheld the sanctity of international treaties and suggested that a ten-year political 
moratorium might allow the political climate to cool down enough to allow for a solution. 
Stimson did not think it was feasible without a concrete hope of a solution. Stimson 
alluded to Laval's view, put forth back in July at the London Conference, of a settlement 
of the problem of the Danzig corridor. While Laval concurred that he had indeed had 
such thought in July, he could not conceive of a solution that would be agreeable to both 
the Poles and the Germans.440 Unknown to Stimson, Laval had approached Bruning on 
this very topic, and was told by the chancellor in no uncertain terms that compromise 
over the eastern border was impossible.441 
On the question of disarmament Laval suggested that great strides could be made 
ifthe United States agreed to a Franco-American "consultative pact" on naval matters. 
Hoover thought it was politically impossible and proposed instead "a basic size for an 
439 
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army, based upon a size large enough merely for an internal police force and then giving 
other nations additions to the basic need based upon their respective different needs." 
Laval could of course not agree to such a ludicrous program. He very diplomatically 
brought up the impracticality of such a plan.442 
Where they did agree was on helping Germany. Hoover suggested that 
Germany's payment capacity should be reevaluated at this time. Laval concurred as long 
as the commission would operate within the Young plan. Stimson recalled, "then Laval 
asked Hoover whether in case the committee reported for a reduction in reparations, 
would the United States cooperate[?] Mr. Hoover replied that he would cooperate of 
course." Laval then added, however, that he could not consider "an entire abolition of 
reparations." One of the Americans, possibly Hoover, then wondered if it would be 
possible to transfer the present reparation charge of the German government to German 
industry. To the Americans' surprise Laval responded affirmatively.443 
The next day Hoover and Stimson met over lunch. Hoover expressed his 
frustration over French militarism and cockiness in general and Laval's rejection of his 
reduced military concept in particular. Stimson moderated the President's frustration by 
pointing out the progress made in France's attitude toward Germany.444 
442 
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F. Laval's political moratorium 
What Hoover missed and even keen Stimson did not grasp was that Laval had laid 
out the core of his foreign policy vis-a-vis Germany. Even the Franco-German 
Commission had been discussed. Laval had devised a plan, one which was known to 
very few. None of the biographers of Laval, not even Geoffrey Warner, who used the 
Stimson Diary as well, detected Laval's solution to the Franco-German dilemma. 
As mentioned above, at the root of all the problems lay the Versailles treaty and 
the reparations. But, rather than attempt to abrogate the treaty and scrap the reparations 
and the payments to America, which he deemed politically unfeasible, Laval was going to 
use them in solving the puzzle. 
One of the greatest difficulties for Germany was that the German government was 
to pay reparations in gold. Laval had devised a solution which was the same as the 
Garrand Winston plan referred to by Stimson. We should add that Flandin as finance 
minister, as well as Laval's team of experts, most certainly had a hand in conceiving this 
portion of the plan. Flandin had met with Ambassador Edge to discuss unofficially the 
possibility of the "transferral of reparation payments to bonded indebtedness," before 
Laval's departure for the United States. Edge wrote the State Department, and he was 
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certainly correct, that he thought "that Flandin made this visit [ ... ] for the sole purpose 
of opening up these possibilities in an unofficial manner. "445 
The "Laval-Winston solution" (for lack of a better name) went as follows: The 
German government instead of paying the recipients of the reparations would instead pay 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) not in gold but in marks. The BIS would 
then lend its funds to the "German industry, public utilities, railroads, and possibly other 
private borrowers." The BIS would receive, from its borrowers, long-term obligations 
payable in gold. These obligations in tum would be used to pay the reparations.446 The 
obvious benefits would be threefold: The German government would be able to fulfill its 
reparation obligation at lesser cost, German enterprises would have access to secure 
credit, and the allied nations would receive their reparations. 
Economically feasible, the Laval-Winston solution needed time to show a 
measurable impact on the German economy, just as the Franco-German commission 
needed time to develop its cross border links. Here German irredentism posed a problem. 
The solution was a ten-year political moratorium which would allow enough time to 
develop the German economy and Franco-German economic ties. In these ten years the 
Germans would refrain from demanding the revision of the Versailles treaty and the 
French right wing would have nothing to rail against. 
445 "The Ambassador in France (Edge) to the Secretary of State," 1October1931, FRUS, 1931, vol. II, 
245-246. 
446 
"Memorandum of Conference with Laval," Stimson, Diary, 23 October 1931. 
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As noted above, Laval had tested the concept of the ten-year moratorium with 
Bruning. In his memoirs, Bruning, rejected the idea of a moratorium. According to 
Warner, the Chancellor was receptive to the idea though the German statesman had 
countered with a one year moratorium. Unfortunately, Stimson thought such a 
moratorium was not feasible without a concrete promise about the outcome. But to Laval 
these promises would most likely have to involve either the end of reparations or the 
redrawing of the Eastern frontier of Germany, two items which were much too explosive 
to mention as a possible outcome to a political moratorium. 
If Stimson was lukewarm at best, Hoover was an iceberg. This did not bode well 
for Laval's concept of a political moratorium. Stimson noted that Laval was not as open 
as he had been in Paris. Ike Hoover, the White House Chief Usher, remarked that Laval 
was markedly tense: "He was like a prize-fighter sparring for an opening. "447 The 
opening was not forthcoming. 
On Saturday, 25 October, Laval and his daughter were guests of Mr. and Mrs. 
Stimson at their Washington home. Laval and Stimson met alone over breakfast with 
Stimson's "own bad French" for interpreter.448 Laval brought up the political moratorium 
447 Irwin Hood (Ike) Hoover, Forty-Two Years in the White House (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 
212. 
448 Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Post-Pres. Individual, Stimson, Henry L. Sunday, 25 October 
1931. (This is a copy of an excerpt of the Stimson Diary covering Laval's visit. Stimson had sent the 
documents to Hoover so he could review them before they were published in Foreign Relations United 
States. Fearing these documents would be used against him Hoover refused their publication.) 
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once more; Stimson rejected the idea again.449 At least the conversation was far easier in 
the absence of Hoover. 
The body of the topics of discussion had been covered on the-first day. All that 
was needed now was to compose the communique. To Stimson's surprise, Ambassador 
Claudel would excessively complicate this task. Stimson always had the best relations 
with the diplomat, but now Claudel was "captious and pettifogging and took all kinds of 
little objections to language." It would take two days to get a statement "as to a 
conversation which had taken [ ... ] only seven hours.450 Possibly Claudel was out of 
sorts because of Laval's gentle rebuff of a speech he had prepared: "A Laval doesn't 
know how to speak like that," said Laval to his ambassador.451 Putting together the 
communique, however, was a minor problem in light ofBorah's intervention. 
449 Stimson Diary, 25 October 1931. 
450 Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Post-Pres. Individual, Stimson, Henry L., Friday, 23 October 
1931. 
451 
"Un Laval ne sait pas parler comme ((a!"Mallet, Des annees obscures, 30. 
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G. Borah: Irresponsible adviser to the world 
James Hart conferred upon Borah of Idaho the sobriquet of "irresponsible adviser 
of the world" for his ill timed intervention during Laval's visit.452 Senator William E. 
Borah ofldaho was the exceedingly influential Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations since the passing of Henry Cabot Lodge in December 1924.453 Borah was 
cordially despised in Europe where he was accurately seen as the chief opponent of the 
ratification of the treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations and the leading 
proponent of American isolationism. The French journalists who had accompanied Laval 
could not resist the opportunity of an interview with the American ogre on 23 October. 
He did not disappoint them. Borah called for the restoration of the Hungarian borders, 
the return of the Polish corridor to Germany, and the cancellation of the reparations, and 
opposed "any security pacts with France or any other Nations. "454 Granted, Borah had not 
expressed anything new. Borah had met with Hoover on 21 October, before the arrival of 
Laval, and had discussed all these points, and according to Borah, the president had 
agreed with him.455 Regardless, Borah's statements had the effect of a bombshell. Borah 
had come out "vigorously and in an embarrassing way on nearly all the embarrassing 
452 James Hart, "National Personalities" in The American Year Book, A Record of Events and Progress, 
Year 1931, Albert Bushnell Hart, ed. (New York: The American Year Book Corporation, 1932), 15. 
453 Johnson, Borah, 311. 
454 Ibid., 44 7. 
455 Johnson, Borah, 446. 
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points there were," recalled Stimson.456 It was a slap in the face for Hoover, an insult to 
the French delegation. When Laval heard of it during the Friday meeting "he raised his 
hands and said, 'Why the man lives in Mars."'457 Laval later answered the journalists who 
questioned him that he came to engage in talks with the president not to polemicize with 
whomsoever. 458 
On Saturday, 24 October 1931 Laval met with Borah at the home of Stimson, 
where they were to attend dinner. There was much anticipation regarding this encounter 
in the press. After "one of Mabel's [Mrs. Simpson] usual good dinners [ ... ]that helped 
carry off the absence of wine for the French," Stimson brought his two guests into his 
study so they could debate at ease.459 "They sat on the sofa and continued it so long that 
it pretty nearly busted up the rest of the conversation. [ ... ] So the rest of the [evening] 
was rather like Hamlet without Hamlet."460 Not surprisingly Laval and Borah disagreed 
on all points: the security pact, the Treaty of Versailles, Germany .. ·. 461 It was 
456 Stimson Diary, 24 October 1931. Also Warner, Pierre Laval, 48. 
457 Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Post-Pres. Individual, Stimson, Henry L., Saturday, 24 October 
1931. 
458 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 50-51. 
459 Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Post-Pres. Individual, Stimson, Henry L., Saturday, 24 October 
1931. 
460 Ibid. 
461 Johnson, Borah, 448-449. 
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unfortunate that Borah, the most influential man in American diplomacy, had such a 
limited vision of world affairs. Amazingly the conversation remained perfectly cordial. 
All guests having departed, Laval, Rist, Bizot and Mills resumed their work on 
the communique, driving Stimson mad with repressed frustration as the tedious task 
prevented him from going to bed.462 
H. The results of the Hoover Laval Conference 
Stimson was not the only one experiencing frustration. Poor Hoover, his plan for 
a reduced military had been rebuffed -- albeit gently. A solution to the Danzig corridor 
had been retracted. The concept of introducing silver as a standard for the countries that 
went off the gold standard was disregarded as a frivolous proposal by Laval and Albert-
Buisson. Hoover thought it might have helped "Mexico, India, China and South 
America," but Laval dismissed the silver solution as an inflationary proposition adding 
that "it was cheaper to inflate paper."463 
Laval did not get a security pact without which the French would never consider 
disarmament, nor did he obtain an endorsement for the political moratorium. The 
promise to match any reduction of German reparations with a decrease of the French debt 
was not put in the communique. What was stated in the joint statement was the 
462 Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Post-Pres. Individual, Stimson, Henry L., Saturday, 24 October 
1931. 
463 
"Memorandum of Conference with Laval" Stimson, Diary, 23 October 1931. 
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attachment of France and the United States to the gold standard. The two governments 
also agreed that the Banque de France and the Federal Reserve would consult each other 
before the transfer of gold.464 This was welcome news after the run on American gold in 
the preceding weeks. In light of the financial crisis, they further agreed to review the 
economic situation of Germany before the Hoover moratorium ran its course. 465 
These were no doubt meager political results. Yet what could be expected from 
the American president a year away from the election, contending with an overall 
isolationist public opinion and Congress on the one hand and a French premier reined in 
by the very members of his cabinet on the other? The Hoover-Laval encounter, however, 
had quite an impact. The Swedish and Norwegian stock exchanges showed recovery for 
a time.466 The American and French press was positively smitten with Laval. Time made 
Laval man of the year, an honor never bestowed on a Frenchman before, following no 
less than Mahatma Gandhi and preceding Franklin D. Roosevelt. A conquering Laval 
riding down Broadway made the cover of L 'Illustration. So there it was: a political draw 
could also be a personal triumph. 
464 Tessan, Le President Hoover, 268. 
46s Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 102. Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures 50-51. 
466 Bruning, Memoiren, 432. 
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CHAPTER 
VII 
WHEN IT RAINS ... 
A. International problems 
Laval returned to France on board the Ile-de-France by way of New York. The 
revitalization of the Young Plan was his first order of business. Briining's approval for a 
reevaluation of Germany's payment capacity was sought and obtained. The Reassessment 
Committee meeting in Basie from 7 through 23 December concluded that the Germany 
should be dispensed temporarily from paying the conditional portion of the reparations. 
The Young plan survived. 
Nevertheless, Laval's string of successes began to meet with serious problems. 
On 9 January 1932 Bruning announced that Germany would not be able to meet its 
obligations. Though on 14 January Bruning moderated his position, and by 13 February 
the British aligned with Laval. The reparations were maintained with enormous 
difficulties. 467 
A major problem was that the World Crisis had reached France, with 
unemployment rising to 200,000, and the looming certainty that the 1932 budget would 
not balance. Free international trade was under threat, Sweden barred the entry of French 
467 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 51. 
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cheeses, the Netherlands and Spain imposed quotas on French imports, Poland raised 
their import taxes, and Italy denounced the Franco-Italian trade agreement. 
The latter was possibly the latest obstacle to the possibility of a Laval trip to 
Rome. A voyage to Italy would certainly have fittingly concluded Laval's international 
tour. However, the project of such a visit would have met with the opposition of the 
Italophobes at the Quai d'Orsay and in the department of the Navy, who feared a Franco-
Italian accord that would reduce the French fleet in the Mediterranean.468 
B. National problems 
Another source of concern was the possible collapse of Laval's support in the 
chambers. The Cantonale elections of October 1931 had seen a strong progression of the 
Left Radicals (Radicaux de Gauche). While the elections in the cantons -- administrative 
entities at the departmental level -- had no impact on the composition of the National 
Assembly or the Senate, it did cause the Radicals to rethink their position within the 
present assemblies in which they had assumed a somewhat benevolent neutrality toward 
Laval. Edouard Herriot remained favorable, at least for the time being, to the present 
course of the government, but Edouard Daladier, as the representative of the left branch 
468 Cointet, Pierre Laval, 112-113. 
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of the Radical Socialists, was looking toward forming a new majority with the 
Socialists. 469 
All the while, an ailing Briand kept to his bed at the Quai d'Orsay. Laval was 
prevented by the "entourage" from visiting the old diplomat. Yet on 2 January 1932 
Laval was called in by Briand. The two men talked at length about the political situation. 
Briand decided to leave the government, Laval promised to take him back as foreign 
minister as soon as he recovered. The old diplomat left for his farm of Cocherel.470 
Worse yet, on 7 January 1932, Minister of War Andre Maginot died, poisoned by 
bad oysters. Laval was at his bedside.471 Maginot had enjoyed the full confidence of 
Laval and had full control over his ministry. The disarmament conference in Geneva 
opened on 2 February 1932. France needed a credible representative and Laval urged 
Tardieu to take over Maginot's ministry.472 Tardieu accepted. Laval attempted to widen 
his majority by including the Radicals in his government. With the departure of Briand 
the Radicals pretended to fear that the government would abandon the policy of peace 
and they refused participation and all voted against the third Laval government. Laval, 
469 Ibid., 113. 
47° Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 103-104. 
471 Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire Politique, tome cinquieme, 105. Chambrun, Pierre Laval devant 
l'Histoire, 36. Chastenet, Dec/in, 27. 
472 Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 51. 
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however, did win the confrontation. On 23 January, 1932, the chamber voted for the new 
Laval government, 312 to 261.473 
Laval had recast his government with the same ministers, promoting the under 
secretaries, Cathala and Achille Fould, to their respective ministries of the Interior and 
Agriculture, reserving the foreign ministry for himself. Still, without the participation of 
the Radicals or their neutrality, Laval's center right coalition was in jeopardy. 
This was evident to all, and the conservative deputy Georges Mandel -- once 
Clemenceau's gray eminence -- proposed an electoral reform which would replace the 
plurinominal ballot with an uninominal one. This would favor the right as it would do 
away with the reciprocal standing down of the Radicals and the Socialists between two 
ballots. A very important amendment giving women the right to vote had been attached 
to the reform by Anatole de Monzie.474 Tardieu, because he associated his vision of a 
modem France with that of a strong conservative party -- and also because of the 
amendment, as he was a proponent of woman's suffrage -- convinced Laval to put the 
weight of the government behind this proposal.475 The reform passed the assembly on 12 
February 1932.476 
473 Bonnefous, Histoire Politique, tome cinquieme, 108. 
474 Ibid., 110. 
41s Andre Tardieu, "Les Projets Constitutionnel de Tardieu (1934)," L 'Heure de la Decision (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1934), 176-178, in Eric Cahm, Politique et Societe; La France de 1814 a nosjours (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1977), 106-108. 
476 Chastenet, Declin, 27-28. Bonnefous, Histoire Politique, tome cinquieme, 110-111. 
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The Radicals and the opposition parties were upset. In the senate, on 16 February 
Albert Peyronnet (gauche democratique) called for an immediate debate on the overall 
policies of Laval's government. Laval asked for a postponement of such a debate for a 
few days, because Tardieu was at that very moment putting forth, to the Disarmament 
conference, the creation of an international military force that would give teeth to the 
League of Nations. This would satisfy France's craving for security, and allow for 
disarmament. Laval appealed to the Senators to choose the superior interest of the nation. 
In order to emphasize his point Laval risked the survival of the government on a vote to 
postpone the debate. On 16 February 1932, Laval was defeated in the Senate, 157 to 
132.477 
The Laval government collapsed over a calendar issue putting an end to the last 
diplomatic effort to bring France and Germany together; the window of opportunity was 
closed. When Laval returned to power three years later he would direct a policy of 
containment against Germany. 
477 Ibid., 111. 
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CONCLUSION 
ASSESSMENT OF PIERRE LAV AL IN 1931 
The first international crisis Laval faced was the Hoover Moratorium and, despite 
the pronouncements of authors such as John W. Wheeler-Bennett, we have seen that 
Laval did his utmost to make the Moratorium work. Though the parliamentary coalition 
that made Laval's government was not wholly behind him at first, Laval was able to 
gather enough outside support to preserve his government and approve the one-year 
Hoover Moratorium. 
Unfortunately, the German economy was so flawed that the reprieve afforded by 
the Hoover moratorium was short-lived. From this renewed financial disaster, however, 
an opportunity for improvement of Franco-German relations arose. Laval's first 
encounter with Bruning was, something of a missed opportunity. Had Laval been able to 
offer Briining the half a billion dollars without the conditions, history might have taken a 
different tum. It is unlikely, nonetheless, that the loan would have been enough to make 
Germans forget the so-called "war guilt clause" and the Danzig corridor. Still, it was to 
Laval's credit that the meeting did not tum into a diplomatic disaster. 
Over the course of the Laval-Bruning meeting, the two grew to appreciate each 
other. From this first missed opportunity arose the French visit to Berlin. Though the 
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results were meager, it too was a positive step toward Franco-German understanding. 
Laval said of the meetings with Brilning: 
I did my best, I was ever conscious of embodying my country. It gave me 
great courage and great strength. I always spoke honestly with my 
interlocutors. I recall a poignant moment when Mr. Brilning and I sensed 
the insurmountable chasm between us. His face was so sad that I felt sorry 
for him. ["]In my situation,r'J I told him, ["]you would not speak 
otherwise.["] He acquiesced with a nod. I added then: "Mr. Brilning, let 
us put forth all efforts so that we may one day meet again. "478 
The encounter with Hoover was not all it could have been. Author James E. 
Pollard wrote that Hoover changed upon becoming President; where he had been open, 
willing to communicate, upon taking office he became inflexible, controlling, and 
secretive.479 It was apparent during Laval's visit that Hoover was not willing to try to 
compromise on anything. This must have been very disconcerting to Laval, especially 
after his candid meetings with Stimson. Granted Hoover had a lot on his plate: with the 
national income dropping to half in the span of his presidency, the Bonus Marchers 
camping on the Mall, the invasion of Manchuria, to name but a few problems Hoover 
faced. Laval had thoroughly prepared for the visit, won over the American press, and 
478 
''J'ai fait de mon mieux, j'avais le sentiment toujours present d'incarner mon pays. Cela m'a donne un 
grand courage et une grande force. J'ai toujours parle loyalement a mes interlocuteurs. Je me souviens 
d'une minute poignante ou Mr. Bruning [sic] et moi nous avons senti le fosse infranchissable entre nous. II 
avait un visage si triste que j'avais de la peine pour lui. A ma place, lui ais-je <lit, wous ne parleriez pas 
autrement. II a acquiese de la tete. Alorsj'ai ajoute: "Mr. Bruning [sic], faisons tous nos efforts pourque 
nous puissions unjour nous rejoindre." Laval quoted by Jean de Pierrefeu in Herman Dons, "Le Voyage de 
M. Pierre Laval, l'homme qui personifie la vieille Europe," L 'Etoile Beige, 26 October 1931. 
479 James E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press (New York: Octagon Books, 1973), 737-742. 
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handled the Borah incident with skill -- but he could not get through to the humorless 
president. 
Being able to conduct any sort of policy in France's Third Republic was a 
remarkable achievement in itself. As to the length of Laval's stay in power, it was 
equivalent to the better performing governments. Yet the key question for any 
statesperson is whether the goal(s) of his or her administration were accomplished? 
Unfortunately, with Laval the answer is no. Laval was unable to convince Brilning and 
Stimson of the viability of a ten-year political moratorium. Yet Laval's year in office was 
not bereft of accomplishments. It was a year of positive beginnings which saw improved 
diplomatic relations with Germany, the United States, and even Great Britain. It was a 
year of personal successes: In 1931 Laval was a popular politician at home and as inthe 
case of the United States, abroad. Had Laval's political career ended here he might have 
been remembered like Louis Barthou as a man who could have averted war "if only." 
But, as the French say, with "ifs" one can put Paris in a bottle. The reality was that 
Laval's career did not end in 1931; he went on to serve a very difficult term as premier in 
1935 and to serve in the Vichy government during World War II. 
Many have thought to draw parallels between Laval's dealing with Germany in 
the 1930s and the 1940s. Such endeavors have little merit for circumstances were 
obviously very different. In 1931 Laval was the head of a strong and free state; in 1940 
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he was not. In 1931 Laval was dealing with a democratic Germany; in 1940 he was not. 
In 1931 Laval was negotiating with an honest and upstanding man; in 1940 he was not. 
Did this study give any insights to Laval's personality, which would explain 
Laval in 1940? Perhaps, but in order to explain one would have to agree as to what he 
did. To borrow Chambrun's words, was Laval a "traitor or a patriot?" This question 
cannot be answered in a paragraph. But ifhe did betray France, he did not do it for the 
common motivations of money, ideology, sex, or even power. If one can agree that 
betrayal without motivation is not possible, then Chambrun must be deemed correct in his 
affirmation that Laval sacrificed himself to protect the French. However, when betrayal 
is loosely defined to mean that all who do not fight provide aid to the enemy, then Laval 
must be a traitor. Over the last few years, although I have spent thousands of hours with 
Laval in 1931, I cannot answer that enduring question. The chief objective of this study 
was to show Laval as he might have been seen by his contemporaries in 1931. I hope the 
reader feels I reached that goal. 
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EPILOGUE 
When Briand, feeling better, returned to Paris in March, Laval was no longer in 
power to give him back his post a the Quai d'Orsay.480 Laval had returned to the Labor 
ministry in the third Tardieu government. Briand died on 7 March 1932. The old 
diplomat was given a national funeral in Paris. His long time opponent Tardieu gave the 
eulogy. 
Heinrich Briining's government outlived Laval's by a few months. Hindenburg, 
victorious over Hitler in the presidential elections of 1932, blamed his chancellor for his 
difficult victory and replaced him with Franz von Papen. In 1934, Briining fled from 
Nazi Germany -- first to the Netherlands, then to Switzerland and England. He 
eventually came to the United States in 1939 to become a professor at Harvard. Upon his 
death in 1970 in Norwich, Vermont, Briining's body was repatriated to Germany and 
given a national funeral. On that solemn occasion he was recognized by the entire 
German parliament, both right and left, as a man of integrity and as a selfless leader.481 
At the Lausanne conference (16 June-18 July 1932), the new Premier Edouard 
Herriot fought the German request for the total abandonment of the war reparations. 
Papen had the support of MacDonald. Although the debt was reduced to three billion 
48° Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 103-104. 
481 Bruning, Memoiren, 681-682, 687. 
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gold marks, it would never be paid. Papen also wanted France to annul the "war guilt 
clause." Herriot refused emphatically. Von Papen, livid, left screaming "You'll get 
Hitler, you'll get Hitler."482 
482 Bonnet, Le Quai d'Orsay, 109-110. 
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Appendix A 
The composition of the Laval governments 1931-1932 
and party affiliation(s) when known483 
27 January 1931 - May 1931 
President du Conseil & ministre de l'Interieur ............... Pierre Laval, (S)(independant) 
Vice-president du conseil 
et Garde des Sceaux ....... Leon Berard, (S)(Parti Republicain Democratique et Social/URD)* 
Affaires etrangeres ................................... Aristide Briand (D)(independant) 
Guerre ............................. Andre Maginot (D)(Action democratique et sociale) 
Marine .................................... Charles Dumont (D)(gauche democratique) 
Air ....................................... Jacques-Louis Dumesnil (D) (independant) 
Instruction publique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mario Roustan (S)(gauche democratique) 
Finances . Pierre-Etienne Flandin (D)(President of alliance democratique/republicain de gauche) 
Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fran~ois Pietri (D)(alliance democratique/republicain de gauche) 
Travaux Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maurice Deligne (D)(gauche radicale) 
Travail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Adolphe Landry (D)(gauche radicale) 
Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louis Rollin (D)(republicain de gauche) 
Agriculture . Andre Tardieu (D)(parti republicain democratique et social/republicain de gauche) 
Marine marchande . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Charles De Chappedelaine (D)(gauche radicale) 
Pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Auguste Champetiers de Ribes (D)(Parti Democrate Populaire) 
Sante Publique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Camille Blaisot (D)(URD) 
P.T.T .......................................... Charles Guemier (D)(gauche radicale) 
Colonies ........... Paul Reynaud (D)(alliance democratique/action democratique et sociale) 
Sous-secretaires d'Etat. 
Presidence du Conseil 
et Economie nationale ...... Andre Fran~ois-Poncet (D)(Parti Rep. Democratique et Social)** 
Interieur ................. Pierre Cathala (D)(gauche sociale et radicale/radical independant) 
Beaux-Arts ................................ Maurice Petsche (D)(republicain de gauche) 
Colonies ............................................ Blaise Diagne (D)(independant) 
Agricuture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Achille Fould (D)(URD) 
Commerce ............................ Charles Frey (D)(action d6mocratique et sociale) 
Travaux publics et Tourisme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gaston Gerard (D)(gauche radicale) 
Travail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maurice Foulon (D)(no label) 
Air ..................................... Etienne Riche (D)(gauche sociale et radicale) 
483 Note that the political label is only given as an indication and should not be taken as an absolute. 
Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 41-42. Jacquemin, La Vie Publique, 73-74. Dictionnaire 
Biographique Fran9ais, 276, 380. Dictionnaire de la politique Fran9aise, Henry Coston, pub. (Paris: la 
Librairie fran~aise, 1967). 
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Marine Marchande ............................ Pierre Dignac (D)(republicain de gauche) 
Education physique ...................... Emile Morinaud (D)(gauche sociale et radicale) 
Enseignement technique ...................... Charles Pomaret (D)(republicain socialiste) 
May 1931 
Representation of the same to the new president Paul Doumer 
12-14 January, 1932 
Few changes after Aristide Briand's retirement and the death of Andre Maginot on 7 January 
1932: 
Presidence du Conseil & Affaires Etrangeres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pierre Laval 
Guerre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Andre Tardieu 
Interieur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pierre Cathala 
Agriculture ......................................................... Achille Fould 
(S) Senator 
(D) Deputy 
*URD =Union republicaine democratique 
**Andre Franc;ois-Poncet upon becoming ambassador to Germany was replaced by C.-J. 
Gignoux (D) (Action democratique et sociale). 
164 
Appendix B 
French presidents and Premiers 
from 18 February 1906 to 10 July 1940484 
Armand F ALLIERES : president du 18 fevrier 1906 au 18 fevrier 1913 
•Maurice ROUVIER (3) du 18 fev. 1906 au 7 mars 1906 
•Ferdinand SARRIEN (1) du 14 mars 1906 au 20 oet. 1906 
•Georges CLEMENCEAU (1) du 25 oct. 1906 au 20 juil. 1909 
•Aristide BRIAND (1) du 24 juil. 1909 au 2 nov. 1910 
•Aristide BRIAND (2) du 4 nov. 1910 au 27 fev. 1911 
•Ernest MONIS (1) du 2 mars 1911au23 juin 1911 
•Joseph CAILLAUX (1) du 27 juin 1911au11 jan. 1912 
•Raymond POINCARE (1) du 14 jan. 1912 au 21jan.1913 
•Aristide BRIAND (3) du 21 jan. 1913 au 18 fev. 1913 
Raymond POINCARE: president du 18 fevrier 1913 au 18 fevrier 1920 
•Aristide BRIAND (4) du 18 fev. 1913 au 18 mars 1913 
•Louis BARTHOU (1) du 22 mars 1913 au 2 dee. 1913 
•Gaston DOUMERGUE (1) du 9 dee. 1913 au 2 juin 1914 
•Alexandre RIBOT (4) du 9 juin 1914 au 12juin 1914 
•Rene VIVIANI (1) du 13 juin 1914 au 26 juil. 1914 
•Rene VIVIANI (2) du 26 juil. 1914 au 29 oet. 1915 
•Aristide BRIAND (5) du 29 oet. 1915 au 12 dee. 1916 
•Aristide BRIAND (6) du 12 dee. 1916 au 17 mars 1917 
•Alexandre RIBOT (5) du 20 mars 1917 au 7 sept. 1917 
•Paul PAINLEVE (1) du 12 sept. 1917 au 13 nov. 1917 
•Georges CLEMENCEAU (2) du 16 nov. 1917 au 18 jan. 1920 
•Alexandre MILLBRAND (1) du 20 jan. 1920 au 18 fev. 1920 
Paul DESCHANEL : president du 17 fevrier 1920 au 21 septembre 1920 
•Alexandre MILLBRAND (2) du 18 fev. 1920 au 23 sept. 1920 
Alexandre MILLBRAND : president du 23 sept. 1920 au 11 juin 1924 
•Georges LEYGUES (1) du 24 sept. 1920 au 12jan. 1921 
• Aristide BRIAND (7) du 16 jan. 1921 au 12 jan. 1922 
484 Gouvernement France, Premier Ministre, Chronologie des Gouvernements sous la Ille Republique, 
Adit, Agence pour la Diffusion de !'information Technologique, ed. 
(http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/), 3-5. 
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• Raymond POINCARE (2) du 15 jan. 1922 au 29 mars 1924 
•Raymond POINCARE (3) du 29 mars 1924 au ler juin 1924 
• Frederic FRAN<;OIS-MARCHAL (1) du 8 juin 1924 au 10 juin 1924 
Gaston DOUMERGUE : president du 13 juin 1924 au 13 juin 1931 
•Edouard HERRIOT (1) du 14 juin 1924 au 10 avr. 1925 
• Paul P AINLEVE (2) du 17 avr. 1925 au 27 oct. 1925 
• Paul P AINLEVE (3) du 29 oct. 1925 au 22 nov. 1925 
•Aristide BRIAND (8) du 28 nov. 1925 au 6 mars 1926 
• Aristide BRIAND (9) du 9 mars 1926 au 15 juin 1926 
• Aristide BRIAND (10) du 23 juin 1926 au 17 juil. 1926 
•Edouard HERRIOT (2) du 19 juil. 1926 au 21 juil. 1926 
•Raymond POINCARE (4) du 23 juil. 1926 au 6 nov. 1928 
•Raymond POINCARE (5) du 18 nov. 1928 au 26 juil. 1929 
• Aristide BRIAND (11) du 29 juil. 1929 au 22 oct. 1929 
•Andre TARDIEU (1) du 3 nov. 1929 au 17 fev. 1930 
•Camille CHAUTEMPS (1) du 21fev.1930 au 25 fev. 1930 
• Andre TARDIEU (2) du 2 mars 1930 au 4 dee. 1930 
•Theodore STEEG (1) du 13 dee. 1930 au 22jan. 1931 
•Pierre LAV AL (1) du 27 jan. 1931 au 13 juin 1931 
Paul DOUMER: president du 13 mai 1931au6 mai 1932, assassine 
•Pierre LAVAL (2) du 13 juin 1931au12jan. 1932 
•Pierre LAVAL (3) du 14 jan. 1932 au 16 fev. 1932 
•Andre TARDIEU (3) du 20 fev 1932 au 10 mai 1932 
Albert LEBRUN : president du 10 mai 1932 au 1 o juillet 1940, reelu 
•Edouard HERRIOT (3) du 3 juin 1932 au 14 dee. 1932 
•Joseph PAUL BONCOURT (1) du 18 dee. 1932 au 28 jan. 1933 
•Edouard DALADIER (1) du 31 jan. 1933 au 24 oct. 1933 
•Albert SARRAUT (1) du 26 oct. 1933 au 24 nov. 1933 
•Camille CHAUTEMPS (2) du 26 nov. 1933 au 27 jan. 1934 
•Edouard DALADIER (2) du 30 jan. 1934 au 7 fev. 1934 
•Gaston DOUMERGUE (2) du 9 fev. 1934 au 8 nov. 1934 
•Pierre-Etienne FLANDIN (1) du 8 nov. 1934 au 31mai1935 
• Femand BOUISSON (1) du ler juin 1935 au 4 juin 1935 
• Pierre LAV AL ( 4) du 7 juin 1935 au 22 jan. 1936 
• Albert SARRA UT (2) du 24 jan. 1936 au 4 juin 1936 
•Leon BLUM (1) du 4 juin 1936 au 21juin1937 
•Camille CHAUTEMPS (3) du 29 juin 1937 au 14 jan. 1938 
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•Camille CHAUTEMPS (4) du 18jan. 1938 au 10 mars 1938 
•Leon BLUM (2) du 13 mars 1938 au 8 avr. 1938 
•Edouard DALADIER (3) du 12 avr. 1938 au 11mai1939 
•Edouard DALADIER (4) du 11mai1939 au 14 sept. 1939 
•Edouard DALADIER (5) du 14 sep. 1939 au 20 mars 1940 
•Paul REYNAUD (1) du 22 mars 1940 au 16 juin 1940 
•Philippe PETAIN (1) du 16 juin 1940 au 11 juil. 1940 
Regime de Vichy (10 juillet 1940 - 2 novembre 1945) 
Gouvemement provisoire de la Republique fran<;aise (3 juin 1944 - 2 novembre 1945) 
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AppendixC 
Notes on the Third Republic; 
Constitutional laws, Institutions and the party system 
France's Third Republic was born in 1875. Its constitutional laws were drafted 
not so much as a reaction to the previous regime -- Napoleon Ill's empire -- but as a 
compromise between the dominant forces of the Republicans, the Conservatives, the 
Monarchists and the Bonapartists. The Republicans upheld the universal suffrage and the 
national assembly, the Monarchists the presidency and the senate. The Royalists were in 
this unusual position of supporting a presidency because the pretenders -- Henri Comte de 
Chambord (Bourbon) and Henri Comte de Paris (Orleans) -- did not dare seize the power 
within their reach. The Royalists hoped that the house of Orleans would eventually 
produce a King who would, in time, take the place of the president. 
From this compromise was born a republic with a chamber of deputies, a senate, 
and a president. The deputies and eventually all the senators were elected by direct 
universal suffrage. The president was elected by the joint chambers. The president had 
the power to name the premier and to dissolve the chambers. The extent of the power of 
the presidency was tested in 1877. President Patrice de MacMahon challenged the 
Republican majority by choosing as premier the Due de Broglie, defender of order and 
religion against Republican anti-clericalism. De Broglie was also an Orleanist. The 
Republicans won the elections, establishing the sovereignty of the National Assembly. 
The Senate, which had been sought by the conservatives and the monarchists as a 
bulwark against the National Assembly, would rapidly evolve through the pressure of the 
Universal Suffrage into a republican institution as well. 
The President would at best exert a power of influence. With rare exeptions, such 
as Raymond Poincarre, the presidents chosen by the combined chambers were not 
significant politicians. Their greatest quality was often not to have offended anyone. 
The executive power rested with the President du Conseil des Ministres (Premier) 
and the ministers. "They were responsible to both houses and were obliged to 
countersign (individually) every act of the President."485 This meant that the defection of 
one minister could cause the collapse of the entire government. Although not mandated 
by the constitution, ministers would normally resign over the defeat of a measure. This 
4ss Chris Cook and John Paxton European Political Facts, 1918-1973 (Macmillan Press LTD, New York, 
1975), 54. 
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explains why "between 1870 and 1934 France had no less than 88 ministries with an 
average life of less than nine months"486 
The executive was further weakened by the party fragmentation. Modem political 
parties did not develop until the tum of the century. The tables below only show a 
portion of the party division in 1928 and 1932, as parties such as the Union republicaine 
democratique were often asssociations of like-minded parties. The division between right 
and left is highly subjective when it came to the center parties such as the Radicaux 
Socialistes who shifted their weigth from one side of the assembly to the other as 
circumstances dictated. 
The political labels could also be misleading: the Republicains de Gauche (Left 
Republicans), for example, was one of the conservative parties. The gauche label 
probably meant they were not Catholic. The religious divide among the conservative 
parties signified that a government of the Right was never sustainable for long. One 
should also know that conservatives in France endorsed centralized government; by the 
same token the Socialists did not want the collectivization of the land since a large 
portion of their electorate in the south were independent farmers. To further complicate 
matters the politicians did not always keep their political labels from one election to the 
next. Perhaps the most unusual behavior was exhibited by the true leftist parties such as 
the Socialists and communists who would often refuse to participate in or head a 
government for governing was decidedly too Bourgeois. 
Though the Third Republic was only suspended in July 1940, it did not survive 
the war, it officially came to an end on 2 November 1945 giving way to the Fourth 
Republic. The Fourth Republic suffered the same instability as the previous republic, it 
experienced twenty-five cabinets from its investiture on 27 October 1946 to its abrogation 
on 4 October 1958. The Fifth Republic, under the guidance of De Gaulle, was given a 
very strong executive power in the person of a president elected by direct universal 
suffrage for seven years. France has since then enjoyed great stability, only experiencing 
twenty-one governments over the last forty years. 
486 Ibid. 
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The Mai 1928 legislative elections, victory of the Right487 
11,396,000 registered voters 
9,470,000 voted 
Seats in the National Assembly 
Conservateurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Union republicaine democrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
Independants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Republicain de gauche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 O I 
Democrates Populaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
Radicaux independants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
Radicaux socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 
Republicains socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
Socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 
Socialistes communistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Communistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 0 
The October 1929 senatorial elections488 
Seats in the Senate 
Droite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Union republicaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
Union democratique et radicale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
Gauche republicame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Gauche democratique radicale et radicale socialiste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 
Socialistes (SFIO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Non-Inscrits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
The Mai 1932 legislative elections, victory of the Left489 
11,561,751 registered voters 
9,579,482 voted 
Seats in the National Assembly 
Conservateurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Union republicaine democrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 
Independants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Republicain de gauche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
Democrates Populaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
Radicaux independants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
Radicaux socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 
Republicains socialistes ............................................................... 37 
Socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 
Socialistes communistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
Communistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
487 Numbers are given as an indication only. Peter Campbell, French Electoral Systems and Elections 
since 1789 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965), 99. Chris Cook and John Paxton, European 
Political Facts, 1918-73 (New York: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1975), 122. 
488 Numbers are given as an indication only. Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire Politique, tome quatrieme, 
202, 367. 
489 Numbers are given as an indication only. Peter Campbell, French Electoral Systems, 99. Chris Cook 
and John Paxton, European Political Facts, 122. Bonnefous, Histoire Politique, tome cinquieme, 119-20. 
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AppendixD 
1931 Man of the Year: 
Pierre Laval490 
This article appeared in "Man of the Year" issue featuring Pierre Laval as he 
might have appeared in 1931 by the Americans, inaccuracies included. 
On the last day of 1931, who loomed calm, masterful and popular as Man of the 
Year? 
"It has been a lean year for everyone," said Prime Minister James Ramsay 
MacDonald with suppressed emotion. Then, faced by the conference.that is to meet Jan. 
18 to do something about Reparations, he burst out, "For God's sake let us meet now!" 
"From this terrifying spectacle which the world presents we must raise our eyes to 
Heaven!" cried Pope Pius XI in his Christmas message. "It is to be feared that God will 
leave men to themselves and that would be most terrible ruin. 11 
The year 1931 pitched even Colonel Lindbergh into heathen waters; sent 
Mahatma Gandhi disgruntled back to India; faced Josef Stalin with ragged gaps in the 
Five-Year Plan; failed to produce a Fascist government under Adolf Hitler (potential Man 
of 1932). But who rose from obscurity to world prominence, steered a Great Power safely 
through 1931, closed the year on a peak of popularity among his countrymen? 
Only one man did these things and at the height of his sudden greatness wagged 
an explanatory finger at President Hoover. The keynote of 1931 was sounded by 
Man-of-the-Year Pierre Laval as he sailed for Washington: "A severe correctional and 
disciplinary period is indicated." 
French Coolidge. Twelve months ago Pierre Laval was as obscure -- even in 
France -- as Governor Calvin Coolidge before the Boston police strike. 
Swart as a Greek, this compact little Auvergnat (son of a village butcher in 
Auvergne, south-central France) was a Senator of no party, an Independent. The public 
neither knew that he always wears a white wash tie (cheapest and unfading) nor cared to 
490 
"1931 Man of the Year: Pierre Laval" Time, 4 January 1932 was generated from RTF source by 
rtftohtml version 2. 7 .1 through America-On-Line. 
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figure out that his name spells itself backward as well as forward. Addicted to scowling, 
didactic (he once taught school), possessed of mellow but unexciting voice, identified 
with no conspicuous cause or movement, Senator Laval was also too young to be 
noticeable in France in January 1931. He was only 4 7 and France likes its Premiers to be 
over 60. The extreme youth of Pierre Laval was made glaring by the fact that France had 
just dispensed with a Premier whom many considered "much too ym~ng," brilliant Andre 
Tardieu, 54, whose Cabinet was brought down by the Oustric scandal. 
Worst of all, a good many Frenchmen who had vaguely heard of "The Man in the 
White Tie" understood that during the War he was a slacker and afterwards a Communist. 
In 1914, being already Mayor of the proletarian Paris suburb of Aubervilliers, he was 
elected to the Chamber of Deputies by his old constituents as a Socialist. He did not 
enlist in the Army. When drafted he served briefly at the front [sic] as a common poilu. 
His Socialist views caused him to orate directly after the War against the Treaty of 
Versailles. In 1919 he lost his seat as Deputy, quarreled with some of his Socialist 
colleagues, remained friendly with others and is said to have been briefly enrolled at one 
time as both a Socialist [sic] and a Communist [sic], not being sure which way the cat of 
popular sentiment would jump [sic]. 
Aubervilliers was the irresolute young statesman's salvation. He was and he 
remains today Mayor of Aubervilliers. Unshakably rooted in this Paris suburb he 
cultivated the friends he had made as a Deputy, notably that bald, enigmatic millionaire 
Joseph Caillaux, onetime Premier. In 1924 Mayor Laval again sought and won election as 
a Deputy, not as a Socialist this time but as a moderate Republican. 
Shrewd Aubervilliers understood. Her beloved Pierre was doffing his radical cap 
and putting on a moderate political coat to match those of his moneyed friends. Why not? 
Great Aristide Briand had made exactly the same switch; so had Alexandre Millerand, 
President of the Republic. 
Less than a year later the Auvergnat, diligent in his attendance upon both M. 
Caillaux and M. Briand, was rewarded by the minor portfolio of Public Works in a 
Painleve Cabinet which starred Foreign Minister Briand and Finance Minister Caillaux. 
When Patron Briand shortly came in as Premier he took Protege Laval under his wing, 
gave him a course in Chamber intrigue as secretary general of the Prime Minister's office, 
graduated him prematurely in 1926 as Minister of Justice. 
Unfortunately Premier Briand had no head for finance. The collapse of the franc 
drove him back to his favorite post of Foreign Minister. In came great Premier Raymond 
Poincare to save the franc, and incidentally to blight the careers of several Briand 
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satellites. Ousted Pierre Laval contrived to get himself elected a Senator from the 
Department of the Seine (which he has since represented). He dropped back for several 
years into obscurity as a quiet Independent. Still close to Old Brer Briand, he also made 
himself close to Young Andre Tardieu. 
In 1929-30 the Tardieu skyrocket went up, twice. In the first Tardieu Cabinet 
there was no Pierre Laval; in the second he was unobtrusively Minister of Labor; and 
when this Cabinet fell his chance almost came. Briand and Tardieu both insisted that 
Laval be asked to form a Cabinet. He tried and he failed, because by a typical quirk of 
"loyalty to my friend Andre" (Tardieu) he insisted that in a Cabinet of which he was 
Premier his friend must be a Minister. To form a cabinet including Friend Andre at that 
moment proved impossible. Again M. Laval slipped into obscurity; but 1931 was just 
around the comer. Briefly Theodore Steeg, former French Resident General of Morocco, 
headed a shaky, stop-gap Cabinet. 
Laval's Year. On the morning of Jan. 24, 1931 there was again a French crisis. 
The Steeg Cabinet had fallen following charges that the Minister of Agriculture had 
speculated in wheat. Importunate telegrams flashed from the President's Palace to Brer 
Briand at Geneva begging him to become Premier for the twelfth time. 
Surfeited with such honors Briand wired his courteous but absolute refusal, 
suggesting Pierre Laval. By this time the Oustric scandal was somewhat cold, the 
constantly shifting line- up of the Chamber had altered, and sturdy Auvergnat Laval was 
able not only to form a Cabinet but to smuggle into it as Minister of Agriculture his 
friend Andre Tardieu. 
Thoroughly befuddled were such correspondents as supposed Andre Tardieu to be 
roughly ten times as big a man as Pierre Laval. One cabled: "The Tardieu Cabinet has 
been reformed with Laval as Premier." Others assumed that Protege Laval would dance 
inevitably to Patron Briand's tunes. Scarcely anyone realized the tremendous will-to-rule 
of the Man of the Year. Perhaps Georges Mandel, long the most intimate colleague of 
"Tiger" Clemenceau, had a glimmering of what was coming. "The Laval Cabinet has 
nothing to fear," he wrote. "It will last if it gives the impression that it is working .... This 
country likes a Government that really governs." 
Straight through 1931, while other Premiers or Presidents hesitated, wavered and 
in some cases fell, Pierre Laval gave month after month the consistent impression that he 
and his Government were working, are working: 
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February: Just getting into his stride, Premier Laval leaned on the stooped 
shoulder of old Brer Briand in Chamber debate, backed him in pledging France to 
observe the One-year Naval Holiday proposed by Foreign Minister Dino Grandi ofltaly. 
March: Faced by Red riots in French Indo-China, the Premier convened the High 
Colonial Council in Paris for the first time in three years and studied critically the results 
of guillotining 700 native Communists in the past two years--with the result that Minister 
of Colonies Paul Reynaud is now in the Far East "sympathetically examining native 
grievances." 
April: Foreign Minister Aristide Briand's conciliatory policy toward Germany 
having been discredited in French eyes by the revelation that Germany and Austria 
planned a zollverein (customs union), Premier Laval put tactful pressure on his own 
Foreign Office, forcing Old Brer Briand to take a "stronger line" which later forced 
zollverein into the World Court, where it died. 
May: When the Chamber and Senate sit together as the National Assembly at 
Versailles and vote for the President of France, who shall vote first is determined by 
opening the dictionary at random. Last spring the dictionary opened at L. Alphabetically 
no other L name in the National Assembly could beat Laval. Having cast the first vote 
Premier Laval saw his shaggy old mentor Aristide Briand heartbreakingly defeated for 
the Presidency, which fell to water-drinking, penny-pinching Paul Doumer. 
Opening in May the French Colonial Exposition proved phenomenally successful 
in a bad year, strengthened the "impression" that the Laval Cabinet was "working." 
June: Premier Laval showed his tough Auvergnat mettle by holding up the 
Hoover One-Year Moratorium single-handed, hurling his famed defy--"President Hoover 
can entrench himself behind his Congress and I can entrench myself ~ehind the 
Chamber"--and hanging on doggedly until the Moratorium was modified into a form 
acceptable to France. 
July: M. Laval signed the Moratorium Accord after negotiations at the French 
Foreign Office with Statesman Stimson and Secretary Mellon, "to which Briand was 
brought in like an aged grandmother whom it is desired not to leave out of the family 
festivities," as venomous "Pertinax" remarked in L'Echo de Paris. 
August: The Premier in his character of Worker, Driver, Leader recuperated in the 
grand manner by taking the cure at Vichy where go so many French, United States and 
British tycoons. 
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September: Taking Old Brer Briand in tow, Premier Laval junketed to Berlin, 
conferred with Chancellor Brilning and Foreign Minister Curtis (since resigned), 
achieved little or nothing, but boosted his fame enormously and is said to have made a 
warm friend of Dr. Brilning. ("What a man!" Visitor Laval exclaimed to beaming German 
newshawks. "I wish there were more such men in France!") 
October: Leaving his Foreign Minister and his wife behind and taking his 
daughter Josee (Josette to him) along, Pierre Laval made the journey to Washington. D.C. 
that stamped his name upon millions of United States minds and swelled his fame 
throughout the world. 
President Hoover is well known to dislike almost all Frenchmen. He and Premier 
Laval had high words which they called "free and frank." Smoking United States cigarets 
at the furious rate of 80 per day, the didactic Frenchman in striped trousers, black jacket, 
white tie and suede-topped buttoned shoes wagged his short forefinger at the President in 
high-laced shoes and conservative business suit, making hotly such points as that France 
will not stand for having another Moratorium thrust forward from the United States 
"suddenly and brutally." (Never understood in the United States, the French position was 
and still is that President Hoover had a perfect right to be as "sudden" as he liked about 
sacrificing for one year $257,000,000 due the United States (that being his own business 
and Congress not being in session): but that the President had no right "brutally" to insist 
that France make a similar abrupt sacrifice of $97,000,000, that being Premier Laval's 
business and the French Chamber being not only in session but twice as angry as 
Congress when Congress finally convened and voted.) Equally blunt was Mr. Hoover, 
according to some reports, in challenging the French thesis of "Security before 
Disarmament," insisting on "real disarmament" when the Disarmament Conference 
meets. 
Concrete result of the White House negotiations was almost nil, Premier Laval 
departing vastly puffed and pleased by a verbal agreement that he should summon the 
German Ambassador on his return to Paris and start Germany taking the initiative for a 
final settlement of her troubles by appealing under the Young Plan for a committee to 
study them, which has now been done. 
November: The complete dominance of Premier Laval over what was once 
supposed to be someone else's Cabinet was dramatically pointed up when 69-year-old 
Aristide Briand collapsed in the Chamber Nov. 17 and lay for a few moments crumpled 
down upon his desk. As chairman of the League Council (both before and after this 
collapse) Old Brer Briand lost further prestige by failing utterly to restrain the aggression 
of Japan in Manchuria. Meanwhile short Premier Laval and his tremendously tall, broad-
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shouldered and aggressive Finance Minister, Pierre Etienne Flandin, were fighting 
through the Chamber their fiscal program for next year. 
December: Chamber and Senate passed not only numerous routine Budget bills 
and the like but also approved several highly controversial steps involving the personal 
prestige of Premier Laval and Finance Minister Flandin: 
1) The loaning from the Treasury to the Bank of France of $100,000,000 to cover 
the Bank's present paper loss on Sterling which it still holds. Premier Laval, it was 
revealed, kept the Bank under pressure during the summer to "stand by the pound" when 
its directors wanted to sell Sterling. 
2) The loaning of $12,000,000 to the French Line to complete their unnamed 
super-super-liner. 
3) The adoption of a $140,000,000 program of public works to relieve French 
unemployment, two-thirds of this sum to be furnished by the Treasur"y and one-third by 
local bodies. According to Laval Cabinet official estimates there are unemployed some 
500,000 Frenchmen, compared to some 7,200,000 United States citizens. 
On Christmas Eve the Chamber gave Premier Laval a straight vote of confidence 
315 to 255, then adjourned to the second Tuesday in January, leaving the Man of the year 
unshaken, triumphant. How great is his achievement may be measured by the fact that 
only four French Premiers since the War have been able to remain in power for as much 
as one year. 
Pierre Laval in his year-end public address at Chapelle-la- Reine nailed to his 
Cabinet's mast a French policy (practical or impractical) respecting Reparations which 
was endorsed next day by virtually the whole French press: "We will not allow 
Reparations to be sacrificed to private debts!" 
"Tenez hon! Hold tight!" shouted a delighted auditor. 
"I always do!" cried the Man-of-the-Year. "We will not let the Young Plan be tom 
up!" 
Nation of the Year? France closed 1931 with vastly greater gold stocks than any 
other European state (the United States has half again as much); she could count her 
unemployed in hundreds of thousands while Britain and Germany counted theirs in 
millions; but her trade balance has turned adverse: her United Statesmeric tourists 
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dwindled from 300,000 in 1929 to 100,000 in 1931. The conviction is strong among 
Frenchmen that they are just entering hard times. 
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